Iran and the Arab States: Where Do They Stand in Middle East Affairs?
![Iran and the Arab States: Where Do They Stand in Middle East Affairs?](/images/www/en/news/news-primary/2010/salmansafavi.jpg)
It is the Arab countries’ conviction that Iran is trying to redouble its regional hegemony. The project launched at the Annapolis Conference –which was unfortunately ignored by Iran- is aimed at bringing the U.S., Israel and the whole gamut of Arab states closer together in a united camp against Iran. In this project, Iran is defined as the biggest regional threat, a position Israel held for decades. In the military phase of the project, Washington has planned a defense umbrella for the Persian Gulf states. It also increased the number of Patriot missiles installed in Kuwait, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Bahrain.
Meanwhile, Iran is involved in a regional competition with Saudi Arabia and Egypt. For Cairo and Riyadh, Tehran’s regional interests (particularly in Palestine and Lebanon) are at odds with their plans. Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq are inherently Arab issues, they firmly believe, which should be kept away from the intervention of non-Arab states. Iran’s responses to that premise are as follows: if so, why did Egypt impose a blockade on Gaza in coordination with Israel? Or why did the Saudi King –Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques- remain silent when Israel was reducing Gaza to rubble? For Iran, the Palestinian cause is at its root a humanitarian and Islamic concern that calls for the engagement of all countries, not just the Arabs.
Another Arab illusion is the so-called Shi’a Crescent. That label was first employed by King Abdullah of Jordan in an interview with Der Spiegel, to describe Iran’s alleged plan to form a Shi’a belt from Tehran to Beirut through the support of Islamist liberation movements. What Abdullah (and those like him) have flagrantly overlooked is the price Iran has paid to date, just for supporting the Sunni Palestinians. The Shi’as’ intended hegemony is an age-old colonialist plot whose benefits are reaped by Western countries. Iran’s support of two Sunni states –Bosnia and Afghanistan- is perhaps the best negation of this theory. And in Lebanon, Iran has proved that it supports the interests of the whole Lebanese nation, regardless of religious or ethnic orientations. Iran’s interests in Iraq are best served by the formation of a united Iraq, one released from religious or ethnic biases. There, Iran has established warm ties with Sunni Kurds and any Arab politician, as long as they’re not on Washington’s payroll.
Smaller Arab states, who lack the potential to challenge Iran, have no alternative but to tilt toward one of the competing poles. Qatar –engaged in territorial disputes with Saudi Arabia- has simultaneously established ties with Tehran, Tel Aviv, and Washington to balance its position vis-à-vis the Saudis. Kuwait, on the other hand, orchestrates its moves with Riyadh and its attitude toward Iran can be best described as a ‘fragile trust’. In Bahrain, the sheikhs of the island believe that Iran still views their country as its 14th province (which it did, up until 1971), and would like to try to bring the majority Shi’as to power. Fearing Iran, Bahrain –which has a population of less than one million- has taken refuge in the arms of the United States and Saudi Arabia (although the winds of change may be coming, with frequent visits between Iranian and Bahraini officials).
Why do the Arabs keep ignoring the fact that Israel and the U.S. are the real threats in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf? Perhaps it’s time to review a little history: since 1948, Israel has led six major wars against Arab countries while Iran has led none. Tehran even supported Kuwait during Saddam Hussein’s attack in 1991. The United States, the Arabs’ big brother, has always sided with the illegitimate interests of Israel; Iran has not. Unfortunately, the Arab states’ distance from Iran is tantamount to their proximity to the Tel Aviv-Washington axis. An intelligent diplomacy by peace activists and the political elite could illuminate the disadvantages of a friendship with Israel.
Nevertheless, the prospect of war between Iran and the U.S. is extremely frightening for the Arabs, who know that they will be the first victims of such a conflict. As their experience tells them not to, the Arabs will hardly encourage the U.S. to attack Iran. That is the basic difference between them and Israel. That fact, however, does not stop the Arabs from tracking Iran’s nuclear program with concern, or carrying out orchestrated pressure on Iran along with Israel and the United States. The failure of Iran’s diplomatic apparatus to neutralize the propaganda against its peaceful nuclear program, and to properly inform Arab countries about the nature of its nuclear projects, is glaring in these circumstances.
For Iran, hoping to wean Arab countries off Washington in the short-term would be vain. However, they can be better informed about Israeli threats and Iran’s regional agenda –which is everything but regime change in their countries. Transparent, constructive talks between Iran and the Arab states, besides an intelligent, rational diplomacy based on mutual interests, can reduce tensions and turn destructive competition into constructive cooperation. This might be how we can achieve a more stable Middle East.
Seyyed Salman Safavi is an Iranian political observer and head of the London Academy of Iranian Studies.