The Diplomatic Motif of Middle East
Hegemony or power equilibrium? The United States should make a clear choice. By Diako Hosseini
Mesopotamia has a long history of quests for power equilibrium; one that is full of wars and mutual frights. In 853 BC, a coalition of twelve Mesopotamian monarchs led by the King Hadadezer of Damascus rose against the dominance of the Assyrian Emperor Shalmaneser III. Despite initial victories, the alliance was crushed by Shalmaneser in the long run, just as the Arab united front that stood up to the Israeli expansionism was defeated. However, it was not always the case that power equilibrium quest faced a rout. The Assyrians joined history with rise of the powerful Urartu civilization and modern Israel had to step back when the Islamic Iran came to stage.
Modern Middle East had its historical turning point in 1967, when the British withdrew from Persian Gulf and sovereign states appeared in the region. A multipolar order existed at that time, similar to the one which ruled millenniums ago. Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Israel resembled the ancient Egyptian, Elamite, Urartu, Assyrian and Hebrew civilizations. To resemble their ancestors, they had engaged into a struggle for hegemony.
It was such a multipolar order that deterred one power from overcoming the others and expanding its territory, either in the ancient times or the modern era. In fact, the equilibrium not only gave a chance to each state to exist, but also guaranteed regional peace. Power balance in modern Middle East was not achieved until 1991. Until then, neither had Iran and Israel defeated each other nor had any Arab country turned into the unquestionable leader of the Arab World.
1990s was the decade of peace and stabilization in the region. Having finally understood that it cannot subjugate Iran, Iraq agreed to sign a peace deal with its eastern neighbor. It also became clear that six bloody wars between Israelis and Arabs had resulted in nothing but exhaustion of their resources. The time for signing treaties had finally arrived. But there was more to this decade. Now a bipolar order was emerging. With the end of Cold War, Iraq and Libya lost their communist patron, no longer could Egypt wield its traditional influence on the Arab World and Turkey had leaned towards Europe. When democracy became the benchmark, Saudi Arabia could no longer keep its face. Iraq became a pariah state the day it occupied Kuwait. The only remaining powers were Israel and Iran. One was the inheritor of Hebrew civilization, yearning to expand its borders, and the other was the successor to the Elamite, Medes and Persian civilizations, vying to gain leadership of the Muslim World. At that point, Iran and Israel stood face-to-face and started picking allies. Syria sided with Iran while Egypt joined Israel. In another part of the picture, encouraged by West, Persian Gulf Arab states formed GCC to check Iran’s power.
Interestingly, despite their hot competition and cold war, Iran and Israel never waged on a real war, as they never let the heat of their rivalry to cool down. While Iran was popular in Lebanon and Palestine, Israel was supported by Iran’s neighbors. Bush’s attack against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq did not disturb the equilibrium, but only revealed the subjective contradictions of Americans. Following an aggressive, proactive policy against Iran, the United States tried to curtail Iran’s regional power and influence, upgrade Israel’s position in the Middle East and tilt the balance in favor of Israel.
Under the pretext of fighting against WMD proliferation –when its closest allies India and Pakistan possessed such weapons- and supporting pro-democracy forces in Iran –when its regional friends Saudi Arabia and Yemen had the darkest record in human rights- the United States opted Iran as its primary target for launching the Great Middle East project. With Israel’s incitement, US decided to actualize the Regime Change plan; a new regime inside Iran which would adopt a US-favored foreign diplomacy. The plan implied that Iran’s diplomatic behavior is rooted in the ideological configuration of its political system and a liberal, pro-West regime would act in a way that serves West’s preferences.
Such a simplistic approach to geopolitics had its roots in neo-conservative thoughts which -although now considered hard-line and rejected inside the US groves of academe- had in fact risen from the extremes of liberal school. Its theoreticians such as Francis Fukuyama and a number of non-academic figures unfamiliar with geopolitical complexities prescribed a tasteless recipe for dealing with unliberal states. They believed that US hegemony in the absence of rival ideologies is only possible if Washington tries to add more states to the liberal camp. An unverified assumption –that democratic states do make war on one another- set the promotion of liberal institutes, organizations and regimes as the macro-strategy of the United States.
