In the Line of Imam
Why is Ayatollah Khomeini’s Household under attack by the ruling political camp? By Javad Mahzadeh
Few thought that the smear campaign run by the victorious side of the election against veteran revolutionaries would gradually turn towards Jamaran, where the Household of late Imam Khomeini reside. ’Enforcing justice even against Imam [Khomeini’s] family’ may show how powerful the threats against the family have become.
In spite of their abstinence to enter unethical politics, it has been for some while that the eldest grandson of the ayatollah, Seyyed Hassan Khomeini, and other members of Imam Khomeini’s family, generally known as ’the Imam’s Household’, have become subject to criticisms, admonitions and even threats.
Two years have passed since a website affiliated with [Ninth Administration spokesperson] Gholam Hosein Elham and his [rabid] wife Fatemeh Rajabi accused and defamed Imam Khomeini’s grandson in that familiar way of the Ninth Administration and provoked the judiciary and revolution veterans to react.
Nevertheless, Seyyed Hassan refused to retaliate at that time and even now –when he is under more vicious attacks but has kept away his honorable Household from entering a battle with ill-disposed politicians.
Even during the memorial of the founder of Islamic Republic, Imam Khomeini’s Household has been unwilling to attract media attention and it has never interfered in state-run TV’s plans for these days. All that we see from Seyyed Hassan Khomeini and Imam Khomeini’s Household is books published under the supervision of Institute for the Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works. The family is determined to preserve the documents and doctrines related to Imam Khomeini and keep his name alive.
If we set the Islamic Revolution and Imam Khomeini’s way as our tradition, then Seyyed Hassan and Imam’s Household are the epitome of this tradition. Clerical background, popular face, unique politicizing and governing model of Imam Khomeini turn the late Leader of Revolution’s Household into ’the benchmark’.
On the other hand, the Household’s abstinence to enter politics after the demise of Imam Khomeini and his son Seyyed Ahmad, demanded by Imam Khomeini and insisted by his late wife, has preserved the veneration for Jamaran and added to the popularity of Imam’s Household among the society.
Thus, being veneration and being regarded as the benchmark, rooted in Jamaran’s abstinence from politics and its adherence to Imam Khomeini’s tradition, has given it stature. Household’s affinity with [political] figures, or its political or moral support for them, is credit.
From the two features of Imam Khomeini’s Household, ’being The Criteria’ is the one that is subject to heavier attacks. In the thirtieth anniversary of the Islamic Revolution and after the tenth presidential elections, developments have put two interpretations and two groups, both of which claim to be following ’The Line of Imam’, in front of the society.
The first group was in ’The Line of Imam’ since the victory of revolution and still regards itself as the heir to the beliefs and ideals of Revolution’s founder. This is the group that not only was stopped from entering power circles, but also is going to be banned from continuing its political life. Some political figures of this camp that advocate a moderate interpretation of Imam Khomeini’s doctrines are either imprisoned or under surveillance. This political current, who led mid Iran’s mid-1990s developments and defends republicity of the political system –in order to reinforce its Islamicity, believes that citizens are the cornerstone of the Islamic Republic. Their line is manifested in Imam Khomeini’s oft-quoted statement that: "the benchmark is people’s vote". Such a democratic interpretation from Imam Khomeini’s thoughts has become an excuse for the opposing camp to call them deviated, subversive, and westernized.
The second camp provides a hard-line interpretation of Imam Khomeini’s ideas and to prove its faithful attachment to Imam’s line, merely insists on the Islamic side of the political system and obedience to the Supreme Jurist, the Leader. This group believes that legitimacy is originally bestowed by a divine will. What the people give –in line with God’s will- is popularity, not legitimacy.
The first current advocates the reinforcement of parties, media, social and political freedom based on the modern interpretation, but the other believes in charisma reproduction, turning people into masses and utopianism.
The gap between these two interpretations of Imam Khomeini’s political theories was clearly demonstrated in the high-profile sermon of Hashemi Rafsanjani about one month after the elections. Analyzing the tradition of Prophet Mohammad (pbuh) and [first Shiite Imam] Ali’s (as) caliphate in the early years of Islam, and rereading Imam Khomeini’s political behavior after the revolution, Hashemi approved the viewpoint of the first group (advocators of moderate interpretation) and stressed that he and other senior figures knew what political system Imam Khomeini had in mind.
