The Obama administration’s realistic Iran options
Iran watchers must see it as perverse that U.S.-Iranian relations are so rocky more than a year into President Barack Obama’s term... By Hooman Majd
Iran watchers must see it as perverse that U.S.-Iranian relations are so rocky more than a year into President Barack Obama’s term.
Obama ran for president promising to talk with Iran without preconditions. He didn’t back down — despite attacks, even ridicule, from Republicans and Democrats.
Once in office, Obama did reach out to Iranians in unprecedented ways. But he also threatened sanctions or even military action should his extended hand be met with a clenched fist. Which is how Washington now views Tehran’s response.
So Obama is looking to address what U.S. options are with respect to Iran. With hawks on his left and right — and in Israel — the pressure is on to do something to prevent Iran from acquiring the ability to develop nuclear weapons.
But the question remains: What?
The Iranians see Obama’s offer of talks as just that, for there have been no direct negotiations beyond one meeting in October.
There, Washington and its allies presented Iran with a plan: They would remove most of Iran’s stock of enriched uranium in exchange for, sometime later, fuel rods that Iran needs to run its medical reactor in Tehran.
Much has been made of Iran’s rejection. But relatively little notice of Tehran’s many counteroffers — including the most recent, last week, from Iran’s foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki.
Mottaki said Iran would put most of its enriched uranium stockpile under 24-hour International Atomic Energy Agency supervision until it was removed from the country simultaneously with the West’s delivery of fuel rods with higher-enriched uranium.
For the problem between Tehran and Washington has always been about trust. It has dominated U.S.-Iranian relations since the 1979 Islamic revolution.
Today, the West doesn’t trust that Iran won’t build weapons with its uranium. Iran, if it first gives up its stockpile, doesn’t trust the West to deliver the fuel rods it needs. It is likely, Iran implies, that other Western demands will be added later.
But trust cannot be built if Washington threatens Iran with everything from sanctions “that bite” to nuclear annihilation — as it does in the latest Nuclear Posture Review — unless Tehran agrees to the West’s one offer.
Not even if those threats are accompanied — in strong contrast to the Bush administration — with offers to open negotiations.
Obama has always said that if diplomacy failed, his administration would seek international cooperation for new sanctions. But few experts believe these could have any real effect.
Most experts also agree that some form of military strike may interrupt, but not stop, Iran’s nuclear program. If Iran is attacked by U.S. or Israeli forces, these experts say, the consequence would be that Iran would almost certainly move full speed ahead in developing its nuclear capability.
So Obama’s realistic option on Iran remains diplomacy and negotiations. But how should he begin the process?
He could have U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice, for example, reach out to her Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Khazaee, who is a block or two away in New York.
Or Secretary of State Hillary Clinton could meet with Mottaki when he arrives in New York next month for the U.N.’s non-proliferation treaty review conference.
Or administration officials could sit down with Iranians anywhere in the world, to talk about bridging the gap between the P5+1 offer on Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile and Iran’s various counteroffers.
Some critics argue that the Iranians aren’t serious and may not even show up. Iran, these critics say, wants to stall so it can reach “breakout” nuclear capability.
But Tehran wouldn’t make such public counteroffers if it had no interest in resolving the nuclear crisis — particularly since its already troubled economy is sure to suffer even more under new sanctions.
Some in Tehran’s leadership probably also seek to solve this international problem so they can focus on the domestic political crisis triggered by the 2009 presidential election results.
Yet even as this domestic political unrest may have quickened Tehran’s interest, it may have checked Obama’s Iran team — who hear from many quarters that Washington must either overtly support the Iranian opposition or do nothing to harm it.
But the nuclear issue, wrapped up as it is with national pride and sovereignty, is one that resonates strongly with most Iranians — supporters of the regime or not.
Resolving this nuclear crisis through negotiations may actually help any legitimate opposition, by removing a rallying point for the government. The regime may be partly propped up by Iranians reacting to outside threats from Washington and the West.
Meanwhile, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the one man responsible for deciding Iran’s nuclear policy, has maintained Iran’s right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But he has disavowed nuclear weapons — even issuing a fatwa to that effect.
He insists that the Obama administration’s nice-guy rhetoric is not enough and demands that the words be backed up by action. In the past, Khamenei has responded to positive U.S. actions.
He authorized the 2009 Geneva meeting between Iran’s nuclear negotiator and Washington. There’s no reason to believe he wouldn’t authorize further talks.
Perhaps Obama’s best option is to take Khamenei’s words at face value and act by initiating a timetable for negotiations.
The biggest concern, Iran’s stock of enriched uranium, is actually the easiest problem to solve.
The Iranians have already indicated they are open to exchanging their stockpile for fuel rods — which would be difficult, if not impossible, to weaponize — just not exactly according to Washington’s terms. Other major issues of U.S. concern, however, like Iran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah, may be far more difficult to resolve.
But the irony of a low point in U.S.-Iran relations occurring in the age of Obama has not been lost on the Iranians. If “hope” and “change” are brought to the table in meaningful ways, perhaps enough trust can be built for future good relations — with this or any future Iranian administration.