However, after US conspicuous failure to realize its Great Middle East project, Iran was not only unaffected by the Regime Chance plan, but also increased its influence in war-ridden Iraq. Threatening the Iranian regime with overthrow misfired and led to Iranian liberals’ crushing defeat in 2005 presidential elections.
United States failed attempts to force Iran scrap its nuclear program, and the electoral victory of hardliners, put the power equilibrium theory back on the agenda. Uncle Sam had once again come to the conclusion that there is no safer way than establishing power equilibrium in the Middle East if it wants to serve national interests. United States fear of an N-bomb-possessing Iran, uttered by Hillary Clinton in her recent remarks, is hard to believe, as was the case for Iraq.
On the brink of occupation of Iraq, many a number of political observers repeated that even if having an A-bomb obsession, Saddam could not be a potential threat to the United States. United States and Israel’s retaliatory power simply stopped the Iraqi dictator of harboring the idea of launching a military attack against US and Israeli interests. Saddam would not even have occupied Kuwait if it wasn’t for April Glaspie’s notorious remarks that on a border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait, the United States would take no positions.
When he waged a bloody war on Iran, Saddam Hussein had the illusion that his eastern neighbor was exhausted by the revolution. It could be easily occupied, its incipient Islamic regime would fall with little trouble and Iraq would take control over Khuzestan and Iran’s share of Shatt al Arab in a flash. When the war ended, Iran’s reorganization and reconstruction campaign sent shudders down Saddam’s spine. Now he had to exaggerate and boast about his chemical and biological weapons. It all pushed him closer to the precipice. West had now found the pretext it needed.
The United States may return to the equilibrium policy and support its allies against Iran’s increasing influence. That approach may improve its situation and stabilize the region, but it could not fit with the other parts of its diplomatic jigsaw.
The Great Middle East idea still exists, although Obama has replaced George W. Bush. That clarifies why US new strategy of supporting regional allies and supplying Iran’s undemocratic neighbors with military equipment is at odds with its Middle East interests. Increasing military budget means less democracy. The money spent of tanks and helicopters was supposed to be used for economic and social projects.
If continued, this self-contradictory process will bring Obama a fate similar to Bush. He can’t escape that unless he abandons dual standards and selects democracy as the criteria by which US regulates its ties with Middle East states. Otherwise, he should forget about the Great Middle East project and return to power balance mechanism; a better option, for both Iran and America indeed.
Modern Middle East had its historical turning point in 1967, when the British withdrew from Persian Gulf and sovereign states appeared in the region. A multipolar order existed at that time, similar to the one which ruled millenniums ago. Egypt, Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Israel resembled the ancient Egyptian, Elamite, Urartu, Assyrian and Hebrew civilizations. To resemble their ancestors, they had engaged into a struggle for hegemony.
It was such a multipolar order that deterred one power from overcoming the others and expanding its territory, either in the ancient times or the modern era. In fact, the equilibrium not only gave a chance to each state to exist, but also guaranteed regional peace. Power balance in modern Middle East was not achieved until 1991. Until then, neither had Iran and Israel defeated each other nor had any Arab country turned into the unquestionable leader of the Arab World.
1990s was the decade of peace and stabilization in the region. Having finally understood that it cannot subjugate Iran, Iraq agreed to sign a peace deal with its eastern neighbor. It also became clear that six bloody wars between Israelis and Arabs had resulted in nothing but exhaustion of their resources. The time for signing treaties had finally arrived. But there was more to this decade. Now a bipolar order was emerging. With the end of Cold War, Iraq and Libya lost their communist patron, no longer could Egypt wield its traditional influence on the Arab World and Turkey had leaned towards Europe. When democracy became the benchmark, Saudi Arabia could no longer keep its face. Iraq became a pariah state the day it occupied Kuwait. The only remaining powers were Israel and Iran. One was the inheritor of Hebrew civilization, yearning to expand its borders, and the other was the successor to the Elamite, Medes and Persian civilizations, vying to gain leadership of the Muslim World. At that point, Iran and Israel stood face-to-face and started picking allies. Syria sided with Iran while Egypt joined Israel. In another part of the picture, encouraged by West, Persian Gulf Arab states formed GCC to check Iran’s power.
