New Security Arrangements in the Persian Gulf

Since the quick liberation of Kuwait by Western forces in 1991, internal strife between GCC members has become more conspicuous, ringing alarm bells for a possible breakdown of the council. If that happens, the region will witness a substantial transformation of geopolitical relations.

With the overthrow of the monarchy in Iran, the region lost a U.S.-backed gendarme who officially bore the responsibility of telling the Arab states of the Persian Gulf what was right and what is wrong. Dissolution of the pre-revolution order—which was based on submitting to the status quo and acknowledging the hegemony of the Iranian Pahlavi dynasty—and rise of a revolutionary regime in Iran led to immense distress among Arab leaders who were prompted to unite under the umbrella of the Cooperation Council. Iran’s occupation with defending itself in its war, however, brought a sense of relative security for those leaders. Nevertheless, a prolongation of the war and Saddam’s failure to subjugate the Iranians fostered the idea among Arab leaders of the region that it was only under the aegis of extraregional powers that they could guarantee their own security. The presence of U.S. military forces in the Persian Gulf region in the late 1980s should be interpreted within this context.

The U.S. presence became permanent after the Second Persian Gulf War and the liberation of Kuwait. The U.S. Navy fleet began patrolling the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean heralding a new age—one in which Iran was excluded from regional security arrangements. From a self-induced fear of Iran to Saddam’s revitalization, every Arab state had certain goals behind the plea for a U.S. presence in the region.

But the occupation of Iraq in 2003 by the United States and its allies led to the formation of new camps in the region. On the one hand stood the ‘resistance’; spearheaded by Iran, but including Syria, Hezbollah, and Hamas. On the other side were the so-called ‘moderate’ Arab states; on the surface led by Saudi Arabia, but backed –not so covertly- by the United States. The diplomatic wrestle between these two camps has in most cases resulted in the defeat of the moderate Arabs’ axis.

The 2005 parliamentary election in Iraq brought Iran-backed Shiites to power. The 33-day war between Hezbollah and Israel shattered the myth of invincibility of the Israeli army, while the 22-day raid on Gaza negated the image of a peace-minded, humanitarian Israel that Tel Aviv was struggling hard to project (and without achieving the goal of rooting out Hamas). The struggle between Lebanese political groups was finally ended by Qatar –moving ever closer to Iran- and not by the moderate camp; an all-out attack on the Shiite Houthis of Yemen by the central government and the Saudi Army led to a fiasco; and despite the 91 Iraqi parliamentary seats won by Riyadh-backed Ayad Allawi in 2010, a coalition between pro-Iran Shiite groups in Iraq will easily sideline Allawi’s block. The only response by Israel to the moderate axis—which is desperate in its quest for peace and the formation of an independent Palestinian state—is Israel’s rebuff.

Successive failures of the moderate axis have undermined the position of its leader, Riyadh, decreasing its influence in regional affairs. Having once bet on Saddam but then watched as his corpse was lowered from the gallows, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf are no longer certain that the Saudi Arabian leadership can be their Prince Charming.

Along with the consecutive strategic losses of the axis, the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council has undergone a transformation, no longer enjoying the unity once it had. Declarations issued with each summit have no practical usage. Internal differences between member states have turned them from allies into rivals. As age-old tensions bubble to the surface, the future of the council appears gloomier than ever. It is not even clear how long the council would continue to exist if it weren’t for U.S. pressure to convene summits. The rift between members of the council has become so glaring during recent months—or is it years?—that it cannot be ignored anymore. Many differences are, indeed, rooted in the behavior of the Council’s Big Brother—Saudi Arabia—and its unilateral policies.

Saudi Arabia is following a subversive agenda in Iraq while Kuwait –the primary victim of the Baath era- fears that Riyadh’s support for terrorists in Iraq may return the situation back to the time of Saddam. Fear of the rise of pre-occupation forces has moved it closer to Tehran. Saudi Arabia has issues to pick with Qatar, too, and Doha and Riyadh have glaring diplomatic differences. To secure itself a firm foothold, Doha is approaching Tehran. It hosts conferences that leave a bad taste for the Saudis. The United Arab Emirates is also struggling with Saudi Arabia over the disputed oil-rich al-Adeed region. Sporadic firing at Saudi fishing boats by the UAE Marine Guard should come as no surprise. Territorial disputes are, however, not exclusive to Saudi Arabia. Bahrain claims sovereignty over the Qatar-ruled islands of Zubarah and Hawar, and the Qatari marine guard firing on Bahraini fishing vessels was responded to by Bahrain with the shutting down of Al Jazeera’s bureau in Manama.

A common currency between the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council members has still not come to realization. While Saudi Arabia insists that the financial administration of the currency should be based in Riyadh, the UAE wants flourishing Abu-Dhabi to host the institutions that do so. Oman, on the other hand, is against a common currency, undermining the vision altogether.

Kuwait and Bahrain are not free from contention in bilateral ties either. Aware of the differences between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the Emir of Bahrain frequents Saudi Arabia on every minor occasion, fomenting disputes between Riyadh and Kuwait.

Iran’s regional power may further undermine the shaky council. Despite the sanctions imposed on it by West, Iran is on a progress track. Tehran’s increasing clout has compelled Arab states of the Persian Gulf to give a second thought to their attitude towards Iran. Recently conducted maneuvers by Iran in the Persian Gulf and Iran’s development of advanced military technologies have convinced the Arab states that the United States is not as prepared as it claims to be to protect them, and a clash between Tehran and Washington can cause trouble for the entire region.

In its 2010 maneuvers, Iran revealed two significant facts: first, it has the capability to block passage through the strait of Hormuz in case of war, despite all of Washington’s bluffs. Second, Iranian reconnaissance aircraft flights over the U.S. Navy fleet and the Americans’ non-reaction convinced the Arabs that they cannot rely merely on what are heartwarming remarks by American generals and admirals.

The rift between Persian Gulf Arab states became more visible when Qatari military officials invited by Iran attended the maneuvers –despite opposition by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Tehran’s initiatives in the region have cornered Washington, and its insistence on continuing its nuclear program has severely undermined U.S. hegemony in the region and its prestige in the eyes of the Arab states.

The fact that United States might not support Arab states against external threats has led leaders of those countries to the conclusion that a new arrangement should be developed for regional affairs—one which involves and includes Iran.