Moscow and Tehran; a Real Friendship?

But such appeasing remarks are hard to believe. Since the early 1990s –when the Nagorno-Karabakh territorial dispute broke out- Moscow has countered Tehran’s efforts in brokering a peace deal between Armenia and the Republic of Azerbaijan. A recent case may suffice to prove this fact: the Kremlin refused to invite Iran to a joint conference attended by the parliamentary spokesmen and national security officials of Russia and the three Caucasian states (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia).

So what do the Russians exactly mean by “stability in the Caucasus”? After two decades, the Karabakh dispute –rooted in Moscow’s misconduct- has not been resolved. Moscow’s behavior has also contributed to the deterioration of the situation in Georgia where contrary to international law, Moscow breached the territorial integrity of Georgia by invading Abkhazia and South Ossetia and recognizing them as sovereign republics. It is not clear which ‘apposite’ Iranian policy it is that Russian politicians are talking about. Is it Tehran’s negligence towards developments in Muslim-dominated regions such as Chechnya, or is it its attitude towards developments in Georgia and Karabakh that they consider clever? Tehran’s inactivity vis-à-vis Russian created crises in the Caucasus renders it anything but a key actor in regional affairs.

Moscow was behind the failure of Karabakh peace talks held in Tehran in the spring of 1992. While the presidents of Iran, Armenia, and the Republic of Azerbaijan were signing a joint peace declaration in Tehran, with Moscow’s green light and collaborationists’ help the historical city of Shusha was occupied by Armenia. Moscow’s military presence in Armenia—apart from its antithetical behavior in Abkhazia and South Ossetia vis-à-vis Chechnya and Ingush—is a far cry from the role of ‘the Caucasus peacekeeper’.

Hand in hand with the United States, Moscow also desires to sideline Iran in energy transfer projects. Iran is a potentially powerful rival for Russians, which is why Moscow is putting increasing pressure on Yerevan not to allow Iran to export its gas through the Armenian territory. Iran’s presence in Turkey’s lucrative energy market has also distressed the Russians.

Nevertheless, Moscow’s efforts to keep Tehran away from the Caucasus have backfired in some cases, creating an opening for extraregional forces such as the United States and Israel. Despite its strong presence in the Caucasus, Moscow has failed to stop the construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum oil pipelines. Russia was also never unable to prevent the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) members from signing cooperation agreements with NATO. The West’s political, economic, cultural, and security influence in the region has steadily increased without the Kremlin being able to counter it. By keeping Tehran at bay, Moscow has amateurishly sacrificed the interests of Iran, the Caucasian states and even itself in the region. Tehran’s struggle with West –particularly the U.S.- and its reliance on Moscow for the delay-plagued Bushehr nuclear power plant, has stopped it from taking a decisive stance against the Russians.

Nuclear cooperation and the Bushehr nuclear power plant

It seems that the time has come for Tehran to rethink its relations with Moscow. During recent months, Moscow has gradually drifted apart from Tehran, tilting towards the West and voicing support for sanctions against Iran. Medvedev’s remark in his meeting with President Lula before he left for Tehran- that Brazil has no more than a thirty percent chance of convincing Iran to agree to a nuclear fuel swap deal- bears more significance these days. Whether it is in the UN Security Council or at the IAEA Board of Governors, Moscow has always voted against Iran. From a strategic perspective, Moscow has always supported West; any differences being merely a matter of tactics.

The sale of the S300 air defense system to Iran is another typical case demonstrating how the Russians misuse Iran’s trust. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claims that the contract to sell the defense missiles is still in place, but there are a few issues that need to be resolved before actual delivery of the system to Iran. According to Lavrov, Moscow heeds the principle (in its domestic laws and international obligations) of not taking any steps that could jeopardize stability in the region. On new sanctions against Iran, Lavrov may have rejected unilateral action by the United States, but we should not take this as a supportive sign. It is just another Moscow-style game of using the Iran card to extract from West the advantages it desires. The Moscow show on the Bushehr nuclear power plant is another old, deplorable story—turned comically bitter when the Russian foreign minister and prime minister announced two different dates for its inauguration.

Overall, from the Kremlin’s attitude towards Tehran it becomes clear that:

1.      Moscow prefers to side with its rivals in the West rather than Tehran.

2.      The Kremlin’s cooperation in the imposition of sanctions on Iran and stopping the uranium enrichment process are stronger than its efforts in the completion and running of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.

3.      Moscow is truly unhappy with Iran’s uranium enrichment program, as much as West if not more.

It appears that the Bushehr nuclear power plant will remain an incomplete project as long as questions over Iran’s nuclear dossier have not reached a clear conclusion. The same goes for the S-300 antimissile systems the Russians were to have delivered to Iran a few years ago (Hillary Clinton warned the Russians on the antimissile systems a little while ago).

Russia believes that its national interests will be served through wielding Iran as a bargaining chip rather than cooperating with it. And the history of Russia-Iran relations attests to this approach. An overall look at the Russians’ attitude calls for rethinking our ties with Moscow. This should be a part of the broader project of the ‘pathology’ of Iran’s foreign diplomacy.