Fluctuating Situation

 

 

The biggest body of land in the world is between Gibraltar and Kamchatka Peninsula on the western coast of the Pacific Ocean. This body of land comprises Asia and Europe and the Middle East and Africa are connected to it like two protuberances. This body of land is named Eurasia and the biggest portion of it is in hands of one country; i.e. Russia. Although 15 countries were born out of Soviet Union’s dissolution, but the Federation of Russia is still the biggest country of the world and across its vast territory it possesses all the elements Mendeleyev, the Russian scientist, introduced in his periodical table.

With an area of 17.1 million square kilometers, Russia is the living place of 145.7 million people, 85 percent of which belong to the Russian ethnicity. Although this federation consists of 89 regions and autonomous republics, the majority of population lives in the west of Ural Mountains.

After dissolution, separatism became impending when in Caucasia tens of thousands of Chechnyans were killed in a bloody battle that lasted from 1994 to 1996. This unrest resumed in 1999 and it is still taking the lives of Chechenyan citizens and Russian military.

Russia possesses about 49 billion barrels of oil that is %5 of the total global volume. Also it owns the largest gas resource of the world which is one-third of the total volume. Large cooperative or state-run farms exist all across the country, but this country has always relied on international aids to provide its food.

%76 of the population lives in cities. Currently the biggest privatization process of the world is carried out in Russia. From spatial missiles to small stores, everything is going to be privatized. The Russian government has even ordered military sector to do the marketing and sales for their products themselves.

 

After the 1917 October Revolution and collapse of the Russian Empire, the foreign policy of Soviet Union gradually became the result of interaction between Soviet Union’s national interests and the Communist ideology. The more this revolution settled down, the more manifest became the essence of Karl Marx’s motto -Proletariat doesn’t have a country- in the processes of USSR’s foreign policies, the revolutions staged and in different Communist and Socialist regimes across the world.

The foreign policy of Soviet Union was decided to have a collective structure from the beginning and Foreign Commissar replaced Foreign Minister. In general, during its 75 years of existence, Soviet Union focused its foreign policy on the expansion of international Communism and liberation of the universal working class along serving USSR’s national interests.

After WWII Stalin became the most successful of Allies’ leaders and expanded his sphere of influence from Bring Strait to Brandenburg Gate at the heart of Berlin. Rivalry between Soviet Union and the United States in post-World War era continued by means of the Cold War and strategies such as peaceful coexistence, détente and deterrence. Throughout all these years, Soviet Union’s foreign policy sought to assist Kremlin with all the problems it faced within the union and its dominions. For example Gorbachev’s proposal to Reagan in Reykjavik’s 1986 summit on entire dismantlement of the two superpowers’ nuclear weapons was in fact an attempt to prevent further declination of USSR’s economy.

Russia’s foreign policy during the Soviet era was ideologically oriented. After dissolution of Soviet Union, the country’s foreign policy became cleared from ideology but it didn’t emancipate from dominant theories of the Bolshevist era. This mainly was due to the theoretical vacuum after 1992. Russian theoreticians couldn’t introduce a new theory to replace Marxism as the official theory of social sciences, especially when the post-Cold War challenges were drastically different from that of past.

On the other hand, the foreign policy body had to face realities that happened around the world every day and they had to react to and take a stand about them. In the absence of mature theories, Russian politicians focused on applied theories. Another reason for this problem was that during the Communist era various academies traditionally acted as study and research centers. With collapse of USSR, the living conditions of researchers drastically declined. Inevitably, to earn a living, most of the researchers tended to collaborate with media, especially radio, television and press that were somehow in relation with West and had less financial problems.

Few individuals were left in the academies to form theories in the field of foreign policy. Most of the Russian scientists immigrated to other countries in an atmosphere of despair. That’s how individuals per se, their perspectives and political and historical orientation found an important role in Russia’s foreign policy and every single change or replacement in the diplomatic body resulted in surprising turns.

 

Based on individuals and their role in Russia, there are two major strategies in foreign policy: Atlanticist and Eurasianist.

1.                  Atlanticists: a small but powerful group of Russian officials and intellectuals that tend towards pro-West strategies for Moscow. Andrey Kozyrev, the first Foreign Minister of Russian Federation (August 1991-December 1992) was one of the most renowned figures of this group. During the first half of Yeltsin’s 8-year presidency in the 1990s, this policy was actualized. Officials who follow this theory believe that the main objective of Russia’s foreign policy should be facilitation of joining democratic countries which have a liberal economy.

Of course this should be accomplished without any discriminatory pressure, for example in joining NATO. Russia initiated this process by joining Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Russia believed that this organization can establish security from Vancouver to Vladivostok. During the pro-West group’s rule, Russia secured its ties with EU, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and G7. On the other hand, this group believed that it is better for Russia to decrease its activities in former republics of Soviet Union, called Near Abroad.

Gradually and because of discrepancy between this strategy and realities in the global scene –the most important of which was West’s lack of commitment to promises given to Kremlin officials at the brink of USSR’s dissolution- the followers of this strategy split into two groups:

b.     Liberal politicians: this group believed that in addition to engaging in a civil dialogue with West, Russia can maintain normal relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

Due to the historical background if this attitude, that was based on immigration and settlement of Russians in vast plains of Eastern Europe, Caucasia, Western, Northern and Central Asia from old times up to the beginning of 20th century, they argued that Russia is a unique country that does not belong only to Europe throughout the history, but has been a bridge between East and West civilizations. Fundamentally it also presents a novel lifestyle, different from that of East and West. With the spread of this mentality, it also divided into different branches among Russian intellectuals:

Russia is in need of sustained ties with East and West. But just like Mackinder’s Heartland Theory, Eurasia is the primary sphere for foreign policy of Russia and the other regions of the world are periphery. This group has a special view towards the national interests of Russia and believes that these have been predetermined by Russian geography, history, culture and morality.

Sergei Stankevich, one of the Eurasian Reformist theoreticians believes that security lies within the concept of national interests. Concepts such as self-defense, prevention of another dissolution, formation of a federal democratic system that precludes dictatorship and secessionism and guaranteeing security for Russian minority that live in Near Abroad, all must be objectives of Russia’s foreign policy. According to this group two types of countries must be in Russia’s priority: CIS countries and Eastern European countries.

On Russian minority that lives in former Soviet republics or Eastern Europe, they believe that maintaining their security must be prioritized and even military power can be used for this cause. Asian neighbors of Russia in south and east must be also given full attention in the country’s foreign policy.

In their view, the priority in foreign policy must be given to Near Abroad and they even believe in gradual commercial, economic and military reunion with CIS countries. They defend ties with West only when it respects Russia’s interests in its sphere of influence that is mainly in Near Abroad. They look at Russia-West ties suspiciously and do not regard West capable of aiding Russia.

Instead, Russia can supply what it wants by export of arms and energy. In their opinion West believes that Russia is gradually retaking control of Soviet sphere of influence, this time by legal, economic and security approaches like what has happened in Belorussia, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. So West may try new ways to control Russia. This group criticizes NATO’s expansion towards east and deems it as a measure that can trigger Russia and West’s collision.

 

During the recent years Russia’s foreign policy has faced various changes. Yeltsin and his foreign minister’s pro-West attitude shifted to more realistic view of Yevgeni Primakov and afterwards Eurasian attitude of Vladimir Putin. With these shifts, Russia’s foreign policy regarding Southern and Asian countries became highly important. That’s because basic parameters of Russia-West ties were predetermined by Russia’s framework of European perspective, but the conditions that rule the southernmost region connecting Europe and Asia are still changing and apparently don’t follow a established pattern.