Contentment and Discontentment
The two important events that took place during the previous days are bad omens for the general course of crisis between Iran and United States. However, Iranian and American delegations have met in Baghdad for the third time.
The two aforementioned events are:
1. Iraqi P.M., Nuri Maleki’s travel to Tehran and United States’ reaction against that.
2 . Hamed Karzay’s visit to Washington and his acknowledgement of Iran’s policies in Afghanistan, followed by Bush’s reaction and his way of attacking Iran.
Briefly, in these two events Iraq and Afghanistan expressed their satisfaction in co-operation with Iran. But United States which has occupied both countries is discontent with Iran’s policies.
I try to explicate the reason for satisfaction of Iraq and Afghanistan beside the grounds for America’s dissatisfaction with Iran’s policies:
1. Nuri Maleki’s government suffers several acute crises. One is the resistance of insurgents who disapprove of the presence of foreign troops in Iraq and the other, sectarian strife between different religious groups. Also in the political scene the government experiences the non-participation of forces associated with some Sunni factions.
Therefore we can say that Nuri Maleki’s government is hit by both security and political crises. But the same government has managed to establish security in many parts of Iraq, especially its southern and northern regions.
The Shiite-dominated southern parts are religious allies of Maleki’s government. The northern parts are political allies and the reason for their coalition is obvious. The Kurds have united with the representative of Iraq’s majority to implement their ideal federal system in the country.
Among the Shiite groups it’s only the Mehdi Army led by Muqtada Sadr which holds an unclear position. The Mehdi Army is against the continuation of the presence of American troops in Iraq, but in all it hasn’t left the Shiites’ coalition. Therefore we can say that Shiites have preserved their unity, whether in security or political aspect and governed their territory with relative security.
The coalition between Shiites and Kurds who are led by Jalal Talebani and Masoud Barzani has kept away the northern and southern parts of Iraq from the hot spots of center and west of the country and has assured Maleki of the support of two key factions in Iraq.
On the other hand Maleki’s government possesses the full support of United Iraqi Alliance and Iraq’s religious leadership (Marja’iyah). It is also aware that Iran has a key role in establishing security in Iraq and even the Mehdi Army can’t adopt unilateralism and leave the umbrella of Shiite coalition and its religious leadership.
Maleki’s negotiations in Iran focused on two issues. The first one was security. The Prime Minister believes that if Baghdad’s security plan ends in a failure, the insurgents will impair the political process which will result in his government’s fall.
Consequently the composition of the next cabinet may become a matter of concern. In fact Maleki wants Iran to use its weight to prevent the breakdown of the government’s security plan, in order to help the success of the current political procedure.
The second subject of negotiations was a political one. Maleki is worried about the behavior of Mehdi Army and the negative impact it has on the unity of Iraq’s Shiite population. He demands Iran to use its influence to control Mehdi Army.
Maleki asserts that up to now his government has done its best to stop a full attack by American troops to oppress Mehdi Army, but these efforts can’t continue further since United States deems the Mehdi Army as part of the Para-insurgent forces that should be disarmed and turn into a political force.
Meanwhile his government knows that Iran is the only country of the region that is both its religious and ideological depth and politically defends the incumbent government, because nearly all of the neighbors of Iraq are discontent with Maleki’s government and its composition.
This is the picture represented when we consider Iraq’s crisis and influential regional factors from the point of view of Maleki’s government. But this point of view is not necessarily similar to that of United States.
Despite its claims, United States doesn’t separate the crisis of Iraq from its other collisions with Iran. Probably Iraq is the weakest and most peaceful link in the chain of Iran and United States encounters; otherwise both countries could use Iraq as a site to launch attack on each others’ interests.
That’s a tacit agreement between Iran and United States to remove Iraq from the list of problematic issues between themselves or at least keep it more undisturbed compared to other cases, since Iraq is a vital sphere for both Iran and America.
But there’s no good reason that Iran exerts all its influence for accomplishment of United States’ plans. Actually Iran follows the strategy of co-operation with Iraq’s government up to the point that its vital sphere is safeguarded.
But Washington doesn’t find this level of co-operation satisfying. That’s why exactly during Nuri Maleki’s travel to Iran, George Bush attacks the policies of Iran and warns Maleki’s government on getting closer to Iran.
2. The same explanation is true about Afghanistan. But the difference is America’s dispatching of more role players to Afghanistan in form of NATO troops. Compared with Iraq, Washington doesn’t have any special interests in Afghanistan, but according to one American official Afghanistan is considered as the terrorists’ fertile soil. United States’ countless predicaments in Iraq have led to Afghanistan’s marginalization in its policies. That’s exactly why Hamed Karzay prefers to initiate his regional policies.
Reinforcing ties with Iran and Pakistan is part of Kabul’s attempts to display the importance of Afghanistan’s security and its concomitant impact on regional and international stability and security, while Taliban’s revival during the past months is sign of a decline in the activities of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in this country.
Concerning its ties with Afghanistan, United Stated demands Iran to play a more active role to control Taliban insurgents. But the question here is why Iran should help United States more than it’s essential for its policy in containing danger in its vital sphere?
Doesn’t United States’ expectation for Iran use of its weight in Iraq and Afghanistan to reduce the threats arouse in return Iranian leaders’ expectation of United States to use its influence in order to reduce pressures on Iran in various fields?
If Americans try to find an answer to this serious and important question of Iran and also its reasonable expectations, a way would be paved for solution of many regional crises. The next question is which countries have the right to decide about the correctness or incorrectness of a neighboring country’s policies? United States or Iran’s neighbors, such as Iraq and Afghanistan?
The definite answer to this question is that apart from its nature, United States’ presence in Iraq and Afghanistan (whether as an intruder or by Security Council’s resolutions) is temporary and it is the neighboring countries which stay together forever.
Therefore, when governments which are appointed by or outcome of United States’ policies in Afghanistan and Iraq express their satisfaction with Iran’s policies, there would be no place for United States judgment.