Rouhani Election Shows Iranians Want Improved Ties with West

December 28th, 2013 - by Sara Massoumi

September 11, 2001 changed the US’ political history forever. The attack of al-Qaeda militants on US soil left US President George W. Bush with only one option: to attack this group’s safe haven in Afghanistan. The Taliban, who ruled this country from 1996 to 2001, were removed from power with the attack of US forces and its European allies. This attack might have been the end of the Taliban’s political rule over Afghanistan, but it never meant the end of this militant group’s existence. The Taliban continue to play a significant role in Afghanistan’s political equations, and they demonstrate this through the terrorist operations they carry out every once in a while. Now, 13 years after American forces entered Afghanistan, current US President Barack Obama is preparing to withdraw US forces from this country in 2014. US forces have relatively left Iraqi soil since the US attack on this country in 2003, but some of these forces are still active in Iraq under different covers. Iranian Diplomacy recently spoke with Zalmay Khalilzad, a former US Ambassador to Afghanistan and to Iraq, about the US presence in these two countries and about Iran-US cooperation with regard to countries of the Middle East region. Mr. Khalilzad is also a former US Ambassador to the United Nations.

You were the US ambassador in two critical regions, Afghanistan and Iraq, where the presence of US military forces led to the downfall of the ruling regimes of the time in both countries. What is your general assessment of the situation in these two countries after more than a decade?

These two countries were ruled by tyrannical regimes which suppressed their own people and threatened security in the region and in the wider world. The Taliban abused and oppressed Afghan women, persecuted ethnic and religious minorities and allowed al-Qaida terrorists who on 9-11 attacked the US to use Afghanistan as a sanctuary.  Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against the Iraqi Kurds and massacred thousand of Iraqi Shiites and others across the country. He started two wars against neighbors. And, like much of the rest of the world, the US believed that Saddam Hussein was reconstituting his weapons of mass destruction in violation of UN Security Council resolutions and the terms for ending the Gulf war of 1992.  Both regimes were part of a set of factors that made the broader Middle East a dysfunctional region, i.e. a region where many regimes were failing to create conditions for development, freedom and stability; a region that instead was generating threats to peace and stability not only for itself but for the world. So, the US moves against the Taliban and the Saddam regime were aimed not only at dealing with specific threats, even though the assumptions about Saddam’s WMD turned out to be wrong, but also to assist with a much broader and longer term transformation of the region with the hope that this would help transform it into a peaceful, democratic and prosperous part of the world.

Afghanistan and Iraq have both had a difficult transition and face enormous challenges. But both are better off than they were 10 years ago. Clearly, Afghanistan has come a long way: on average Afghans can expect to live 14 years longer than they did 10 years ago, the number of children going to school is now 10 times the number under the Taliban. 35 percent of the 10 million students are girls. Girls were not allowed to go to school under the Taliban. Afghanistan has one of the freest media in region. Political opposition is free to organize and challenge the government. Civil society is strong. The country has its own security institutions which are gradually taking on the responsibility for protecting the citizens.  But with sanctuaries in one neighboring state and support from the other, the Taliban and their friends such as the Haqqani network continue to pose a threat. Rule of law has not made the progress that it should.

Iraq, too, is better off in some regards. Civil society, a free press, and political parties have made progress. The Kurdish region is enjoying enormous economic growth. Revenues from oil have increased. But, there is still no consensus among Iraqis on a number of key issues such as the role of the federal government in the development and export of oil and the role of the national security forces. Sectarianism is a powerful emotive and political force and has facilitated the recent increase in Al-Qaida related threats and violence. The policies of the neighbors and developments in Syria have impacted Iraq negatively and have exacerbated these problems.

When the US attacked Afghanistan in 2001, many news and intelligence sources talked about Iran’s cooperation with the US in overthrowing the Taliban regime. Nonetheless, the US did not express its gratitude for Iran’s move and Iran’s name was even mentioned in the axis of evil. Will the US ask for Iran’s help once again during the days of withdrawal from Afghanistan? What guarantees are there that this time around Iran’s help would not be ignored?

Iran did help in 2001. It assisted diplomatically, for example, in Bonn, when the UN convened Afghans and others to get the invited Afghans to agree to a political road map. Iran also helped in other ways. As far as gratitude is concerned, of course, Iran itself also was a beneficiary of the US-led overthrow of the Taliban regime in Kabul.  The Taliban and Iran had come close to war. Iran supported the Northern Alliance which fought the Taliban. The Taliban had pursued a sectarian policy and had persecuted Afghan Shiites. I agree, however, that more could have been done to build on this cooperation between the US and Iran against the Taliban.  Two factors had a negative effect on the US attitude regarding Iran's role.  First, there were reports that some Iranian security forces were encouraging opposition to the new government in Kabul and were even providing arms to forces resisting it, creating the impression that Iran was playing a double game.  Second, some al-Qaida leaders on the run from Afghanistan had gained refuge in Iran with support from elements of the Iranian security apparatus. Iran was refusing to turn these people over to the US or to Afghanistan or to their countries of origin. I supported continued engagement with Iran as Ambassador in Afghanistan and Iraq. Because I am not involved in development of the Obama administration’s policies, I do not know if there is any discussion with Iran on the US withdrawal and Iranian assistance to facilitate US policy.

