The Strategic Game Between Iran and Russia

With the dissolution of Soviet Union in the early 90s and the formation of the Russian Federation, Iran moved toward warmer ties with its northern neighbors. Iran had certain rationales for its proximity approach, including the fact that it could utilize Russian military technology (as the U.S.—once Iran’s largest supplier of arms—had ceased all cooperation in that area after the revolution). And Iran believed Russia would remain an influential country.

The road to the Caucasus and Central Asia passed through Moscow. This was the doctrine advocated by Iran’s sixteen-year foreign minister, Ali Akbar Velayati. A competition between Iran and Russia nonetheless took shape in areas in following years, paving the way for Israel and the U.S. to gain their desired footholds in the region. While Moscow was endeavoring to expand its sphere of influence in the Central Asian and Caucasian regions, Iran tried to turn the situation to its own favor by relying on its historically deep cultural and religious ties with those areas. Iran and Russia have meanwhile always regarded each other as balancing factors that can be wielded against Western powers’ goals.

The Caspian Sea has been another stage for Tehran and Moscow’s interaction in recent decades. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which implied a transformation of the former legal regime of the world’s largest lake, Iran sought a strategy of cooperation. The Caspian as a tool for friendship and cooperation: this was Iran’s slogan in these years. Tehran has frequently asked for joint use of the surface, basin and sub-basin resources of the sea. In the case of a likely division of the Caspian, Tehran has announced that it won’t agree to a less than 20% share of the sea. Nevertheless, Russia, along with Kazakhstan, opted to take a separate path since the debate on the Caspian heated up, and worked toward the goal of a preferred share of the northern section of the body of water through a bilateral regime. Russia later gained the consent of Azerbaijan and signed a second agreement, which was consequently turned into a trilateral contract between Astana, Baku and Moscow. Turkmenistan’s joining the trio left Iran isolated and empty-handed in the Caspian.

Moscow and Tehran’s nuclear strategy

Iran’s nuclear program is perhaps the most critical aspect of bilateral ties with Russia. In Tehran, the nuclear decision-makers are aware of Russia’s unhappiness with the possibility of uranium enrichment on an industrial scale by their southern neighbor. For the Russians, the best scenario would be Tehran’s enrichment to be only a R&D program. Iran, however, is not still assured of Russia’s –or the West’s- commitment to supply it with the fuel required for nuclear reactors under construction if it alters the direction of its nuclear activities. For Iran, possession of nuclear reactors (such as the one constructed in Bushehr, awaiting an already overdue Russian promise to commence operation) is meaningless unless the know-how of uranium enrichment is achieved. Global powers’ mistrust towards Iran and the fear of another nuclear power on the world stage has complicated the issues.

Unlike the Americans up until now, the Russians have never totally ruled out uranium enrichment by Iran. Industrial-scale enrichment is, however, a shared concern of Moscow and the West. But apart from strategic concerns, the Russians are also worried about the economics of the issue. The domestic enrichment program by Iran coul potentially mean the loss of a valuable customer (for fuel) for Moscow.

Hasan Beheshtipour is university professor and foreign affairs analyst.