NPT Review Conference 2010: The US approach

This time round, one of the US’s greatest preoccupations is its perception of “threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism”. Of foremost concern to US in this context is its perceived violation of the NPT by Iran’s nuclear program. The US, a nuclear-weapon-state with the largest and most sophisticated nuclear arsenals, is particularly concerned about Iran’s low-level enrichment activities. That is in spite of the fact that, the resulting uranium is only usable for peaceful applications of nuclear energy.

Therefore, regardless of apparent change in US foreign policy, as claimed by President Obama, the US approach to the review conference would probably be severely dominated by the US’s highly antagonistic perception of Iran’s nuclear program. Were this US approach to the review conference loose sight of legitimate interests of the non-nuclear-weapon states members of the NPT, including Iran, the 2010 review conference would likely see the unfortunate fate of the 2005 review conference.

Theoretical considerations

In spite of hard and deep rooted constants determining the US foreign policy, regardless of who is sitting in the White House, President Barack Obama’s Administration is somehow distinct from the ones before it. From a theoretical point of view, in its approach to foreign policy, Bill Clinton’s leadership (1993- 2001) has been seen as having been dominated by “liberal institutionalism”, characterized by establishing “institutional balance” in international politics, and exercising US power through multilateralism and via institutions that lead to the strengthening of institutionalism. It was believed that through reform and strengthening of norms, regimes and institutions, regional and international balance is achievable.

President Clinton’s period also saw the emergence of “international Wilsonism”, which favored and gave particular importance to the use of force in international relations. This approach presented itself in such terms as “preemptive strike”, “regime change”, and “humanitarian intervention”, resulting in a degree of US unilateralism, vis-à-vis other nations.

However, the era of George Bush, the previous US President (2001-2009), has been labeled as “realism”. Here, some important matters, such as the balance of power in international politics, lost their previous importance to some degree. From the point of view of George Bush and the neo-conservatives surrounding him in Washington, “balance of power” meant US superiority over all other nations. Neo-Cons did not have and did not show much confidence in the international system and did not give much attention to international diplomacy. These conditions led to the adoption of a more “offensive” US foreign policy. Confronting potential threats to US national security, and wiping out the presumed sources of such threats, was given a special focus in US foreign policy formulation (Mottaghi, 2009: 11-13).

With the event of 9/11, the need for, both, the preservation of the US national security, and confronting the enemy, at home and outside, were strongly boosted. In this vein, national security became the most powerful US obsession. Institutions dealing with national security were strengthened and new ones were established to enforce maximum control over the public. The US was preparing for war in Iraq, Afghanistan, and later perhaps, Iran.[4] US unilateralism was at its peak.

Bush’s militarist approach brought catastrophic destruction to Iraq and Afghanistan. In spite of a most severe clamp-down on the media internationally, the extent of catastrophe could not be hidden for long, from the world. The prolongation of the war,^[5] particularly in Iraq, gave rise to a strong tide of criticism against the Bush administration’s foreign policy. It also cautioned Bush against attacking Iran, considering the numbers killed and the chaotic condition of the US forces in Iraq. Also, it was not hard to see the US forces led into a much deeper quagmire, than what they were already in, were they to attack Iran.

Words can hardly encapsulate the immensity of the wrongs done, in the Bush presidency era. All done, under glamorous names, such as “war on terror”, promotion of  “democracy”, and preservation of “security” in the world, killing and terrorizing millions of peoples in Iraq and Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the Middle East. The period is tainted with open and illegitimate US military aggressions against Iraq and Afghanistan, in particular. Therefore, in theoretical terms, the Bush era may be recognized under the supremacist, militarist, and unilateralist concept of “offensive realism”.^[6]

By late 2006, it was widely clear that the Neo-Con’s approach had to give way to a less costly US foreign policy approach. Therefore, Obama’s presidential campaign slogan of “change” may be seen as a response the US society’s urgent need for a change in US foreign policy, in particular.^[7] In this vein, Obama has tended towards (a) "multilateralism” to resolve the US military conflicts and other international issues, and (b) “co-operation” to attain and preserve international peace, security and stability, in his foreign policy approach.

However, in view of serious complexities, mainly due to various interest groups, some of them extremely influential in US corridors of power, and the continuing US military engagements of the Bush legacy,^[8] any “change” in US foreign policy can not realistically be expected to be fundamental. In line with this, points of serious contradiction could be found, both in terms of important policy decisions, high-level State appointments, and policy execution.^[9] Nevertheless, in line with the overwhelming US society’s need for change, and the requirements of the essential US national security and interests, Obama’s approach to foreign policy is in some important respects different to the one preceding it.