After the sermon (in which Hashemi also defended the rights of post-election political prisoners), instead of subsiding, the invectives against the senior cleric entered a new level and forced Hashemi to keep a low-profile. It was since then that Imam Khomeini’s Household was regarded as protestors’ refuge and became a new target for attacks, though these attacks were soft warnings at first.
Seyyed Hassan Khomeini’s absence in Ahmadinejad’s endorsement and inauguration ceremonies, his absence in Ahmadinejad’s symbolic visit to Imam Khomeini’s mausoleum, cancelling the Ramadan’s religious ceremonies in the mausoleum for the first time in 20 years (after pressures to change the preachers) were intolerable for the ruling party since Imam’s Household was the benchmark by which closeness to the ideas of Islamic Republic’s founder was measured.
The affinity between Imam’s Household and Mir Hossein Musavi and Seyyed Mohammad Khatami is inevitable, not because of old friendships and politics but because of similar interpretations of Imam Khomeini’s doctrines. This intellectual affinity, unbearable for the victorious side of the election and its theoreticians, led to complaints and criticisms that were at first polite, but later caught an intimidating tone.
The scale of being in ’The Line of Imam’ went down in favor of reformists’ interpretation. So, Seyyed Hassan’s support for Khatami and Musavi was deemed as an unethical measure by the victorious camp, as was his meeting with released political figures.
In fact, it can be said that the ethical -while silent- presence of Imam’s grandson during the post-election development is itself a sort of serious warning to aberrant interpretations made by the second group, that believes Seyyed Hassan Khomeini has turned away from Imam’s advice and has entered politics. To substantiate their point, they refer to Imam Khomeini’s words to his son Mustapha advising his family to avoid political controversies. This is the point categorically rejected by reformists since they believe the tensions and aberration was initiated by their opponents when despite Imam Khomeini’s frequent warnings to military not to enter politics, they were used as an alternative to people’s support.
Clearly there are two different interpretations of Imam Khomeini’s teachings. Radical interpreters consider themselves the revivers of ’pure’ Islam and fundaments of Imam’s thoughts. They attack the old companions of Imam, want to rewrite the book and redefine the tradition. However, there is someone who is the epitome of Imam’s teachings and confrontation with him glaringly reveals these contradictions. No wonder he has become the target of smear campaigns.
In spite of their abstinence to enter unethical politics, it has been for some while that the eldest grandson of the ayatollah, Seyyed Hassan Khomeini, and other members of Imam Khomeini’s family, generally known as ’the Imam’s Household’, have become subject to criticisms, admonitions and even threats.
Two years have passed since a website affiliated with [Ninth Administration spokesperson] Gholam Hosein Elham and his [rabid] wife Fatemeh Rajabi accused and defamed Imam Khomeini’s grandson in that familiar way of the Ninth Administration and provoked the judiciary and revolution veterans to react.
Nevertheless, Seyyed Hassan refused to retaliate at that time and even now –when he is under more vicious attacks but has kept away his honorable Household from entering a battle with ill-disposed politicians.
Even during the memorial of the founder of Islamic Republic, Imam Khomeini’s Household has been unwilling to attract media attention and it has never interfered in state-run TV’s plans for these days. All that we see from Seyyed Hassan Khomeini and Imam Khomeini’s Household is books published under the supervision of Institute for the Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works. The family is determined to preserve the documents and doctrines related to Imam Khomeini and keep his name alive.
If we set the Islamic Revolution and Imam Khomeini’s way as our tradition, then Seyyed Hassan and Imam’s Household are the epitome of this tradition. Clerical background, popular face, unique politicizing and governing model of Imam Khomeini turn the late Leader of Revolution’s Household into ’the benchmark’.
On the other hand, the Household’s abstinence to enter politics after the demise of Imam Khomeini and his son Seyyed Ahmad, demanded by Imam Khomeini and insisted by his late wife, has preserved the veneration for Jamaran and added to the popularity of Imam’s Household among the society.
Thus, being veneration and being regarded as the benchmark, rooted in Jamaran’s abstinence from politics and its adherence to Imam Khomeini’s tradition, has given it stature. Household’s affinity with [political] figures, or its political or moral support for them, is credit.
