The Last Hopes of Afghanistan
By Mohammad Reza Bahrami, Iran’s former ambassador to Kabul.
The Afghanistan election marathon has finally ended and Hamed Karzai is now officially the president for a second term. The years ahead of Afghanistan are now tempting topic of discussion for observers, but certain points should be taken into consideration before we start talking about Afghanistan’s state of affairs, :
1. Comparing Afghanistan’s current situation with the one during 2004 presidential elections is simply erroneous. The biggest challenges facing the new administration are the crisis of mistrust between key political figures which naturally afflict the Afghan society. The legitimacy crisis which stems from the Karzai government’s inefficiency (a challenge which can be tackled in short-term), high expectations and little patienceof donor countries , increasing power of Afghan insurgents and their ever-growing role in undermining security are other problems. Add poverty, unemployment, bureaucratic corruption and narcotrafficking to this collection.
2. Although crucial, the strong emphasis of donor countries on anti-corruption measures is not a priority. Even worse, it maybe a cover-up for the failure of their military operations to root out Taliban and alQaeda influences in the country. Eight years of military presence in Afghanistan have not led to any tangible achievements, but have merely put in impasse spearheads of the war againt terror, i.e. NATO and the United States. It seems that frustrated with military operations, Western countries are trying to define victory in a way that tailors to their capabilities.
3. United States’ new strategy officialized in March 2009 has now undergone revision after facing basic challenges. Although American officials have not yet reached an agreement on the new Afghanistan strategy, their stance which seems to be a prelude to the new strategy conveys clear signals. First, reassuring that their presence in Afghanistan is not infinite, uttered to remove suspicions in the region about the true reason of their stay. Secondly, the delay in sending fresh military forces to Afghanistan despite the frequent requests of American military commanders, although testifying to the inefficiency of military solution and encouraging insurgents and their regional patrons to further destabilize Afghanistan and pressurize foreign troops, can limit the overriding dominance of the military commanders. It will push the Afghan government towards further reforms, reveal the reliance of the non-American troops on U.S. Army and put their activities in harmony. Thirdly, shifting the target to alQaeda in the war against terrorism will pave the way for political interaction with the opposition. It may lay the groundwork for a win-win policy that brings Afghan parties closer.
4. Since the invasion, Britain has constantly tried to introduce itself as the second most influential country in Afghanistan and revive its once remarkable regional influence. The responsibilities Britain has undertaken with regard to Afghanistan (eradicating opium cultivation, training Afghan army and police forces, hosting conference) are eye-catching. Of course, Pakistan and Persian Gulf Arab States have always occupied a more prominent role Britain’s diplomatic strategies.
It might have been due to such strategies that rarely we have seen The British show interest in curbing training and funding sources of Afghan insurgents in Afghanistan’s neighboring countries. An assessment of Britain’s official policy on Afghanistan during the recent months shows that it revolves around these central issues: 1. Emphasis on drafting a withdrawal timetable for foreign troops and conferring the responsibility to Afghan forces, emphasis on the need to initiate political interaction with insurgent groups, particularly Taliban, and clear avoidance of direct military confrontation with these groups, pressurizing the Afghan government to raise its efficiency, encouraging the United States and other NATO members to dispatch more soldiers to Afghanistan for short term in order to prop up the Afghan government, preventing the extension of insurgents’ sphere of influence and creating an atmosphere in which political reconciliation could be achieved. On Britain, however, let’s not forget the wave of criticism rising from the public opinion and politicians inside the country which has impelled the Labor to rethink the party strategy for the next election coming up in six months.
5. In Pakistan, the government has clearly distanced itself from the previous policy of manipulating extremist groups as their agents Afghanistan. Dispension with this policy has given Pakistan the opportunity to regain the trust of regional and extraregional powers. However, in practice there are still circles inside the Pakistani army’s intelligence system and religious fanatics that outpace the government and influence its foreign policies. Despite what some Western countries may think, the transition of power from these groups into the hands of a civil government is not achievable in short-term. It is a matter intertwined with Pakistan’s identity. Moreover, there is no predictable scenario for how things may turn out in tribal areas and the Sarhad Province. Pakistan is replete with dormant crises. In fact, it seems to be part of the problem itself, not the solution. A simplistic approach which patrons appeasing Pakistan in order to restore security in Afghanistan will just deteriorate the situation.