Despite the fact that the security pact between Iraq and the US was not signed, there are apparently a significant number of US military forces with a diplomatic cover in this country who cooperate with the security and military system of Iraq. What are the reasons behind the continuation of insecurities in Iraq while there is this cooperation and presence?

I believe the absence of a bilateral security agreement has been a mistake for both Iraq and the United States. It has intensified regional competition to fill the vacuum in Iraq, which has helped increase sectarian and ethnic polarization. This development and the brutal war in Syria have increased the al-Qaida presence in Iraq and in Syria. Also, some of the neighbors including some elements of Iran's security forces maintain ties with militias which undermine security.  These factors have produced a high threat environment for the US diplomatic presence and shapes the size of US security presence to protect it.   The US military withdrawal has also reduced Washington's ability to influence developments in Iraq and the region--especially in Syria. 

Many of the Arab states which were Saddam’s allies and were somehow dissatisfied with the US attack against Iraq in 2003 believe that the result of this attack was handing Iraq over to a Shiite government supported by Iran. Would you agree with this assessment? Have the US and Iran cooperated with each other with regard to Iraq like Afghanistan or not?

I am familiar with this argument, made by a number of Arab leaders and analysts.  This belief has been due to three factors: (1) the general rise of sectarianism and the opposition to elections and democracy in the region generally but especially in a Shiite majority country; (2) the boycott of the political process by the Sunni Arabs in Iraq and the decision to go forward with the first elections without them in January 2005; and (3) the existence of strong ties between Iran and several Iraqi Shiite parties and militias who became very important after Saddam's overthrow. I worked hard to encourage Sunni political participation and improved relations between Iraq and Arab states--with some success.  There was limited cooperation between the US and Iran regarding Iraq before, during and after Saddam's overthrow. But relations became increasingly hostile because of Iran's provision of lethal support, particularly IEDs by the Quds Force, to militias under its influence. These were used to attack coalition forces, to settle scores with former Iraqi military leaders, and against other Iraqi targets with the aim of tying down coalition forces and keeping Iraq weak and divided. Obviously, these were regarded as hostile acts.  

Do you believe that direct contacts between Iran and the US, which have recently begun with regard to Iran’s nuclear issue within the framework of the P5+1, could also improve the security and political situation of the two countries of Iraq and Afghanistan?

I support a dialogue on regional issues. However, it is my impression that Iran and the US have agreed to focus first on Iran's nuclear issue. This does not mean that discussions on regional issues might not take place in multilateral settings before a final nuclear agreement.  Iran can help on regional security issues--if it decides to do so. For example, it can end support by elements of its security apparatus to elements of Taliban.  It can encourage reconciliation between Prime Minister Maliki and Sunni leaders such as Finance Minister Issawi and it can end all support to militias.  It can adjust its Syria policy to contribute to a realistic settlement of the war there -- a conflict that has increased the suffering of the Syrian people to unspeakable levels and raised sectarian tensions across the region. 

Fighting against radicalism and terrorism was the main reason behind the US’ presence in the region. An analysis of the situation in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Syria, Libya and even parts of Egypt shows that this crisis has spread and even strengthened al-Qaeda recruitment. Could we say that part of this problem is caused by the nature of the presence of foreign military forces and some incorrect measures taken by the US in the region? The issues of Syria, Afghanistan and Pakistan can be mentioned in this regard.

I do not agree with the premise of the question. The strength of extremists is caused by specific and mostly local and regional circumstances.  For example, the strength of al-Qaida in Syria and Iraq today is largely the result of the brutal tactics of Bashar Assad's forces, and these are supported by Iran and Russia. The lack of adequate and timely support by the US and the West for moderates and for a democratic Syrian opposition has also contributed.  There has been a huge gap between US declared goals and its strategy and plans.  Similarly, the failure of the international system to end the conflict has produced the current conditions. The extreme conditions created by the war have produced extremism and an opportunity for Al-Qaida. Moderates do not prosper in extreme circumstances.  Extremism is spreading from Syria to Iraq and will impact the region and the world for a long time to come. A number of states in the region including Saudi Arabia support extremist groups. The regional and global polarization, and lack of consensus about the future of their country among the Syrians themselves, all point to a protracted civil war.  The handling of Syria by the international community has been a mistake and will have long term negative consequences for Syria, the region and the world.  In Afghanistan, extremists have not gained. Most Afghans are moderate and at least for now they support strong ties with the West and the US. Even in Iran, the election of Mr. Rouhani demonstrates that most Iranians want moderation and improved ties with the West especially the US.  The Arab Spring countries are trying to find their way. The previous status quo was not sustainable. It will take a long time, however, before a new stable order is established. In Tunisia, the democratic transition has been damaged by assassinations and a stalled constitutional process. Morocco has taken a number of important reform measures. In Egypt, the country's elected President was ousted after just one year in power, and the nation is now moving to ratify its second constitution in two years.  In Libya, the security vacuum left in the wake of the NATO-led intervention and the proliferation of weapons has contributed to militias taking control of regions of the country. ​​ In Yemen, a national dialogue process is stalled. 

