A Revision, a Dossier
By Ebrahim Mottaqi, international affairs analyst
It has been all about using diplomatic means to approximate Iran and West during the last months. The Americans -and other Western countries- have finally come to the conclusion that threatening Iran is not the way turn it into a responsible partner. They may have also noted the 2010 IAEA meeting, where revising the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) gives any state the right to quit the UN atomic agency and release themselves from the burden of inspections and IAEA chairman reports.
Five plus One is now seeking a diplomatic approach to encourage Iran raise the level of its cooperation. However, a fleeting glimpse is enough to understand that the incentives proposed are no temptation for Iran. The favorite option for West was Iran’s uranium being sent to Russia for higher level enrichment. But clear it is that Iran will not trust Russia or any other world power. The Russians have conclusively proved themselves as unreliable partners during the past years. Bearing this in mind, Iran is understandably reluctant to deliver Russia the fruit of its nuclear activity in years and become a hostage in Russians’ hands. Thirty-five years have passed since the start of the Bushehr nuclear project, but Iran’s northern neighbor that undertook the project since mid-1990s has not fulfilled its promises. A power plant that aged should not be in function anymore.
Looking at the history of the prolonged Bushehr project, one finds out that compared with the Russians, the German Siemens –initial partner for construction of the facility- behaved far more ethically. The company refunded Iran after it quit the project, but since their involvement in the project, the Russians have actually done nothing to finalize the undertaking. Iran is off base if it gets into a situation where it becomes the hostage of Russia, China, France or any other country.
The initial promises Iran has made in the Geneva are not feasible at all. The country should put another solution on the table, one that perpetuates the negotiations and results in further transparency of Iran’s nuclear activities. For instance, Iran could purchase nuclear material from other countries but allow for closer surveillance by IAEA inspectors and the organization’s monitoring system to ensure that uranium enrichment will not exceed the innocuous four percent. Iran’s low-enriched uranium (LER) has no potential for military use. As long as Iran follows a policy of nuclear transparency, West could see itself on the winning side.
All the Westerns want is to erect a barricade that stops Iran from producing nuclear weapons. Monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities is one way for this. However, Iran does not want to see years of painstaking nuclear efforts go up in smoke. Exporting the LER to Russia or any other country is a meaningless measure and would be rejected by both political elite and social groups in Iran. The country has paid a heavy economic and diplomatic price for its nuclear activities during the past years and with all those hardships endured, it deserves a better deal.
Naturally, West avoids taking hasty measures. However, proceeding with the negotiations and proposing mechanisms that could convince Iran are relieving for West while relieving . A win-win product is expectable if the United States and other Western countries apply reassuring techniques in their talks to Iran. Otherwise, intensifying the sanctions may drive Iran to revise its engagement with IAEA in the 2010 meeting.
Five plus One is now seeking a diplomatic approach to encourage Iran raise the level of its cooperation. However, a fleeting glimpse is enough to understand that the incentives proposed are no temptation for Iran. The favorite option for West was Iran’s uranium being sent to Russia for higher level enrichment. But clear it is that Iran will not trust Russia or any other world power. The Russians have conclusively proved themselves as unreliable partners during the past years. Bearing this in mind, Iran is understandably reluctant to deliver Russia the fruit of its nuclear activity in years and become a hostage in Russians’ hands. Thirty-five years have passed since the start of the Bushehr nuclear project, but Iran’s northern neighbor that undertook the project since mid-1990s has not fulfilled its promises. A power plant that aged should not be in function anymore.
Looking at the history of the prolonged Bushehr project, one finds out that compared with the Russians, the German Siemens –initial partner for construction of the facility- behaved far more ethically. The company refunded Iran after it quit the project, but since their involvement in the project, the Russians have actually done nothing to finalize the undertaking. Iran is off base if it gets into a situation where it becomes the hostage of Russia, China, France or any other country.
The initial promises Iran has made in the Geneva are not feasible at all. The country should put another solution on the table, one that perpetuates the negotiations and results in further transparency of Iran’s nuclear activities. For instance, Iran could purchase nuclear material from other countries but allow for closer surveillance by IAEA inspectors and the organization’s monitoring system to ensure that uranium enrichment will not exceed the innocuous four percent. Iran’s low-enriched uranium (LER) has no potential for military use. As long as Iran follows a policy of nuclear transparency, West could see itself on the winning side.
All the Westerns want is to erect a barricade that stops Iran from producing nuclear weapons. Monitoring Iran’s nuclear activities is one way for this. However, Iran does not want to see years of painstaking nuclear efforts go up in smoke. Exporting the LER to Russia or any other country is a meaningless measure and would be rejected by both political elite and social groups in Iran. The country has paid a heavy economic and diplomatic price for its nuclear activities during the past years and with all those hardships endured, it deserves a better deal.
Naturally, West avoids taking hasty measures. However, proceeding with the negotiations and proposing mechanisms that could convince Iran are relieving for West while relieving . A win-win product is expectable if the United States and other Western countries apply reassuring techniques in their talks to Iran. Otherwise, intensifying the sanctions may drive Iran to revise its engagement with IAEA in the 2010 meeting.