The Supreme Leadership Is Not Against Détente with the US

IRD: Mr. Ahmadinejad made new claims about 9/11 in his UN General Assembly speech. Of course, conspiracy theories about 9/11 have been around since the early days after the catastrophe. On the other hand, Mr. Ahmadinejad called for unconditional talks with the Five plus One in New York, one week after he had demanded the inclusion of Turkey and Brazil in nuclear negotiations with the six world powers. He also indicated a green light for direct talks with Washington. How do you explain these paradoxes?

SK: Clarifying these remarks is Ahmadinejad’s responsibility. All I know is that such statements deepen the gap between Iran and the United States and fuel the already tense circumstances which are plagued by psychological warfare. Ahmadinejad is not the first person to doubt the official narrative of 9/11, and he won’t be the last one. But no one can deny this human catastrophe which ushered in an era of radicalism in US foreign policy. Washington could make use of the situation to bridge the gap between itself and Islam. George W. Bush made a strategic blunder and intensified the aversion toward the U.S., however.

But we can look at the recent uproar from another point of view. Look, the Americans are meddling in every single domestic affair in Iran. They allot budgets for regime change, pressure and threaten Iran. Iran will naturally try to retaliate. As we say in Persian, “they don’t give you sweets in a fight”. That’s why Ahmadinejad decides to irk them where they are the most sensitive. 9/11 itself needs a serious pathology. Al-Qaeda and Taliban are American brainchildren. That is a well-documented fact. I’m not fond of Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric, but the Americans have offended Iranians in every way possible and they have to be responsible for their policies.

IRD: Your comments brought something to mind: the US withdrew from Vietnam after broad public protest inside the country, especially by students. American citizens had become aware of the crimes committed by their country in Vietnam. This may be a crude comparison, but Ahmadinejad’s remarks could harm Iran’s image among American citizens and facilitate further pressures. Isn’t this a failure in Ahmadinejad’s favorite ‘public diplomacy’ strategy?

SK: You’re right. US public opinion is touchy about the 9/11 incident. Uttering such words near the site of the catastrophe will cause controversy. Ahmadinejad is shooting at the wrong target—he could mention that Iran is itself a victim of violence and terror, and it advocates dialogue.

IRD: Obama’s administration has openly supported the rule of a reformist government in Iran. On the other hand, no Iranian administration has been as eager as Ahmadinejad’s to resume ties with Washington. Is there any fundamental difference between the foreign policy of reformists and principlists that gives the United States a disposition towards pro-reform forces?

SK: Look, the most unrelenting pressure was imposed on the two progressive administrations of Hashemi Rafsanjani and Khatami by both Democrats and Republicans in Washington. The endorsement of reformists is another American game in their interference in our domestic affairs. Iranian citizens remember the rule of Clinton and Bush. Americans are not supporting the reformists because they care for the Iranian people. The Dual Containment policy was followed during Clinton’s presidency. Bush’s administration labeled Iran a member of the Axis of Evil while Iran was offering exceptional cooperation with the international community to overthrow the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. That was the biggest blow to the reform government in Iran. What Americans actually want is an Iran which is not revolutionary anymore, one similar to the one before the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Iran also cooperated with the US government to free American hostages captured by Hezbollah in Lebanon in the 1980s. In return, what we received was direct US aid to Iraq during the 8-year war, a number of direct confrontations with the US military in the Persian Gulf, and the shooting down of our civilian IranAir airbus. Unfortunately, Obama’s advisors are either unaware of Iran’s realities, or are willing to return Iran to the days before the Revolution.

We could behave better of course, but when hostility becomes the basis of interaction, Obama utters words that even George Bush hesitated to say.

Any reconciliation is unacceptable when Americans are seeking regime change in Tehran. Washington’s paradoxes have brought crisis to both sides while among Middle Eastern countries, Iran’s interests most overlap with those of the United States’: both countries want the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to perish, and both are loathed by these two terrorist groups. Americans –if they really mean what they say- are against extremism, as is Iran. Totalitarian regimes better serve US interests in the region, otherwise they wouldn’t have tried to undermine Khatami and Ahmadinejad (in his first presidential term). Israel and the Jewish lobby are also heavily influential on US policies, and regardless of the camp in power inside Iran, it is not acceptable that Washington’s Tehran policies be dictated by Tel Aviv.

Haven’t we made any mistakes? Weren’t there occasions when they had to will to reconcile and we decided not to hold out our hand?

SK: Dual standards inside Iran covey the wrong message. Meanwhile, the road to Washington passes through the Supreme Leader’s office. The president and foreign ministry should beware of discredited middlemen.

IRD: When Obama was elected as US president, everyone was anticipating change. However, looking at the team of advisors on Iran affairs for the Secretary of State, we see some unrelated, at times opportunist figures such as Trita Parsi, Karim Sadjadpour or Ray Takeyh who are not knowledgeable enough to be consulted. How do such people approach the power circles in the United States?