6. Recent remarks of Vakil Ahmad Motevakkel -foreign minister of the Taliban regime- in his interview with CNN was full of signals which should not be neglected. Although it is claimed that no strong connections exist between Motevakkel and Mulla Omar, the aims of both appear to be less distant. What came from Motevakkel’s remarks was Taliban’s refusal to share the cake of power with Karzai Instead, Motevakkel tried to construct a new image of Taliban. What he said implied that former rulers of Afghanistan will not repeat thier previous policies and are prepared to build trust with West. This could be a warning to countries like Britain who naively believe that reaching an agreement with Taliban is possible.
7. A quick glance at UNODC’s latest report shows Afghanistan is still the world’s largest producer of opium. 2.5-3 million Afghans are directly involved in the cultivation, harvest and transportation of the drug. Insurgents have a 90-160 million dollar income from the trade. The data reveal lack of any serious intentionamong Afghan officials and other parties involved to stop cultivation of the narcotic.
8. The most important point during the recent weeks, addressed by European countries, NATO and the United States is the necessity of drawing a timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan and conferring security responsibilities to Afghan forces. It may appear as a positive step at the first glance, but there are certain concenrs to be regarded: first of all, conferring responsibilities to Afghan forces should move beyond security, and extend to economic and reconstruction domains. Second, there needs to be a specific, rational time set for every stage of the process. Third, the process of transferring responsibilities to domestic forces cannot be undertaken without the cooperation of other countries, which should sidestep their interests and abide by a homogenuous strategy. Fifth, the Afghan government needs to revise its policies regarding the structure and number of military forces and police. Fifth, simultaneous withdrawal of foreign troops and transference of responsibility to Afghan forces should not be tied to reconciliation with insurgents. These cannot be put in one package. Any haste in accelerating this project in order to reduce pressure on foreign troops will be an erroneous political move that can put achievements all at jeopardy.
What comes in conclusion is the necessity for Afghan government to grasp the last opportunity to realize the demands of Afghan people. Developments in the recent months and impatience of donor countries has limited the maneuverability of the government. Afghanistan’s diplomacy needs further attention to the principle of balance between regional and extraregional states. Overcoming domestic challenges requires a serious anti-corruption campaign, avoiding ethnocentric and sectarian policies, forming an efficient, incorruptible cabinet and most important of all, reinforcing national solidarity as the key to security and taking matter at one’s own hands. If the government adopts absorbing -and not repelling- insurgents, less effort would be needed to fill vacant seats in the inauguration ceremony.
1. Comparing Afghanistan’s current situation with the one during 2004 presidential elections is simply erroneous. The biggest challenges facing the new administration are the crisis of mistrust between key political figures which naturally afflict the Afghan society. The legitimacy crisis which stems from the Karzai government’s inefficiency (a challenge which can be tackled in short-term), high expectations and little patienceof donor countries , increasing power of Afghan insurgents and their ever-growing role in undermining security are other problems. Add poverty, unemployment, bureaucratic corruption and narcotrafficking to this collection.
2. Although crucial, the strong emphasis of donor countries on anti-corruption measures is not a priority. Even worse, it maybe a cover-up for the failure of their military operations to root out Taliban and alQaeda influences in the country. Eight years of military presence in Afghanistan have not led to any tangible achievements, but have merely put in impasse spearheads of the war againt terror, i.e. NATO and the United States. It seems that frustrated with military operations, Western countries are trying to define victory in a way that tailors to their capabilities.
3. United States’ new strategy officialized in March 2009 has now undergone revision after facing basic challenges. Although American officials have not yet reached an agreement on the new Afghanistan strategy, their stance which seems to be a prelude to the new strategy conveys clear signals. First, reassuring that their presence in Afghanistan is not infinite, uttered to remove suspicions in the region about the true reason of their stay. Secondly, the delay in sending fresh military forces to Afghanistan despite the frequent requests of American military commanders, although testifying to the inefficiency of military solution and encouraging insurgents and their regional patrons to further destabilize Afghanistan and pressurize foreign troops, can limit the overriding dominance of the military commanders. It will push the Afghan government towards further reforms, reveal the reliance of the non-American troops on U.S. Army and put their activities in harmony. Thirdly, shifting the target to alQaeda in the war against terrorism will pave the way for political interaction with the opposition. It may lay the groundwork for a win-win policy that brings Afghan parties closer.
