Winning in Syria Vital for Saudi Arabia

Throughout history, Iran and Saudi Arabia, as two key countries of the Middle East, have always been in competition. Besides ideological, political, and cultural contradictions, the developments of North Africa and the Arab Middle East, particularly the Syrian crisis, have led these two countries to be faced with strategic differences as well. The main differences between Tehran and Riyadh are over their relations with foreign powers and different approaches towards regional issues. This is while, before the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, there was cooperation with Saudi Arabia in the security arrangements of the Persian Gulf.

At that time, Saudi Arabia had somehow accepted to act as Iran’s gendarmerie in the Persian Gulf region, and under the strategy of the West, Iran, as the military arm of the West, alongside Turkey and with the support of the conservative Arab countries especially Saudi Arabia, played a significant role in preventing the influence of communism in the Middle East. Undoubtedly, with the Islamic Revolution and the collapse of the US’ two-column thesis, Saudi Arabia and other conservative sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf were confronted with security problems and the idea of the formation of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council was established to prevent Iran’s influence in the region. The leaders of the council, through their vast military and financial support of Iraq’s Baath regime, were even the main elements behind the continuation of the Iraqi invasion against Iran and its consequences which spread tension in the region and led to an attack against Kuwait.

This is while Iran pursued a trend of cooperation and a friendly approach with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq following the war and supported Kuwait’s territorial integrity and the unconditional exit of the Iraqi army from Kuwait. But in its strategy of détente, Iran was faced with serious obstacles with its Arab neighbors. One of these issues of difference was the new security arrangement in the Persian Gulf.

Iran’s proposal to provide the security of the Persian Gulf region was a cooperative model based on the exit of foreign military forces. Nevertheless, while rejecting Iran’s friendship, Saudi Arabia, as the godfather of the Persian Gulf countries, permitted foreign intervention, leading to more crises in the region. Under the present conditions, by exaggerating the differences, Riyadh has repeated certain accusations like the Shiite crescent and Iran’s peaceful nuclear issues and the establishment of the US’ Fifth Fleet in the Persian Gulf is the major factor of insecurity in the political situation of the region.

This is while, following the Arab Spring in the region, the different positions of the two countries with regard to the nature of these uprisings have added to the existing tensions. Saudi Arabia, as an authoritarian regime, is concerned about the wave of democracy-seeking in the region and the downfall of dictatorial and monarchial regimes and attempts to prevent any change in the balance of power in the region by suppressing the Shiite minority of eastern Hijaz and the dispatch of military forces to Manama.

But the issue that has given a strategic dimension to the differences between Tehran and Riyadh is the issue of Syria. Due to security and economic necessities, Syria, as the sole strategic ally of Iran in the region, welcomes the expansion of relations and supported Iran in its eight-year war with Iraq. Syria’s support of the Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian Jihadi groups has increased the strategic depth of these relations.

Thus, Iran’s view of the Syrian crisis by nature is different from other countries of the region. Despite the existing shortcomings in the political system of Syria and due to its strategic influence in the region and moving the probable war with Israel to the borders of the occupied territories, Iran still supports Syria and slow political reforms with the participation of all groups. This is while Saudi Arabia has considered the Syrian crisis a proper opportunity to gain more concessions from Iran and weaken its superior regional status. Thus, from Riyadh’s point of view, the overthrow of the Alawi regime in Syria and the weakening of the Lebanese Hezbollah, while destroying the strategic balance of the region, would increase the possibility of maintaining the al-Khalifa regime in Bahrain. The Saudi rulers consider a victory in Syria as a victory in the whole region and as limiting Shiite Iran’s influence and they attempt to take away the initiative from other moderate opposition groups in Syria by equipping terrorist groups like al-Nusra and spreading domestic chaos.

Despite the creation of discord among Bashar Assad’s opponents and even the softening of some countries like Turkey and Egypt for compromise and national dialogue, Saudi Arabia still pursues the issue of military intervention in Syria. The trend of recent developments shows that, regarding the crisis in Syria, despite the all-out efforts made by the West and the anti-Syria Arab axis to repeat the Libyan scenario, the downfall of the Syrian regime through the military option has become more difficult. Differences among the Syrian opposition over the issue of leadership is one of the most important matters in this regard. The resignation of Muaz al-Khatib, the leader of the coalition of Syrian opposition, following the Friends of Syria meeting in Turkey, can be considered in this regard. The increasing role of the Salafi radical groups which are affiliated with al-Qaeda and also the concern of the western countries about the transformation of this country into another Afghanistan have added to the complexities of this crisis.  Furthermore, Bashar Assad and his forces (the army and the security forces alongside the Alawis and the seculars and Christian groups) uniformly reiterate the continuation of their struggle and victory in the war over their opponents, with the support of Iran, Russia, and China.

This is while the attempts made by the West to create solidarity among the political forces opposing Bashar Assad have not gained huge achievements despite the high military and financial costs. Thus, the present situation in Syria is filled with anarchy and an uncertain future. Saudi Arabia, alongside Turkey, supports the path of fighting until victory in line with reducing Iran’s influence in the region and the political puzzle of the West. Regional competition and the non-tendency of the disputing parties, at both domestic and foreign levels, to reduce tensions and manage the crisis indicate that the lack of international consensus among the foreign powers to change Syria’s political structure has transformed the continuation of military conflicts in Syria into an unpreventable matter.

Furthermore, due to the existing strategic void left in Syria between the supporters and opponents of Bashar Assad and also the conflicting interests of the intervening forces in this crisis, the possibility of solving the differences through international institutions and in a peaceful manner has been reduced. Saudi Arabia does not intend to change its aggressive strategy with regard to Syria’s developments either, hence, it attempts to spread Salafism in the region and compete with Iran by using military and financial tools to change the political developments in Syria and take revenge from Iran for its support of the vast civil demands of the people of Bahrain. This strategy is somehow in line with the interests of the West in the region. What is certain is that with the continuation of the crisis in Syria and increasing political tensions in the region, differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia will enter a new phase and will impact relations between the two neighboring countries.