The Contradicting Interests of Afghanistan’s Neighbors

In our interview with Faramarz Tamanna, faculty member of Herat’s University of Law and Political Sciences, we have discussed Afghanistan’s developments within the last month, Taliban’s resurgence, Pakistan’s interventions, United States’ news strategy and the historical accumulation of crises in Afghanistan. A summarized version of our discussion comes in the following: 

How do you see the course of developments for Afghanistan with the conferences held in March? What were the most important results? The feasible plans? 

March was a critical month. We had the conference in Moscow on drug trafficking and terrorism and the conference in The Hague. Decisions on security, economic development, promoting democracy, improving women’s conditions and human rights were made in such conferences, though it seems most of them are left unrealized. This may go back to the structural defects of the Afghan society which have deprived us from making the best of international focus and aids in recent years. I think the main objective of recent conferences was securing previous agreements. 

Some problems such as terrorism and fundamentalism have even aggravated during the past eight years. In other domains progress is not remarkable, if any. The problem is either with the policies or the Afghan government and society. What is you analysis? Can focusing on military and security challenges resolve the problems? 

See, during the past seven years we’ve been under international attention. But one thing that kept us away from using international help was frailty of the government and its mishandling of the situation. 

They lacked authority? 

They could manage better. This administration is qualified and it was the best option at first considering Afghanistan’s critical situation. But it could be better. We have efficient executives but Karzai’s circle blocked their way towards higher positions on ethnic grounds. Another factor is the historical accumulation of crises in Afghanistan. Within the past 30 years we have faced crises which we must tease out the roots. This has been neglected in all strategies for reconstructing Afghanistan. For example, Taliban and its mindset is a cultural and historical reality in Afghanistan and we can’t deal with it as a passing political movement. Taliban is now a mentality, and eradicating this mentality needs efforts beyond one-day solutions. And politically, they are turning into an influential movement. 

You mean Afghanistan’s politics is that polarized a stage that all government opposition groups are joining Taliban? 

Exactly. Taliban is the only organized, cohesive group that stands against the government. Therefore, other major groups overshadowed by Taliban join the movement and are welcomed. Some regional states such as Pakistan support this trend. Religious ideologues and insurgents have reinforced Taliban. Their resurgence is a consequence of opportunities disregarded within the past seven years. Bureaucracy corruption also diverted the flow of international financial aides and reconstruction has lost the vigor it had in the first two or three years. 

You mean the money was spent on unnecessary cases? 

I mean it wasn’t spent correctly. It was used lavishly, or for personal advantage, by both Afghans and international NGOs. This bureaucratic corruption hampered infrastructure reconstruction process. The educational system was also overlooked. Though the numbers have become better in primary levels, but they are still far behind global standards. Of course we shouldn’t deny the developments: More than 6.5 Afghans going to school, tens of private European and American universities in Afghanistan and students and professors sent abroad. 

Are these adequate to counter the religious seminaries which promote fundamentalistic ideologies? 

There are many state-run schools that teach based on a relatively modern educational system but two institution support fundamentalism. One is the mosques. Afghan kids go to mosque from early childhood. However, the government is not monitoring the teachings in the mosques. Taliban’s beliefs are taught to children in some mosques. Religious seminaries are the other supports which aren’t modernized yet and unlike religious schools of other Islamic countries, computer, English, mathematics and modern sciences aren’t instructed in these schools and they still have a traditional system. These two institutions have undermined efforts to abolish fundamentalism in Afghanistan. 

We shouldn’t forget Pakistan which promotes fundamentalism in the region. 

Our biggest challenge is the contradicting interests of our neighbors inside Afghanistan. That is, we can reach a regional agreement on strategies for development and stability in Afghanistan. China, Russia, Iran and Pakistan -some of the most powerful countries in the region- also Persian Gulf states and Turkey have contradicting interests in Afghanistan due to their structural and ideological differences. This has impeded stability in Afghanistan. And Pakistan has treated Afghanistan dishonestly and mischievously. 

With both Musharraf and Zardari in power? 

With both. Of course Zardari’s is a frail government and ISI (Pakistan Army’s intelligence service) still dominates the scene in Afghanistan. A reality constantly ignored in these seven years is that meddling with Afghanistan’s affairs is the existential, critical philosophy of Pakistan. Without presence in Afghanistan, Pakistan would perish. 

You’re talking about identity? 

Look, 61 years ago Pakistan was a country with a weak system, just separated from a powerful country. This newly-independent country was involved with a strategic, economic, political, cultural and military competition with India and apparently weaker. That’s why from the beginning the Pakistani statesmen were seeking a strategic depth to make up for their weakness vis-à-vis India in South Asia. This became a stronger tendency especially after the Soviet Union attacked Afghanistan thirty years ago. 

Pakistan has also had another problem: interacting with the global community while coping with its domestic problems rising from fundamentalists’ tendency to gain power. Except during the reign of Zia ul-Haq, a powerful Islamic government has been never formed in Pakistan. Therefore, fundamentalist parties have always opposed the government so Islamabad channeled their zeal towards Kashmir and Afghanistan. So we see that in fighting Soviet Union Pakistan had a significant role. But after Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and its dissolution, Pakistan faced a crisis, since there were no needs for it to remain in Afghanistan. 

But after some years of inaction, with the rise of Taliban Pakistan’s foreign policy regained its dynamic. The strategic depth had to be maintained at any expense. Taliban had to be invigorated even after its fall in 2001 since fundamentalism was the only means Pakistan could maintain influence in Afghanistan. Plus, we also have a territorial dispute with Pakistan over the Durand line imposed and is still disputed by Afghanistan. Now Afghanistan must always remain weak and troubled with internal problems so it couldn’t want to restore any territorial claims. Pakistan thinks long-term about Afghanistan and this has been neglected by the world in the past eight years. 

One of the basic means West could opt to resolve Afghanistan’s crisis was focusing on the border dispute between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This is root for most of our problems. They could convince Afghanistan to recognize the border and Pakistan to compensate for Afghanistan a way such as providing Afghanistan with a customs-free trade corridor. United States’ new policy is even disregarding this possibility. 

Do you think United States should support Pakistan’s new government -that faces efficiency and authority crises and is under Pakistani Army’s influence- to uproot fundamentalism? Could Zardari’s era be a starting point? 

U.S. mad the same mistake during Musharraf’s presidency providing them with financial aids. Unfortunately Obama is following the same line. United States’ diplomatic body is not clearly aware of Pakistan’s foreign policies and the strategic nature of their presence in Afghanistan and the region. As I said, without Afghanistan Pakistan would perish. There should be an alternative found for Pakistan’s exporting radicalism. Pakistan’s inability to fight against terrorism and their reluctance to support stability in Afghanistan is yet not understood by American statesmen. 

And this problem may not be solved even in long-term since it’s related to Pakistan’s identity. 

I think resolving the border dispute is the key to easing the tensions. The present border should be recognized, but not unless Afghanistan has received a bonus. And that is having access to free waters through Pakistan.