To Divert Your Attention from …?
Why do hardliner media keep lying about Musavi’s ’foreign contacts’? By Javid Ghorban-Oghli
One. Of the biggest lies spread by pro-Ahmadinejad media after the controversial presidential election, was other candidates’ –particularly Mir Hosein Musavi- ’contact with foreigners’. To masquerade their false accusation against Musavi as valid, the lie-forging media resorted to any possible ruse, including the existence of a ‘committee to contact foreign ambassadors’ in Musavi’s campaign bureau. Of course, as they say "a drowning man will clutch at a straw", so I was not surprised to hear such fake news. The blunder of manipulated votes definitely calls for scenarios which could persuade the public opinion at any way possible to accept the election results as valid.
In the early 1990s, after thirty years of firm grip on power, the ruling Algerian party, National Liberation Front (FLN), was crushed by the then newly-established Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the country’s first multiparty parliamentary elections. The Algerian army, the key supporter of FLN that pulled the strings in Algerian economy and politics, had to intervene overtly. It forced the Algerian President Chadli Benjedid to resign and blocked FIS way to power. The initial phase of Algerian army’s scenario was to point the finger towards foreign governments, particularly Iran and Sudan. Next, the winners of election had to be arrested and imprisoned under the pretext of being a puppet of foreign powers. I, as Iran’s ambassador to Algiers, was expelled, accused of supporting the Islamic Salvation Front. Everyone got to know about the folly later, even the Algerian statesmen. The finger pointing was merely a subterfuge to convince the public opinion to regard the coup against their vote as a justified act.
Two. Naturally, election days are the most hectic days for foreign embassies. As a veteran diplomat, I am aware that one of the principal missions of every embassy is to provide the foreign ministry with in-depth analyses based on valid data. In case of overlooking such reports, embassies will be reprimanded and ambassadors will witness a dark spots in their record. On the contrary, an ambassador will be rewarded if s/he shows a high capability in sending detailed reports. The task could become even more overwhelming when there is a neck-to-neck competition.
To carry out their mission, within the conventions ruling interstate relations and with regard to the principle of non-intervention, embassies are allowed to meet legal parties of the host state. In some countries, the meeting can take place only if the ministry of foreign affairs grants a letter of approval. This restrictive measure aims to control foreign embassies’ activities. Security forces always keep an eye on foreign embassies and the higher the sensitivity towards the ambassador, the closer the surveillance.
Three. It was in the early days of Bahman 1387 [January 2009] that I was assigned with the responsibility of chairing ’foreign policy committee’ of Mir Hosein Musavi’s electoral headquarters. Mr. Musavi had not officially announced his candidacy, and naturally, the electoral headquarters could not start their campaign under such a title. It took around one and a half months until he officially joined the presidential competition. During this period, there were even some members of the committee who doubted if Musavi would enter the election, since Mr. Khatami had already started his campaign and made visits to some provinces. Selectivity in choosing the members of committee, observing the establishment’s boundaries on sensitive issues –particularly the nuclear program- and caution in contacts with foreigners were some of the issues I had to consider in the committee upon Mr. Musavi’s request. Musavi has retained this sensitivity towards contacts with diplomats of other countries since his position as foreign minister in early 1980s and his subsequent premiership.
Four. Besides what mentioned so far, gathering and analyzing information via the local staff is a common practice of embassies. Using such employees is cost-effective, while being a good means to establish contacts with some key domestic figures. Countries can set restrictions for their citizens’ cooperation with foreign embassies; otherwise, they should admit that an employee of a foreign embassy should prioritize demands of the employer. Our embassies across the world carry out the same routines. Loyalty of embassy’s local staff to their homeland is determined by several factors. One is their economic state; another is knowing that there is a job opportunity in the domestic market if they turn down an offer from the foreign embassy.
Local staffs who work in the embassy are the most reliable agents for undertaking missions that foreign diplomats can’t do themselves. Naturally, among these employees there are those that perform daily chores and a group who conducts qualitative researches. The host country is particularly watchful of the second group and tries to retain its control on them.
I believe that controlling local staffs and foiling their activities, if illegal, is both necessary and feasible. While believing that both the trial of the Iranian employees of British and French embassies in Tehran and their release after foreign pressures were wrong, I want to ask a fundamental question: which one creates more serious threats for our national security?: an embassy using its local employees to carry out missions inside the host country, or an Iranian senior diplomat [Mohammad Javad Larijani – brother of parliament spokesperson Ali Larijani] negotiating with the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General for Middle East Affairs Nick Brown to gain support for his favorite candidate in Iranian presidential election [in 1997]. Of course, emboldened by the repressive atmosphere after the tenth election, Larijani feels free to come out of his den in Institute for Studies in Theoretical Physics and Mathematics and attack Ayatollah Khomeini’s companions with his acid tone. What would have happened if Musavian, Khatami or Mir Hosein Musavi had done what Javad Larijani –right wing theoretician- did? No need to answer.
Five. Let’s make it short. For those who are searching after their self-made ‘committee to contact foreign ambassadors’, it would do no harm to look at post-election developments from another perspective. What is happening in the diplomatic scenes at these days, i.e. the forty-five minute talk between chief Iranian negotiator Saeed Jalili and William Burns in Geneva, Mottaki’s visit to Washington and his meeting with CFR members, Ahmadinejad’s request to raise the diplomatic level of Five plus One negotiation, is the fruit of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, besides his electoral strategies. Instead of basking in their illusions about the so-called ‘committee’, such blatant pro-Ahmadinejad media should search for the reason behind such negotiations.