Politico
Obama ran for president promising to talk with Iran without preconditions. He didn’t back down — despite attacks, even ridicule, from Republicans and Democrats.
Once in office, Obama did reach out to Iranians in unprecedented ways. But he also threatened sanctions or even military action should his extended hand be met with a clenched fist. Which is how Washington now views Tehran’s response.
So Obama is looking to address what U.S. options are with respect to Iran. With hawks on his left and right — and in Israel — the pressure is on to do something to prevent Iran from acquiring the ability to develop nuclear weapons.
But the question remains: What?
The Iranians see Obama’s offer of talks as just that, for there have been no direct negotiations beyond one meeting in October.
There, Washington and its allies presented Iran with a plan: They would remove most of Iran’s stock of enriched uranium in exchange for, sometime later, fuel rods that Iran needs to run its medical reactor in Tehran.
Much has been made of Iran’s rejection. But relatively little notice of Tehran’s many counteroffers — including the most recent, last week, from Iran’s foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki.
Mottaki said Iran would put most of its enriched uranium stockpile under 24-hour International Atomic Energy Agency supervision until it was removed from the country simultaneously with the West’s delivery of fuel rods with higher-enriched uranium.
For the problem between Tehran and Washington has always been about trust. It has dominated U.S.-Iranian relations since the 1979 Islamic revolution.
Today, the West doesn’t trust that Iran won’t build weapons with its uranium. Iran, if it first gives up its stockpile, doesn’t trust the West to deliver the fuel rods it needs. It is likely, Iran implies, that other Western demands will be added later.
But trust cannot be built if Washington threatens Iran with everything from sanctions “that bite” to nuclear annihilation — as it does in the latest Nuclear Posture Review — unless Tehran agrees to the West’s one offer.
Not even if those threats are accompanied — in strong contrast to the Bush administration — with offers to open negotiations.
Obama has always said that if diplomacy failed, his administration would seek international cooperation for new sanctions. But few experts believe these could have any real effect.
Most experts also agree that some form of military strike may interrupt, but not stop, Iran’s nuclear program. If Iran is attacked by U.S. or Israeli forces, these experts say, the consequence would be that Iran would almost certainly move full speed ahead in developing its nuclear capability.
So Obama’s realistic option on Iran remains diplomacy and negotiations. But how should he begin the process?
He could have U.N. Ambassador Susan Rice, for example, reach out to her Iranian counterpart, Mohammad Khazaee, who is a block or two away in New York.
Or Secretary of State Hillary Clinton could meet with Mottaki when he arrives in New York next month for the U.N.’s non-proliferation treaty review conference.
Or administration officials could sit down with Iranians anywhere in the world, to talk about bridging the gap between the P5+1 offer on Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile and Iran’s various counteroffers.
Some critics argue that the Iranians aren’t serious and may not even show up. Iran, these critics say, wants to stall so it can reach “breakout” nuclear capability.
But Tehran wouldn’t make such public counteroffers if it had no interest in resolving the nuclear crisis — particularly since its already troubled economy is sure to suffer even more under new sanctions.
Some in Tehran’s leadership probably also seek to solve this international problem so they can focus on the domestic political crisis triggered by the 2009 presidential election results.
Yet even as this domestic political unrest may have quickened Tehran’s interest, it may have checked Obama’s Iran team — who hear from many quarters that Washington must either overtly support the Iranian opposition or do nothing to harm it.
But the nuclear issue, wrapped up as it is with national pride and sovereignty, is one that resonates strongly with most Iranians — supporters of the regime or not.
Resolving this nuclear crisis through negotiations may actually help any legitimate opposition, by removing a rallying point for the government. The regime may be partly propped up by Iranians reacting to outside threats from Washington and the West.
Meanwhile, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the one man responsible for deciding Iran’s nuclear policy, has maintained Iran’s right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But he has disavowed nuclear weapons — even issuing a fatwa to that effect.
He insists that the Obama administration’s nice-guy rhetoric is not enough and demands that the words be backed up by action. In the past, Khamenei has responded to positive U.S. actions.
He authorized the 2009 Geneva meeting between Iran’s nuclear negotiator and Washington. There’s no reason to believe he wouldn’t authorize further talks.
Perhaps Obama’s best option is to take Khamenei’s words at face value and act by initiating a timetable for negotiations.
The biggest concern, Iran’s stock of enriched uranium, is actually the easiest problem to solve.
The Iranians have already indicated they are open to exchanging their stockpile for fuel rods — which would be difficult, if not impossible, to weaponize — just not exactly according to Washington’s terms. Other major issues of U.S. concern, however, like Iran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah, may be far more difficult to resolve.
But the irony of a low point in U.S.-Iran relations occurring in the age of Obama has not been lost on the Iranians. If “hope” and “change” are brought to the table in meaningful ways, perhaps enough trust can be built for future good relations — with this or any future Iranian administration.
Politico