From the two features of Imam Khomeini’s Household, ’being The Criteria’ is the one that is subject to heavier attacks. In the thirtieth anniversary of the Islamic Revolution and after the tenth presidential elections, developments have put two interpretations and two groups, both of which claim to be following ’The Line of Imam’, in front of the society.
The first group was in ’The Line of Imam’ since the victory of revolution and still regards itself as the heir to the beliefs and ideals of Revolution’s founder. This is the group that not only was stopped from entering power circles, but also is going to be banned from continuing its political life. Some political figures of this camp that advocate a moderate interpretation of Imam Khomeini’s doctrines are either imprisoned or under surveillance. This political current, who led mid Iran’s mid-1990s developments and defends republicity of the political system –in order to reinforce its Islamicity, believes that citizens are the cornerstone of the Islamic Republic. Their line is manifested in Imam Khomeini’s oft-quoted statement that: "the benchmark is people’s vote". Such a democratic interpretation from Imam Khomeini’s thoughts has become an excuse for the opposing camp to call them deviated, subversive, and westernized.
The second camp provides a hard-line interpretation of Imam Khomeini’s ideas and to prove its faithful attachment to Imam’s line, merely insists on the Islamic side of the political system and obedience to the Supreme Jurist, the Leader. This group believes that legitimacy is originally bestowed by a divine will. What the people give –in line with God’s will- is popularity, not legitimacy.
The first current advocates the reinforcement of parties, media, social and political freedom based on the modern interpretation, but the other believes in charisma reproduction, turning people into masses and utopianism.
The gap between these two interpretations of Imam Khomeini’s political theories was clearly demonstrated in the high-profile sermon of Hashemi Rafsanjani about one month after the elections. Analyzing the tradition of Prophet Mohammad (pbuh) and [first Shiite Imam] Ali’s (as) caliphate in the early years of Islam, and rereading Imam Khomeini’s political behavior after the revolution, Hashemi approved the viewpoint of the first group (advocators of moderate interpretation) and stressed that he and other senior figures knew what political system Imam Khomeini had in mind.
After the sermon (in which Hashemi also defended the rights of post-election political prisoners), instead of subsiding, the invectives against the senior cleric entered a new level and forced Hashemi to keep a low-profile. It was since then that Imam Khomeini’s Household was regarded as protestors’ refuge and became a new target for attacks, though these attacks were soft warnings at first.
Seyyed Hassan Khomeini’s absence in Ahmadinejad’s endorsement and inauguration ceremonies, his absence in Ahmadinejad’s symbolic visit to Imam Khomeini’s mausoleum, cancelling the Ramadan’s religious ceremonies in the mausoleum for the first time in 20 years (after pressures to change the preachers) were intolerable for the ruling party since Imam’s Household was the benchmark by which closeness to the ideas of Islamic Republic’s founder was measured.
The affinity between Imam’s Household and Mir Hossein Musavi and Seyyed Mohammad Khatami is inevitable, not because of old friendships and politics but because of similar interpretations of Imam Khomeini’s doctrines. This intellectual affinity, unbearable for the victorious side of the election and its theoreticians, led to complaints and criticisms that were at first polite, but later caught an intimidating tone.
The scale of being in ’The Line of Imam’ went down in favor of reformists’ interpretation. So, Seyyed Hassan’s support for Khatami and Musavi was deemed as an unethical measure by the victorious camp, as was his meeting with released political figures.
In fact, it can be said that the ethical -while silent- presence of Imam’s grandson during the post-election development is itself a sort of serious warning to aberrant interpretations made by the second group, that believes Seyyed Hassan Khomeini has turned away from Imam’s advice and has entered politics. To substantiate their point, they refer to Imam Khomeini’s words to his son Mustapha advising his family to avoid political controversies. This is the point categorically rejected by reformists since they believe the tensions and aberration was initiated by their opponents when despite Imam Khomeini’s frequent warnings to military not to enter politics, they were used as an alternative to people’s support.
Clearly there are two different interpretations of Imam Khomeini’s teachings. Radical interpreters consider themselves the revivers of ’pure’ Islam and fundaments of Imam’s thoughts. They attack the old companions of Imam, want to rewrite the book and redefine the tradition. However, there is someone who is the epitome of Imam’s teachings and confrontation with him glaringly reveals these contradictions. No wonder he has become the target of smear campaigns.