Efforts to Restore Relations

If the pinnacle of Iran’s diplomacy was once saying "no" to Americans, non-withdrawal from this stance after two decades will be construed as political weakness or diplomatic backwardness by diplomatic circles, since the world of politics witnesses daily transformation of objective and subjective concepts such as interests, friend, enemy, threat and ally.

 

The deterrent power of WMD stockpile was the cornerstone of industrial countries’ defense and security doctrines. But today, with new concepts such as human rights, democracy, women and youth issues, health and education gaining currency, new interpretations of national and international security have emerged.

 

Accordingly, countries have no permanent friend/ally or enemy/opponent, but permanent national interests that change the place of friends and foes. Contrary to classic approaches to diplomacy, relations between countries shouldn’t necessarily be friendly, but they can be efficient inside an agreed framework.

 

The intensive experience of the past hundred years in international relations has convinced countries and international circles non-agreement over political or economic issues shouldn’t preclude less sensitive domains such as cultural affairs or communication between citizens.

 

Within this framework, opening a consulate or interest section in other countries is not something strange, and its minimum function is reducing international tensions and mitigating disputes that seem insoluble at first. U.S. implicit proposal of opening an interest section in Tehran, first revealed by Washington Post, is one of those diplomatic initiatives that challenge Iran’s modern and classic interpretations of foreign diplomacy.

 

The traditional attitude of Iranian politicians regarding international relations is that during the last three decades, Americans have been their "number one enemy" and opening any sort of diplomatic bureau in Tehran is tantamount to foundation of another "den of espionage" [as U.S. former embassy in Iran was called after the revolution]. But there is another interpretation circulating among some Iranian analysts that believes the days of insistence on the big "no" are over and now it is time to pursue national interests, even if means starting diplomatic relations with those more evil that the "Great Satan".

 

Americans are masters of starting diplomatic relations and negotiating with opponents, even potential enemies. Disarmament negotiations with USSR at the zenith of the Cold War, five years of talks with Vietcongs at the height of the Vietnam War are all evidence for U.S. foreign policy’s power and flexibility.

 

During the last two decades, U.S. Department of State has been the always present in Middle East peace talks and attaining any sort of agreement between Arabs and Israel hasn’t happened without United States’ cooperation with the parties involved in the crisis.

 

The American tradition of brokering in international crisis has consequently provided them a valuable archive of precise information about countries and conflict-prone regions.

 

This has helped Americans in their specialized approach to international relations, to adopt the big "yes" instead of the big "no", unlike Iranians. That’s why by sending always-smiling diplomats they enthusiastically talk and challenge negotiators who may never appreciate a smile or joke during monotonous talks.

 

However, even these veteran diplomats –as CFR analysts argue- have failed to establish diplomatic ties with Iranians and turn the closed meetings into official talks with Iran’s formal diplomatic apparatus. Analysts believe three decades of unresolved historical differences and legacy of U.S. intervention in Iran, affective impediments and discontinuity of bilateral agreements have created obstacles in Iran-U.S. ties which harm interests of both countries, even their shared regional interests.

 

It seems that Americans have suffered more in some levels, since they own an blank archive as to what is really happening inside Iran. During the recent years, ,United States’ consulate in Dubai, in addition to issuing visa for Iranians, undertook the job of collecting information about Iranian politicians and the challenges between conservatives and reformists. But it seems finding of this bureau haven’t been satisfactory for understanding the diplomatic norms Iranian politicians follow.

 

The long-term gas export contract with Switzerland and the European country’s refusal to follow U.S. sanction policies on oil and gas deals with Iran, have propelled Washington to establish an interest section independent from the current office located in Swiss Embassy that is ran by Swiss staff.

 

This is not the first time Americans send Iranians signals for opening an independent interest section in Tehran. They want to observe personally what is happening in Iran and to be in direct contact with Iranians. This means U.S.-resident Iranians, the immigrants, refugees, exiles and the opposition have not been able to show a real picture of Iran. When you talk with Americans, you find out that they don’t know the difference between modern and traditional Iranians, between fervent pro-West Iranians and the religious. Within their mental framework all are the same.

 

In their analysis of the political challenge between reformists and conservatives, Americans’ mistakes haven’t been few. They have seen traditional conservatives that at times have acted more modern than reformists and they’ve seen modernists who have become more traditional than conservatives. Americans believe they know nothing from the new Iran and with a 30-year absence, picture of Tehran’s stylish skyscrapers on a background of Tochal mountains, no less beautiful than Manhattan skyline, is bizarre for them.

 

Contrary to view of some Iranian politicians who see the United States’ Department of State, Pentagon, Council of Foreign Relations and the whole political apparatus of U.S. as a unified whole that supports Israel, within the past thirty years circles in the Department of State and Pentagon have tried to circumvent the Congress and Senate and deal with Iran by resorting to laws that the U.S. president wields. Even some Iranian sources have claimed that contacts between the two sides have never halted during these thirty years.

