Continuing the Win-Win Game

Although the adoption of United Nations Security Resolution 1929 against Iran has heightened the wall of distrust between Iran and the international community especially the United States, the nature of Iran’s nuclear program namely its direct connection with global public opinion and the mutual interests of all concerned parties for solving the issue in a peaceful manner favors Iran ongoing adherence to a win-win strategy regarding its nuclear policy.

 While it is clear that the new resolution cannot change the course of Iran’s nuclear development, shifting from the current “win-win” game towards a “lose-lose” game in the future could be the unfortunate future of the new development and prove counter-productive for the Middle East’s political-security affairs.

 The early days of Obama’s presidency were greeted with a mixture of skepticism and optimism inside Iran. While a segment of the governing elite believed the U.S. president was ready to discard Bush’s policy of unilateralism and shift towards a “win-win” game with Iran, pessimists asserted Obama posed a new challenge and will use the element of time to bring about global consensus against Iran.

 To defuse these pressures and highlight the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program, President Ahmadinejad launched several initiatives such as hosting the Nuclear Disarmament Conference in Tehran(April 17-18, 2010), maintaining a high-profile presence at the United Nations’ NPT review conference in New York (May 3, 2010) and signing the Tehran Nuclear Declaration with Turkey and Brazil (May, 17, 2010). Inside Iran, all major political parties voiced support for the Iran-Turkey-Brazil Nuclear Deal to prop up the government’s stance.

 The Tehran Agreement was a massive step taken by Iran towards trust-building with the international community especially the United States. While the above-mentioned initiatives taken by Tehran were an opportunity to create a new wave in the international political atmosphere, they also turned into a challenge and moved the once friendly Russia and China closer to other Western powers. They realized that continued support for Iran at this level will undermine their long-held political clout and traditional authority at the United Nations Security Council.

 Meanwhile, Iran’s new nuclear policy harbored the potential to challenge President Obama’s efforts to forge a global consensus against Iran. This, amongst other reasons, led the United States to quickly pass another sanction resolution so as to gain the upper hand vis-à-vis Iran. This may explain why immediately after the adoption of the Resolution, Washington announced that diplomacy remains on the table and the EU has asked Iran for a new round of negotiation.

 When the nuclear swap proposal was initially presented by the IAEA and the West in October 2009, it was broached by the disparate political organs of Iran’s power structure. The embodiment of Iran’s strategic decision was the acceptance of the Tehran Nuclear Deal in May 2010. Although Washington has rejected the Tehran Deal on the basis of its own narrow reasons i.e., Iran has increased its enriched uranium stockpile within the last few months rendering the swap deal useless, one should accept that Tehran needed some time to weigh up the Geneva Deal on the domestic political scene.

 With the assent of Russia and China to the adoption of Resolution 1929, Iran should redefine the role of these two countries with respect to its nuclear policy. This does not mean that Tehran should eliminate their role; rather it is about the necessity of being more realistic about the role they could and should play. Russia and China’s recent position has shown to what extent these countries are ready to support Iran, as well as connect their global strategic issues with their short-term lucrative economic relations to Iran. It has also shown that upon entering global strategic issues such as global nuclear disarmament, nuclear monopoly, etc., the Islamic Republic of Iran will face serious challenges, even from rival great powers like Russia and China.

 By contrast, Turkey and Brazil admirably stood firm on their position and cast a negative vote against the 1929 resolution. This could be a turning point for Iran in reassessing the role and place of new rising powers in its regional and international strategic affairs. The new development showed that on issues such as nuclear disarmament and resistance to nuclear monopoly, Turkey and Brazil offer the prospect of being more reliable partners than either Russia or China.

 Although the United States has missed an opportunity to initiate a strategic breakthrough with Iran, the new political development has yet to reach an absolute stalemate. The nature of Iran’s nuclear program is such that continuing a win-win strategy, working with the IAEA, and sticking within the parameters of NPT regulations can better legitimize the aims and strategies of Iran’s nuclear activities on the global stage. 

 Kayhan Barzegar is a university professor and Iran’s nuclear affairs analyst.