No More Sanctions on the Way
Commentary by Ebrahim Mottaqi, Iran-US affairs analyst, on September’s likely talks between Iran and Five plus One
September will be a critical month in Obama’s efforts for bringing Iran to the table of negotiations. Obama insists on Iran’s acceptance of nuclear talks and says that otherwise it could face tougher sanctions. Following comes the commentary by Ebrahim Mottaqi, Tehran University professor and Iran-US affairs analysts:
The United States conception of Iran’s nuclear program is paradoxical in nature. On the one hand, security services have come to the conclusion that Iran is not capable of producing nuclear weapons, that is, Iran is at least four or five years before achieving such a capability. Clearly, during this period the United States and other concerned countries can carry out indirect measures to contain Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
On the other hand, the public opinion, plus European and Israeli diplomacy, are effective in measures taken vis-à-vis Iran. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu toured around Europe last week to convince the European governments exert further pressures on Iran through sanctions. Netanyahu-Merkel agreements will have their repercussions on the whole European Union’s decisions, and they will also affect the United States.
Talk of the day is that IAEA Head Mohammad ElBaradei has more detailed information about Iran’s nuclear program which he should convey to Five plus One before handing his position to the new Japanese chairman of the organization in November 2009. Therefore, the diplomatic pressures on ElBaradei in addition to Israel’s efforts will have noticeable impacts on the current state.
Such pressures will naturally affect the outcome of multilateral meetings by world powers. September will witness two meetings which concern Iran’s nuclear program. One will be the 5+1 sitting and the second is IAEA’s Board of Governors convention. Iran’s nuclear program will be also discussed in UN general assemblies.
Despite all these meetings, a quick decision which brings broader and more intense sanctions against Iran is unlikely. In fact, Europe and the United States prefer to move on step by step. The wave of anti-Iranian diplomacy may start from September 2009 but most probably it may not lead to approval of a new resolution against Iran.
Why is West hesitant over new measures? The reason seems to be the unknown outcome of Iran’s upcoming negotiations with Five plus One. Meanwhile, Ahmadinejad is occupied with the selection of his team members and their approval by the parliament. With the Iranian administration in the transitional phase, there is no time for talking to 5+1 over a strategic security issue such as the nuclear program.
Mid-September seems to be the Iranian government preferred date to negotiate, when Ahmadinejad has known the layout of his team. The candidates for Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense –ministries most engaged with the nuclear issue- will have few problems in gaining the parliament’s vote of confidence. When mid-September comes, the Iranian government will have found its final arrangement and will be ready to start talks with Five plus One.
On the other hand, the Americans are ready to engage Iran in bilateral and multilateral talks over Afghanistan and its own nuclear program. Negotiations will probably start in two or three weeks. Iran may also be reluctant to follow its previous aggressive attitude since it faces serious problems inside the country and to weather the plight, the country needs to make some progress in foreign affairs.
Evidence shows that Iran’s pragmatic sole is reconstructed and will be applied in nuclear talks with 5+1. Hence, Western countries will not rush for finalizing Iran’s nuclear case or implementing further punitive measures, since it would kick back. Americans and Europeans are now aware of the nature of Iran’s diplomacy and they are unlikely to intensify punitive measures.
The United States conception of Iran’s nuclear program is paradoxical in nature. On the one hand, security services have come to the conclusion that Iran is not capable of producing nuclear weapons, that is, Iran is at least four or five years before achieving such a capability. Clearly, during this period the United States and other concerned countries can carry out indirect measures to contain Iran’s nuclear capabilities.
On the other hand, the public opinion, plus European and Israeli diplomacy, are effective in measures taken vis-à-vis Iran. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu toured around Europe last week to convince the European governments exert further pressures on Iran through sanctions. Netanyahu-Merkel agreements will have their repercussions on the whole European Union’s decisions, and they will also affect the United States.
Talk of the day is that IAEA Head Mohammad ElBaradei has more detailed information about Iran’s nuclear program which he should convey to Five plus One before handing his position to the new Japanese chairman of the organization in November 2009. Therefore, the diplomatic pressures on ElBaradei in addition to Israel’s efforts will have noticeable impacts on the current state.
Such pressures will naturally affect the outcome of multilateral meetings by world powers. September will witness two meetings which concern Iran’s nuclear program. One will be the 5+1 sitting and the second is IAEA’s Board of Governors convention. Iran’s nuclear program will be also discussed in UN general assemblies.
Despite all these meetings, a quick decision which brings broader and more intense sanctions against Iran is unlikely. In fact, Europe and the United States prefer to move on step by step. The wave of anti-Iranian diplomacy may start from September 2009 but most probably it may not lead to approval of a new resolution against Iran.
Why is West hesitant over new measures? The reason seems to be the unknown outcome of Iran’s upcoming negotiations with Five plus One. Meanwhile, Ahmadinejad is occupied with the selection of his team members and their approval by the parliament. With the Iranian administration in the transitional phase, there is no time for talking to 5+1 over a strategic security issue such as the nuclear program.
Mid-September seems to be the Iranian government preferred date to negotiate, when Ahmadinejad has known the layout of his team. The candidates for Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense –ministries most engaged with the nuclear issue- will have few problems in gaining the parliament’s vote of confidence. When mid-September comes, the Iranian government will have found its final arrangement and will be ready to start talks with Five plus One.
On the other hand, the Americans are ready to engage Iran in bilateral and multilateral talks over Afghanistan and its own nuclear program. Negotiations will probably start in two or three weeks. Iran may also be reluctant to follow its previous aggressive attitude since it faces serious problems inside the country and to weather the plight, the country needs to make some progress in foreign affairs.
Evidence shows that Iran’s pragmatic sole is reconstructed and will be applied in nuclear talks with 5+1. Hence, Western countries will not rush for finalizing Iran’s nuclear case or implementing further punitive measures, since it would kick back. Americans and Europeans are now aware of the nature of Iran’s diplomacy and they are unlikely to intensify punitive measures.