It seems that there is contradiction in the issue of fighting against radicalism in US policies. Finding the ideological and financial sources of radicalism in the region is not difficult but practically, these sources are your strategic allies in this region. How would you justify this contradiction?

It is true that some of our regional friends have been supporting extremist groups such as the Taliban or the Salafists. Iran, too, has supported extremists in Iraq, in Palestine and in Lebanon.  With regards to US friends, the US has sought to encourage and even pressure them to cease support for the extremists. Sometimes this has worked and more often it has not.  The use of extremists as an instrument of policy has contributed to making this region unstable and has severely limited the cooperation among its member states.  

Pakistan is among the countries which have been introduced as US non-NATO allies. On the other hand, when you were the US ambassador to Afghanistan, you protested many times against the double-standard behavior of parts of the Pakistani government with regard to Afghanistan. Do you believe that this double-standard behavior has ended? Could the change in government in this country be interpreted as a change in the view of the system as a whole with regard to serious struggle against the insecurity crisis in Afghanistan?

The security policies in Pakistan such as their policy on Afghanistan, including support for the Taliban, have been determined by the Pakistani military--not the elected civilian governments. However, the military's support for extremists has backfired. Now extremists are threatening Pakistan itself. The Nawaz government has not yet come up with an effective strategy to address the issue. The Prime Minister has appointed a loyalist to become the army chief. Whether the two men will come up with an effective anti-extremist strategy and are able to stop the use of extremists as an instrument of policy remains to be seen. 

The US security pact with Afghanistan has become a hot issue in this country. The President of Afghanistan has set certain conditions for its signing and contrary to the US’ emphasis that this pact must be signed until the end of this year, he has stated that he has postponed the signing to after the upcoming presidential election in this country. On the other hand, the US Deputy Secretary of State on South American Affairs has been quoted as saying that the US intends to, under any condition, be present in western Asia. Considering this position, what will happen to the zero option or the exit of all forces from Afghanistan if this pact is not signed by this country’s president?

I support a bilateral security agreement between the US and Afghanistan. It would be a tragedy for Afghanistan if the agreement is not concluded. Afghan forces still need US and NATO support to protect Afghanistan. Afghanistan is not yet in a position to stand on its own feet financially.  Without US and NATO military presence and Western financial support, Afghanistan is likely to decline and even collapse. In such a scenario a vacuum will be created which will lead to the intensification of the fight for Afghanistan, possibly shifting the balance in favor of extremists. Regional competition and interference will also increase. Given their experience after the departure of the Soviets, Afghans overwhelmingly recognize that they need Western assistance for now and support the bilateral security agreement with the US. This was demonstrated in the recently held grand assembly--the Loya Jirgah. President Karzai is isolated at home on this issue. He should not gamble with the future of Afghan people--the current and future generations. He should reverse course and sign the agreement. If he refuses, the US should be patient, avoid the so-called zero option, and instead simply wait to sign the agreement with the next Afghan President.

Aside from the text of this pact, does the US have a special plan to reduce the concerns of the regional countries with regard to the continuation of its presence in Afghanistan?                                                       

The only regional country that has expressed opposition to the US-Afghan agreement is Iran.  This was revealed by President Karzai in his speech to the Loya Jirgah. Pakistan, India, Russia, China, the Central Asian States, Turkey and Iraq support or do not oppose this agreement. Iran should ask itself why it is so isolated on this issue.  Why is Iran putting itself at odds with the wishes of the Afghan people including the overwhelming majority of Shiite Afghans? Like the people of Iran, the Shiite Afghans want strong and positive relations with the US. In the recent Loya Jirgah, the people of the Bamiyan province, who are mostly Shiites, demanded a US military presence in their province and made it a condition for their support of the bilateral security agreement with the US.  

With regards to regional concerns, I understand the Afghan officials have engaged with Iran on the security agreement to assure Iran that it did not pose a threat to Iran. If Iran has legitimate concerns that it wants to raise with The United States, it should do so in future bilateral or multilateral discussions on Afghanistan.