Discursive Structures Block Further Cooperation
Commentary by Hosein Salimi, university professor and foreign affairs analyst, on Geneva negotiations and the future of Iran-US relations
In diplomatic teachings, we have two kinds of diplomacy: one is overt diplomacy in which everything, including the content of negotiations, results, gives and takes are transparent and clear. Second is covert diplomacy in which there is a huge difference between what the parties actually discussed and what is announced as the result.
Our current status in nuclear negotiations is something in-between. Some of the deals are publicized, but there are parts officially left unsaid which we have to conjecture from the statements and measures of diplomats.
On the surface, Iran has presented a proposal package which is totally unrelated to the nuclear dispute, but what has occurred in reality is different. Reading between the lines, we sense that some agreements have been made. From what the Iranian side states, it seems that Iran will not give in to demands for freezing uranium enrichment, but it may agree to keep the things at the level they are, that is, it will not extend its uranium enrichment project.
On the other hand, West has proposed to help with the uranium enrichment project in a third country, initiate cooperation on other nuclear projects and keep from imposing or toughening sanctions against Iran. What raises hope in both Tehran and West and encourages them to continue negotiations is the signs that show Iran is going to accept the non-extension formula instead of freeze. It will also stay committed to IAEA inspections even for its newly publicized Qom facility. In return, Western diplomats will probably decide no toughen the sanctions and continue the negotiations instead. These agreements will improve ties and lead to further negotiations.
There were also other promising signals. For the first time after the Islamic Revolution, Iranian and American officials discussed bilateral issues. This shows that both sides are somehow willing to clean up. In his recent visit to New York, Ahmadinejad frequently wished for better ties between Iran and the US. Such omens prove mutual determination to reform relations in both nuclear negotiations and other issues of bilateral interest.
The most serious obstacles on the way are mental and conceptual structures which influence the leaders’ decision. In Iran, ideological structures have been internalized in the minds and speeches of the leaders, which somehow encourage them to stand against West -particularly the United States. It is because of such structures that Iranians promote the nuclear program as the symbol of resistance against West.
Iranians have turned a certain discourse into their legitimizing ideology in which the United States is the archenemy and the nuclear program is the symbol of fighting against this enemy. Such a discourse makes it difficult to have diplomatic talks and exchanges. The other side also suffers this problem.
After the revolution, the mental image Iranians have constructed from Western political decision-makers may have not been compatible with the existing conceptual structures of Western leaders and opinion-makers in the Europe and the United states. It seems national interests have driven both sides to come closer and break the ice. However, discursive and ideological structures are still the most formidable setbacks that preclude further agreement.
Negotiators were hopeful after Geneva talks however, and the outcome has provided new opportunities for interaction between Tehran and Five plus One members, especially Washington.
Our current status in nuclear negotiations is something in-between. Some of the deals are publicized, but there are parts officially left unsaid which we have to conjecture from the statements and measures of diplomats.
On the surface, Iran has presented a proposal package which is totally unrelated to the nuclear dispute, but what has occurred in reality is different. Reading between the lines, we sense that some agreements have been made. From what the Iranian side states, it seems that Iran will not give in to demands for freezing uranium enrichment, but it may agree to keep the things at the level they are, that is, it will not extend its uranium enrichment project.
On the other hand, West has proposed to help with the uranium enrichment project in a third country, initiate cooperation on other nuclear projects and keep from imposing or toughening sanctions against Iran. What raises hope in both Tehran and West and encourages them to continue negotiations is the signs that show Iran is going to accept the non-extension formula instead of freeze. It will also stay committed to IAEA inspections even for its newly publicized Qom facility. In return, Western diplomats will probably decide no toughen the sanctions and continue the negotiations instead. These agreements will improve ties and lead to further negotiations.
There were also other promising signals. For the first time after the Islamic Revolution, Iranian and American officials discussed bilateral issues. This shows that both sides are somehow willing to clean up. In his recent visit to New York, Ahmadinejad frequently wished for better ties between Iran and the US. Such omens prove mutual determination to reform relations in both nuclear negotiations and other issues of bilateral interest.
The most serious obstacles on the way are mental and conceptual structures which influence the leaders’ decision. In Iran, ideological structures have been internalized in the minds and speeches of the leaders, which somehow encourage them to stand against West -particularly the United States. It is because of such structures that Iranians promote the nuclear program as the symbol of resistance against West.
Iranians have turned a certain discourse into their legitimizing ideology in which the United States is the archenemy and the nuclear program is the symbol of fighting against this enemy. Such a discourse makes it difficult to have diplomatic talks and exchanges. The other side also suffers this problem.
After the revolution, the mental image Iranians have constructed from Western political decision-makers may have not been compatible with the existing conceptual structures of Western leaders and opinion-makers in the Europe and the United states. It seems national interests have driven both sides to come closer and break the ice. However, discursive and ideological structures are still the most formidable setbacks that preclude further agreement.
Negotiators were hopeful after Geneva talks however, and the outcome has provided new opportunities for interaction between Tehran and Five plus One members, especially Washington.