Interestingly, despite their hot competition and cold war, Iran and Israel never waged on a real war, as they never let the heat of their rivalry to cool down. While Iran was popular in Lebanon and Palestine, Israel was supported by Iran’s neighbors. Bush’s attack against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq did not disturb the equilibrium, but only revealed the subjective contradictions of Americans. Following an aggressive, proactive policy against Iran, the United States tried to curtail Iran’s regional power and influence, upgrade Israel’s position in the Middle East and tilt the balance in favor of Israel.
Under the pretext of fighting against WMD proliferation –when its closest allies India and Pakistan possessed such weapons- and supporting pro-democracy forces in Iran –when its regional friends Saudi Arabia and Yemen had the darkest record in human rights- the United States opted Iran as its primary target for launching the Great Middle East project. With Israel’s incitement, US decided to actualize the Regime Change plan; a new regime inside Iran which would adopt a US-favored foreign diplomacy. The plan implied that Iran’s diplomatic behavior is rooted in the ideological configuration of its political system and a liberal, pro-West regime would act in a way that serves West’s preferences.
Such a simplistic approach to geopolitics had its roots in neo-conservative thoughts which -although now considered hard-line and rejected inside the US groves of academe- had in fact risen from the extremes of liberal school. Its theoreticians such as Francis Fukuyama and a number of non-academic figures unfamiliar with geopolitical complexities prescribed a tasteless recipe for dealing with unliberal states. They believed that US hegemony in the absence of rival ideologies is only possible if Washington tries to add more states to the liberal camp. An unverified assumption –that democratic states do make war on one another- set the promotion of liberal institutes, organizations and regimes as the macro-strategy of the United States.
However, after US conspicuous failure to realize its Great Middle East project, Iran was not only unaffected by the Regime Chance plan, but also increased its influence in war-ridden Iraq. Threatening the Iranian regime with overthrow misfired and led to Iranian liberals’ crushing defeat in 2005 presidential elections.
United States failed attempts to force Iran scrap its nuclear program, and the electoral victory of hardliners, put the power equilibrium theory back on the agenda. Uncle Sam had once again come to the conclusion that there is no safer way than establishing power equilibrium in the Middle East if it wants to serve national interests. United States fear of an N-bomb-possessing Iran, uttered by Hillary Clinton in her recent remarks, is hard to believe, as was the case for Iraq.
On the brink of occupation of Iraq, many a number of political observers repeated that even if having an A-bomb obsession, Saddam could not be a potential threat to the United States. United States and Israel’s retaliatory power simply stopped the Iraqi dictator of harboring the idea of launching a military attack against US and Israeli interests. Saddam would not even have occupied Kuwait if it wasn’t for April Glaspie’s notorious remarks that on a border dispute between Iraq and Kuwait, the United States would take no positions.
When he waged a bloody war on Iran, Saddam Hussein had the illusion that his eastern neighbor was exhausted by the revolution. It could be easily occupied, its incipient Islamic regime would fall with little trouble and Iraq would take control over Khuzestan and Iran’s share of Shatt al Arab in a flash. When the war ended, Iran’s reorganization and reconstruction campaign sent shudders down Saddam’s spine. Now he had to exaggerate and boast about his chemical and biological weapons. It all pushed him closer to the precipice. West had now found the pretext it needed.
The United States may return to the equilibrium policy and support its allies against Iran’s increasing influence. That approach may improve its situation and stabilize the region, but it could not fit with the other parts of its diplomatic jigsaw.
The Great Middle East idea still exists, although Obama has replaced George W. Bush. That clarifies why US new strategy of supporting regional allies and supplying Iran’s undemocratic neighbors with military equipment is at odds with its Middle East interests. Increasing military budget means less democracy. The money spent of tanks and helicopters was supposed to be used for economic and social projects.
If continued, this self-contradictory process will bring Obama a fate similar to Bush. He can’t escape that unless he abandons dual standards and selects democracy as the criteria by which US regulates its ties with Middle East states. Otherwise, he should forget about the Great Middle East project and return to power balance mechanism; a better option, for both Iran and America indeed.