Iran’s Return to Negotiations: Because of Sanctions or National Interests?

What is clear is that the basic compromise will be made over Iran’s nuclear program, and Iran’s proposals for global issues have not been addressed in the UNSC or Board of Governor’s resolutions, or any other international document. Besides, the P5+1 (five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany) are not eligible to make decisions on management of global affairs. It is unlikely that the West will accept changing its agenda and will view Iran’s nuclear program as just one problem in a set of globally important concerns.

As a general phenomenon, what Iranian officials say in domestic tribunes is different from the content of their talks in negotiations. What bears import are the remarks of Saeed Jalili [Head of Iran’s National Security Council and chief nuclear negotiator] and his team. It is up to the Iranian delegation to decide the nuclear negotiations’ agenda. If either side insists on directing the negotiations toward fulfillment of its preferred set of objectives, the talks will be nipped in the bud. But I believe for Iran the best option at the moment is to resume talks with the West over its nuclear program. The ongoing developments will have undesirable ramifications for Iran and the region. For Western countries, from the point of view of national interests, it also better to solve the dispute via diplomatic means.

Nonetheless, claims that Iran’s wish to resume the talks is due to the biting sanctions are nowhere near reality. It is undeniable that sanctions are turning into an increasing nuisance for Iran, and bypassing the sanctions results in higher prices for Iranian industry, but Iran’s return to negotiations is not because of these pressures, rather, it is for the likely benefits (or damages resulting from failure).

Davoud Hermidas Bavand is professor of Shahid Beheshti University and an international affairs expert.