SK: Americans are still unrealistic towards Iran. They are using advisors who are part of the political game inside Iran. Unfortunately, we have closed our doors to the US elite and we are paying the price, because they will be replaced by second-rate people, following their personal interests. If we are thinking of public diplomacy, we should open the doors for the realistic, impartial elite. Some anti-regime groups in the United States are trying to put themselves on the White House payroll, without taking into consideration national interests.

IRD: After the taboo of negotiations with the US was broken by Ahmadinejad, it was repeated that Iran is ready to talk, but in circumstances which guarantee ‘equality’ and ‘dignity’. But equality and dignity have never been explicated. What lies behind these words? What is their essence? What should happen for Iran to sit at the negotiating table?

SK: Despite what you may think, the Leadership has set the terms and conditions and he is not against détente between Iran and any other country, even the US. What he opposes is resumption of ties based on pre-Revolution arrangements. Iranians have died to maintain their independence and prevent the interference of foreign countries.

Iran-US relations should be based on mutual respect. We have to sit at the negotiating table with the Americans one day and resolve our issues. But the problem is that our good will has never been responded to appropriately by the Americans.

Americans have always interfered in our domestic affairs. They talk of dialogue while they set a budget for regime-change in Iran. If they want to object to Iran’s attitude toward the Middle East peace process, we have a lot to say about that. Incorrect US policies have spilled Palestinian blood and dislocated hundreds of thousands in the last 60 years. Americans are keen on using double standards and they want to receive without giving. They are also trying to undermine Iran’s relations with the rest of the world. In fact, their priority is infusing tension into Iran’s foreign relations. I hope the government observes this.

IRD: Is it only the US that treats us this way? China, Russia and even Japan are selling us their low-quality products at a higher price in the absence of a powerful technological and economic power like the US. They have also taken advantage of the situation.

SK: Look, China and some other powers have no imperialist history. Their motives are purely financial.

IRD: So is it only the historical background that has caused the rift between Iran and the US?

SK: They are exploiting Iran in favor of their national interests. China and Japan have never meddled with our domestic affairs. And the days of Russia’s intervention are long over. They’re realistic now. We are asking the Americans to be realistic too. Regime change is senseless. Whatever the government in power in Iran, it will defend our independence and territorial integrity, and it fears a repetition of history.

IRD: Mr. Kharrazi, you’re a veteran diplomat. When do you think the problems between Iran and the Arab states will come to an end?

SK: We have serious disagreements with the Arabs. If you take a look, Iranians have made the biggest contribution to Arab civilization in their history. We are willing to expand our economic, political and cultural ties, but they are infected by Pan-Arabism and direct the most offensive remarks toward us. Israel has committed the worst crimes against Lebanon and Palestine and now some Arab states have sided with it against Iran. After sixty years of Israel’s isolation, some regional states are trying to include it in a regional Arab-Israeli alliance against Iran.

IRD: Let’s move to another subject. It seems that we lack adequate experts in foreign policy. There are hundreds of students, professors, researchers and other scholars of international relations, but in reality, we lack experts who are knowledgeable about foreign policy and regional and international issues. Global phenomena are taking place that influence Iran directly or indirectly; nevertheless, they don’t receive adequate attention inside the country. Why?

SK: It’s better to say that we do have many experts, but we prefer not to ask for their contributions. The ninth and tenth administrations of Ahmadinejad purged the best experts, those who had gained experience in the decades after the Revolution. Our leading experts are now sitting at home. Of course it’s the same in many other domains. When the circle of trust has shrunk this much, while the circle of enemies is blowing out of proportion on a daily basis, we face a situation like this, where our best diplomatic experts are outside the ministry. The Foreign Ministry issues letters in English which have grammatical mistakes. That’s a catastrophe! This dismissive attitude even makes people like [Head of the President’s Office Esfandiar Rahim] Masha’i a victim. He has the right to express his opinion. Why are they trying to marginalize him?

IRD: So you’re criticizing the dismissive attitude.

SK: Exactly. It is seriously detrimental. Anyone loyal to the principles of the Revolution, the Constitution, Emam Khomeini and the Supreme Leadership should stay and serve the country. Unfortunately, everyone is affixed with a label these days. Let’s not talk more about it—it’s too painful.

IRD: Mr. Kharrazi, as the last question, what is the biggest challenge for our foreign policy, and what is its solution?

SK: I believe that policies of the reform era [1997-2005] should still be applied. Détente, trust building, and deterrence are still a part of the Ahmadinejad administration’s strategy, but the first two should receive further attention. Iran should be introduced as an Islamic role model for development, while we follow constructive interaction with the rest of the world. Moderation and balance in foreign diplomacy and avoiding fervent or burning rhetoric are also necessary.

We should gain an objective understanding of the realities of the international community and appreciate opportunities and notice the threats. Avoiding tension and moving closer to Muslim countries is another point.