Theoretically, Obama’s approach to foreign policy, particularly, in relation to the Middle East, where his most pressing concerns for security are piled up,^[10] is considered to be rooted in "realism" and “defensive realism”^[11] in particular (Mottaghi, 2009: 16). On this basis, and on the basis of many of the political positions he has adopted^[12] since he took the lead in Washington, Obama’s foreign policy is expected to be leaning less towards offensiveness, unilateralism, militarism, and weaponization, as compared to the Bush administration’s one. In contrast, he is seen to be more favorable towards defense and constructive diplomacy, expansion of relations, conduct of negotiations, arms control and disarmament, multilateralism, cooperation, rationality, pragmatism, flexibility, and consensus-building (Mottaghi, 2009: 17-27).

In theory, that’s not too bad. However, in order to come to a more realistic understanding of the US approach to foreign policy, particularly as it relates to the NPT Review Conference 2010, a closer look at how the US has practically addressed the issue in the real world could be enlightening.

US’s Preparatory Committee Statement

In May 2009, at the third and final session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference,[13] US Ambassador Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, read a message from U.S. President Barack Obama.

Disarmament

One month ago in Prague, the president had reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to the NPT. As said then, the US believed that the NPT’s framework was sound: “countries with nuclear weapons will move toward disarmament, countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries can have access to peaceful nuclear energy”.

While they agreed on that framework, they were to strengthen the NPT to deal effectively with the threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism. Action was needed to improve verification and compliance with the NPT and to foster the responsible and widest possible use of nuclear energy by all states. To seek the peace and security of a world free of nuclear weapons, he had committed the US to take a number of initial steps.  Through cooperation and shared understanding, he was hopeful that the NPT pillars would be strengthened and confidence restored in its credibility and effectiveness.

Obama recognized that differences were inevitable and that NPT parties would not always view each element of the treaty in the same way. “But we must define ourselves not by our differences, but by our readiness to pursue dialogue and hard work to ensure the NPT continues to make an enduring contribution to international peace and security.”

The US Ambassador added that, they sought a review process that reflected a balance in emphasis on those pillars, the first one being disarmament, NPT Article VI. As outlined by President Obama in Prague, first, the US and Russia would negotiate a new agreement to replace the strategic arms reduction treaty (START), which expired in December 2009. Obama had also said in Prague that: “We will seek a new agreement by the end of the year that is legally binding and sufficiently bold…. This will set the stage for further cuts, and we will seek to include all nuclear weapon states in this endeavor.”

Obama and Russian President Medvedev had instructed that the new agreement achieve reductions lower than those in existing arms control agreements, and that the new agreement should include effective verification measures.  The Presidents had also directed that the talks begin immediately, and further charged their negotiators to report, by July, on their progress in working out a new agreement. An initial meeting was held in Rome on April 24th, and another meeting was planned in Moscow after the PrepCom.

Obama had confirmed in Prague that the US “would immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).” The US would also launch a diplomatic effort to bring on board the other states whose ratifications were required for the treaty to enter into force.

Obama had also sought a new treaty that verifiably ended production of fissile materials intended for use in nuclear weapons – a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). The treaty was not only to help fulfill their NPT Article VI commitments, “but it also could help avoid destabilizing arms races in regions such as South Asia”.  It could also facilitate the task of securing such weapons-usable materials against theft or seizure by terrorist groups. The negotiation of a verifiable FMCT, delayed for long, was the top U.S. priority at the Conference on Disarmament.[14] The US hoped that its renewed flexibility on this issue would enable negotiations to start soon in Geneva.

Pending the successful negotiation and entry into force of an FMCT, the US had reaffirmed their “decades-long unilateral moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons”. Also, other governments, nuclear-weapon-states in particular, were called, “to declare or reaffirm their intention not to produce further fissile material for weapons.”  Similarly, until CTBT entered into force, the US was to continue their nearly two-decade long moratorium on nuclear explosive testing and asked other governments for a similar undertaking.

Nonproliferation

Turning to nonproliferation, it was noted,

[How] important stopping the spread of nuclear weapons is to giving the nuclear weapon states confidence that further reductions in these weapons can be made without undermining international peace and security.  Partly for this reason, it is critical that NPT Parties comply fully with their Treaty obligations. To this end, as President Obama said in Prague, “we need more resources and authority to strengthen international inspections.”

Much of this increase in resources and authority had to go to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), particularly, to its safeguards system.  

Efforts had to be redoubled to update IAEA safeguards technologies and convince those NPT Parties that have not yet done so to bring into force the comprehensive IAEA safeguards agreements required by the Treaty’s Article III.  Universal entry into force of the Additional Protocol to safeguards agreements had also to be   pursued vigorously. “Universal adherence to the NPT itself – including by India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea” also remained a fundamental US objective.

Consequences for those breaking the rules or withdrawing from the treaty without cause also had to be addressed. As President Obama had said in Prague, “[R]ules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something. The world must stand together to