4. Since the invasion, Britain has constantly tried to introduce itself as the second most influential country in Afghanistan and revive its once remarkable regional influence. The responsibilities Britain has undertaken with regard to Afghanistan (eradicating opium cultivation, training Afghan army and police forces, hosting conference) are eye-catching. Of course, Pakistan and Persian Gulf Arab States have always occupied a more prominent role Britain’s diplomatic strategies.
It might have been due to such strategies that rarely we have seen The British show interest in curbing training and funding sources of Afghan insurgents in Afghanistan’s neighboring countries. An assessment of Britain’s official policy on Afghanistan during the recent months shows that it revolves around these central issues: 1. Emphasis on drafting a withdrawal timetable for foreign troops and conferring the responsibility to Afghan forces, emphasis on the need to initiate political interaction with insurgent groups, particularly Taliban, and clear avoidance of direct military confrontation with these groups, pressurizing the Afghan government to raise its efficiency, encouraging the United States and other NATO members to dispatch more soldiers to Afghanistan for short term in order to prop up the Afghan government, preventing the extension of insurgents’ sphere of influence and creating an atmosphere in which political reconciliation could be achieved. On Britain, however, let’s not forget the wave of criticism rising from the public opinion and politicians inside the country which has impelled the Labor to rethink the party strategy for the next election coming up in six months.
5. In Pakistan, the government has clearly distanced itself from the previous policy of manipulating extremist groups as their agents Afghanistan. Dispension with this policy has given Pakistan the opportunity to regain the trust of regional and extraregional powers. However, in practice there are still circles inside the Pakistani army’s intelligence system and religious fanatics that outpace the government and influence its foreign policies. Despite what some Western countries may think, the transition of power from these groups into the hands of a civil government is not achievable in short-term. It is a matter intertwined with Pakistan’s identity. Moreover, there is no predictable scenario for how things may turn out in tribal areas and the Sarhad Province. Pakistan is replete with dormant crises. In fact, it seems to be part of the problem itself, not the solution. A simplistic approach which patrons appeasing Pakistan in order to restore security in Afghanistan will just deteriorate the situation.
6. Recent remarks of Vakil Ahmad Motevakkel -foreign minister of the Taliban regime- in his interview with CNN was full of signals which should not be neglected. Although it is claimed that no strong connections exist between Motevakkel and Mulla Omar, the aims of both appear to be less distant. What came from Motevakkel’s remarks was Taliban’s refusal to share the cake of power with Karzai Instead, Motevakkel tried to construct a new image of Taliban. What he said implied that former rulers of Afghanistan will not repeat thier previous policies and are prepared to build trust with West. This could be a warning to countries like Britain who naively believe that reaching an agreement with Taliban is possible.
7. A quick glance at UNODC’s latest report shows Afghanistan is still the world’s largest producer of opium. 2.5-3 million Afghans are directly involved in the cultivation, harvest and transportation of the drug. Insurgents have a 90-160 million dollar income from the trade. The data reveal lack of any serious intentionamong Afghan officials and other parties involved to stop cultivation of the narcotic.
8. The most important point during the recent weeks, addressed by European countries, NATO and the United States is the necessity of drawing a timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan and conferring security responsibilities to Afghan forces. It may appear as a positive step at the first glance, but there are certain concenrs to be regarded: first of all, conferring responsibilities to Afghan forces should move beyond security, and extend to economic and reconstruction domains. Second, there needs to be a specific, rational time set for every stage of the process. Third, the process of transferring responsibilities to domestic forces cannot be undertaken without the cooperation of other countries, which should sidestep their interests and abide by a homogenuous strategy. Fifth, the Afghan government needs to revise its policies regarding the structure and number of military forces and police. Fifth, simultaneous withdrawal of foreign troops and transference of responsibility to Afghan forces should not be tied to reconciliation with insurgents. These cannot be put in one package. Any haste in accelerating this project in order to reduce pressure on foreign troops will be an erroneous political move that can put achievements all at jeopardy.
What comes in conclusion is the necessity for Afghan government to grasp the last opportunity to realize the demands of Afghan people. Developments in the recent months and impatience of donor countries has limited the maneuverability of the government. Afghanistan’s diplomacy needs further attention to the principle of balance between regional and extraregional states. Overcoming domestic challenges requires a serious anti-corruption campaign, avoiding ethnocentric and sectarian policies, forming an efficient, incorruptible cabinet and most important of all, reinforcing national solidarity as the key to security and taking matter at one’s own hands. If the government adopts absorbing -and not repelling- insurgents, less effort would be needed to fill vacant seats in the inauguration ceremony.