This Is Diplomacy!
By Hasan Beheshtipour
It’s never too late. Even though the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has already issued four resolutions against Iran, Iran’s shuttle diplomacy aimed at non-permanent members of the Council is, nonetheless, good news. And it may prove that Iran’s diplomatic apparatus has finally come around to the belief that diplomacy is the most grounded political activity. Diplomacy is the art of the trade-off and the backstage deal; the art of the make-up and the break-up.
But we should not allow the Austrian prime minister’s remarks, after meeting Foreign Minister Mottaki, to frustrate us. What could one expect when U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had visited Austria a few days before Mottaki’s trip? And we must not forget that Austria is a EU member, naturally affected by British, French and German efforts to hinder Iran’s nuclear program. Even if it sympathizes with Iran under the surface, Austria has limited room for maneuvering (the United States’ overt and public disappointment with Austria hosting the Iranian FM itself demonstrates that the talks have most probably been effective).
Other UNSC non-permanent members, including Turkey, Lebanon, Uganda, and Kenya, are probably on Mottaki’s list of diplomatic targets, and visits to those countries can help Iran clarify its position and its nuclear intentions for the international community. Retreating in our shell will not solve any of our problems.
Mottaki also visited another influential character during his visit to Austria—IAEA chief Yukio Amano. The mainstream media may have dubbed the meeting ‘fruitless’, but we should forget about what the media proclaims. At their best, the media only half covers the truth. (They may not have even known about the details and agenda of the Tehran-IAEA talks.) With this meeting, though, Iran has once again clarified its interest in cooperating with the Atomic Agency and its openness to further monitoring of nuclear facilities. Sustained negotiations are a victory for Iran, even if after his meeting with Manouchehr Mottaki, Amano was quoted as saying that the IAEA was still awaiting Iran’s response to the nuclear swap proposal.
Iran is now following its preferred strategy—to advance its nuclear dossier within the walls of IAEA central office in Vienna. Iran views the IAEA as the legitimate arbiter of disputes and disagreements since it is a UN affiliate. Unlike the UN Security Council, the IAEA—entitled to monitor nuclear activities of its members—attends to technical and legal aspects, not the political and security aspects of any program. For Iran, the UNSC is a place where world powers abuse the UN Charter and present Iran as a threat to global peace and security.
As such, it is unsurprising that Iran insists on continuing negotiations with the IAEA. Over two thousand man/hours of IAEA supervision over (and 21 related reports on) Iran’s nuclear activities clarify that no deviation from the NPT framework has been observed in Iran’s nuclear program.
Iran has also officially expressed its readiness to swap one thousand kilograms of its low-enriched uranium with one hundred kilograms of the twenty-percent enriched uranium that it requires for Tehran’s medical reactor. This prelude is flawless in the strategy of trust building and initiating of fruitful negotiations between Iran and the IAEA. Tehran is waiting for a response, but it is unclear that its reasonable proposal has, as of yet, penetrated the walls of the IAEA building in Vienna.
Hasan Beheshtipour is a foreign affairs analyst.
But we should not allow the Austrian prime minister’s remarks, after meeting Foreign Minister Mottaki, to frustrate us. What could one expect when U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had visited Austria a few days before Mottaki’s trip? And we must not forget that Austria is a EU member, naturally affected by British, French and German efforts to hinder Iran’s nuclear program. Even if it sympathizes with Iran under the surface, Austria has limited room for maneuvering (the United States’ overt and public disappointment with Austria hosting the Iranian FM itself demonstrates that the talks have most probably been effective).
Other UNSC non-permanent members, including Turkey, Lebanon, Uganda, and Kenya, are probably on Mottaki’s list of diplomatic targets, and visits to those countries can help Iran clarify its position and its nuclear intentions for the international community. Retreating in our shell will not solve any of our problems.
Mottaki also visited another influential character during his visit to Austria—IAEA chief Yukio Amano. The mainstream media may have dubbed the meeting ‘fruitless’, but we should forget about what the media proclaims. At their best, the media only half covers the truth. (They may not have even known about the details and agenda of the Tehran-IAEA talks.) With this meeting, though, Iran has once again clarified its interest in cooperating with the Atomic Agency and its openness to further monitoring of nuclear facilities. Sustained negotiations are a victory for Iran, even if after his meeting with Manouchehr Mottaki, Amano was quoted as saying that the IAEA was still awaiting Iran’s response to the nuclear swap proposal.
Iran is now following its preferred strategy—to advance its nuclear dossier within the walls of IAEA central office in Vienna. Iran views the IAEA as the legitimate arbiter of disputes and disagreements since it is a UN affiliate. Unlike the UN Security Council, the IAEA—entitled to monitor nuclear activities of its members—attends to technical and legal aspects, not the political and security aspects of any program. For Iran, the UNSC is a place where world powers abuse the UN Charter and present Iran as a threat to global peace and security.
As such, it is unsurprising that Iran insists on continuing negotiations with the IAEA. Over two thousand man/hours of IAEA supervision over (and 21 related reports on) Iran’s nuclear activities clarify that no deviation from the NPT framework has been observed in Iran’s nuclear program.
Iran has also officially expressed its readiness to swap one thousand kilograms of its low-enriched uranium with one hundred kilograms of the twenty-percent enriched uranium that it requires for Tehran’s medical reactor. This prelude is flawless in the strategy of trust building and initiating of fruitful negotiations between Iran and the IAEA. Tehran is waiting for a response, but it is unclear that its reasonable proposal has, as of yet, penetrated the walls of the IAEA building in Vienna.
Hasan Beheshtipour is a foreign affairs analyst.