The myth of ’committee to contact foreign ambassadors’ was another red herring to divert attention from Mottaki’s talks with U.S. officials. And while hardliners are applauding for the Geneva talks and calling it a victory, Western sources reveal the true content of Jalili-Burns talks.
In the early 1990s, after thirty years of firm grip on power, the ruling Algerian party, National Liberation Front (FLN), was crushed by the then newly-established Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in the country’s first multiparty parliamentary elections. The Algerian army, the key supporter of FLN that pulled the strings in Algerian economy and politics, had to intervene overtly. It forced the Algerian President Chadli Benjedid to resign and blocked FIS way to power. The initial phase of Algerian army’s scenario was to point the finger towards foreign governments, particularly Iran and Sudan. Next, the winners of election had to be arrested and imprisoned under the pretext of being a puppet of foreign powers. I, as Iran’s ambassador to Algiers, was expelled, accused of supporting the Islamic Salvation Front. Everyone got to know about the folly later, even the Algerian statesmen. The finger pointing was merely a subterfuge to convince the public opinion to regard the coup against their vote as a justified act.
Two. Naturally, election days are the most hectic days for foreign embassies. As a veteran diplomat, I am aware that one of the principal missions of every embassy is to provide the foreign ministry with in-depth analyses based on valid data. In case of overlooking such reports, embassies will be reprimanded and ambassadors will witness a dark spots in their record. On the contrary, an ambassador will be rewarded if s/he shows a high capability in sending detailed reports. The task could become even more overwhelming when there is a neck-to-neck competition.
To carry out their mission, within the conventions ruling interstate relations and with regard to the principle of non-intervention, embassies are allowed to meet legal parties of the host state. In some countries, the meeting can take place only if the ministry of foreign affairs grants a letter of approval. This restrictive measure aims to control foreign embassies’ activities. Security forces always keep an eye on foreign embassies and the higher the sensitivity towards the ambassador, the closer the surveillance.
Three. It was in the early days of Bahman 1387 [January 2009] that I was assigned with the responsibility of chairing ’foreign policy committee’ of Mir Hosein Musavi’s electoral headquarters. Mr. Musavi had not officially announced his candidacy, and naturally, the electoral headquarters could not start their campaign under such a title. It took around one and a half months until he officially joined the presidential competition. During this period, there were even some members of the committee who doubted if Musavi would enter the election, since Mr. Khatami had already started his campaign and made visits to some provinces. Selectivity in choosing the members of committee, observing the establishment’s boundaries on sensitive issues –particularly the nuclear program- and caution in contacts with foreigners were some of the issues I had to consider in the committee upon Mr. Musavi’s request. Musavi has retained this sensitivity towards contacts with diplomats of other countries since his position as foreign minister in early 1980s and his subsequent premiership.
Four. Besides what mentioned so far, gathering and analyzing information via the local staff is a common practice of embassies. Using such employees is cost-effective, while being a good means to establish contacts with some key domestic figures. Countries can set restrictions for their citizens’ cooperation with foreign embassies; otherwise, they should admit that an employee of a foreign embassy should prioritize demands of the employer. Our embassies across the world carry out the same routines. Loyalty of embassy’s local staff to their homeland is determined by several factors. One is their economic state; another is knowing that there is a job opportunity in the domestic market if they turn down an offer from the foreign embassy.
Local staffs who work in the embassy are the most reliable agents for undertaking missions that foreign diplomats can’t do themselves. Naturally, among these employees there are those that perform daily chores and a group who conducts qualitative researches. The host country is particularly watchful of the second group and tries to retain its control on them.
I believe that controlling local staffs and foiling their activities, if illegal, is both necessary and feasible. While believing that both the trial of the Iranian employees of British and French embassies in Tehran and their release after foreign pressures were wrong, I want to ask a fundamental question: which one creates more serious threats for our national security?: an embassy using its local employees to carry out missions inside the host country, or an Iranian senior diplomat [Mohammad Javad Larijani – brother of parliament spokesperson Ali Larijani] negotiating with the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General for Middle East Affairs Nick Brown to gain support for his favorite candidate in Iranian presidential election [in 1997]. Of course, emboldened by the repressive atmosphere after the tenth election, Larijani feels free to come out of his den in Institute for Studies in Theoretical Physics and Mathematics and attack Ayatollah Khomeini’s companions with his acid tone. What would have happened if Musavian, Khatami or Mir Hosein Musavi had done what Javad Larijani –right wing theoretician- did? No need to answer.
Five. Let’s make it short. For those who are searching after their self-made ‘committee to contact foreign ambassadors’, it would do no harm to look at post-election developments from another perspective. What is happening in the diplomatic scenes at these days, i.e. the forty-five minute talk between chief Iranian negotiator Saeed Jalili and William Burns in Geneva, Mottaki’s visit to Washington and his meeting with CFR members, Ahmadinejad’s request to raise the diplomatic level of Five plus One negotiation, is the fruit of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, besides his electoral strategies. Instead of basking in their illusions about the so-called ‘committee’, such blatant pro-Ahmadinejad media should search for the reason behind such negotiations.
The myth of ’committee to contact foreign ambassadors’ was another red herring to divert attention from Mottaki’s talks with U.S. officials. And while hardliners are applauding for the Geneva talks and calling it a victory, Western sources reveal the true content of Jalili-Burns talks.