Amman and Tehran, Friendship for Mutual Deterrence
On December 11th, 2010, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, the strongman of Ahmadinejad’s cabinet, made a surprise visit to Amman to meet Abdullah II, the king of Jordan, whose country has had lukewarm relations with Iran ever since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Mohammad Irani, Tehran’s former ambassador to Amman, explains the challenges and potentials in Iran-Jordan relations:
Tehran-Amman relations have been at their nadir for around three years. So, Mashaei’s visit to Jordan is a big step forward. Jordan is a relatively small country, nearly deprived of natural resources, and therefore lacking the potential to have an export-driven economy. That is why it receives substantial aid from foreign countries, particularly Western states. At the core of Jordan’s government lies sustention of stability and building up regional capacity, so for long it has adhered to a policy of de-escalating existing tensions with neighboring states. Thus Iran, as a regional power, possesses a central position in Jordan’s diplomatic strategy.
Although it is considered a moderate, pro-West state, Jordan seeks a balance in its relations with adjacent forces—particularly pro-Resistance countries—due to its special domestic circumstances. The significance of relations with Iraq, Jordan’s lifeline, renders rapprochement with Iran an imperative. There are false worries, nonetheless, among Jordan’s leaders that Iran may be trying to intervene in their domestic affairs by providing financial and armament support for the political and religious opposition or for Palestinian groups. Considering the fact that 60% of Jordan’s population is originally Palestinian, this is a grave concern for the country.
Three substantial developments happening near the borders of Jordan have also lent weight to these concerns: the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime and the rise of Shi’as to power—which compelled King Abdullah II to warn about the formation of a Shi’a crescent in the region in his December 2004 interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel—the electoral victory of Hamas and its seizure of Gaza after an internal row with Fatah, and the 33-day war of the Summer of 2006 between Israel and Hezbollah which shattered Israel’s image of invincibility.
For many Jordanian statesmen, Iran has been behind all these developments, so it’s a power they must beware of. However, even these politicians know that closer ties with Iran may actually benefit Jordan, as they may persuade Iran to cease what they assume is interference in Jordan’s internal affairs.
As I’ve mentioned, security and internal stability are cardinal concerns for Amman. Jordan has a volatile demographic and social texture. Tension is still bubbling under the surface between the originally Palestinian majority and the rest of the Jordanian population –which is itself built on tribal networks. A porous borders with Iraq -which provide terrorists with a convenient route for carrying out their attacks against American troops or Iraqi citizens- has made Amman more sensitive toward its internal security, impelling it to avoid entering serious conflict with any regional actor that can undermine its security. This is why Amman has always followed a moderate line toward Iran’s nuclear program. This also explains why Jordan has frequently supported Iran’s right to achieve peaceful nuclear technology: the country is concerned that in a likely faceoff between Tehran and Tel Aviv, its long border with Israel will expose it to serious threats. Jordan’s moderate approach toward regional tensions is a way to keep its domestic scene stable.