 

Let’s not forget that at the zenith of Iran-Iraq war, less then ten years after the Islamic Revolution, when Iranians chanted the "Death to America" slogan more fervently than ever, Americans sold arms to Iranians which in periods shifted the balance of war towards Iran. United States also turned a blind eye on Iran’s heavy arms deals.

 

Sending Robert McFarlane, National Security Advisor to Reagan, to Iran with cake and Bible was definitely not done without pre-arrangements. End of the hostage crisis in Lebanon in the late 1980s was also impossible without Iranians’ cooperation with the United States. After the 9/11 attack, despite the initial allegations against Iran, Americans soon found out that Iranians weren’t responsible for the attack. Even anti-American Iranian politicians condemned the terrorist attack.

 

Joint meetings in a third country [Switzerland] for attacking Afghanistan and aids given to U.S. troops on Afghanistan’s western borders during the military operation against Taliban yet confirm that contacts between the two countries have never ceased to exist.

 

By overthrowing Saddam, Americans brought for the Iranians their biggest victory in century. Probably in no period as those leading to Iraq invasion in 2003 were foreign policies of Iran and United States so alike and complementary.

 

A view at the course of developments in Iran-U.S. relationships during the last thirty years makes it necessary to remind a basic point: as Iran’s major regional competitor, Israel has always tried to foil the attempts for compromise between Iran and the United States. That’s because a defense doctrine in Israel argues that restoration of ties between Iran and U.S. will decrease Israel’s strategic importance and U.S. military aids to Tel Aviv. But there is also another doctrine in Israel stressing that the likely relief of tensions between Iran and the United States will end Israel’s isolation and provide it a sense of security among Arab countries.

 

Hence, those in charge of Iran’s foreign policy must contemplate the quality of relations with the United States after Washington’s proposal for establishing an interest section in Tehran. By visiting the official website of Iran’s interest section in American and the Swiss Embassy in Tehran they can understand:

 

 

To follow their legal and fiscal suits, citizens can refer to these sections. Rice’s recent remarks regarding the idea convey the diplomatic message that Americans will probably issue visas from their interest section in Tehran, since the bureau in Dubai already does the task. According to diplomatic norms, an interest section that issues visa can be upgraded to consulate and later embassy in case of mutual agreement.

 

Iranians’ traditional reaction to establishment of an independent U.S. interest section in Iran is that the office will soon turn into a center for gathering sensitive data and it’ll form a base for another den of espionage. It must be mentioned that an essential responsibility of interest sections, consulates and embassies in every country is collection, analysis, summing up and sending information to the respective government.

 

If Iranian diplomats residing in foreign countries do not undertake this job and prefer to continue their education, that’s our problem not others. Also we shouldn’t think that other embassies and consulates in Tehran do not send sensitive information from Iran to their countries, since foreign ministries around the world ask their bureaus to do so.

 

 

Announcing and expanding ties with official organization and institutions and the multitude of unofficial institutions will give Iran an space to breathe in the international stage. This can gradually help Iran to get out of international isolation.

 

 

In 1972 the Chinese and Americans started broad negotiations over the total gamut of political, military, economic and security differences and they reached a final conclusion on the major issues, especially over billions of dollars of trade agreements. Comparing Iran’s case to China, one must say that Iran is not like the 1970s’ China, nor is U.S. foreign policy today bipolar and influenced by Cold War circumstances anymore. Also the international relations have been relieved from the rigid, inflexible conditions of the 1970s. So minor agreements are attainable even without reaching a basic agreement.

 

 

While Iran’s nuclear program has become the main ground of international community’s confrontation with Iran, a sensible decision on the proposal may bring Iran achievements. Many Iranian diplomats believe the essence of Iran’s nuclear case has nothing to do with its nuclear activities but with the suspended relations with the United States and non-agreement over security affairs of Iraq.

 

Iranian politicians can experience negotiating at two different but related tables, one about their nuclear programs and one about bringing a change in relationship with the United States.

 

Therefore, at a time when the international community is increasingly siding with Americans, taking account of the diplomatic green lights seems rational. When Hamas and Iran’s strategic ally, Syria, are negotiating with Israel and when Hezbollah reaches agreement with the 14^th of March front –apparently directed by the United States and Arab countries- why shouldn’t we activate our diplomatic ability?

 

No doubt American diplomats do not perform prayers, they don’t go to mosque, do not wear hijab and orange juice is not what they drink in ceremonies, but they are the most active diplomats in the international stage. They say you should count your fingers after shaking hands with Americans, but that doesn’t stop us from talking to them. There are countries with much more political and security problems that negotiate with all those who challenge them and believe that non-agreement in a round of negotiations shouldn’t preclude starting the next round. That’s the way Indians are. So if we tie solution of differences with America and start of direct negotiations with apology from one side or all-out agreement over the disputes of the last thirty years, or if we are waiting for a joint press conference by presidents of the two countries, photos and joint declarations, that may never happen.

 

If during the last thirty years and after 8 presidential terms, from Carter to George W. Bush, we are waiting for developments by the new president (Barack Obama?), we shouldn’t forget that promises made in presidential campaigns and the reality that starts from the day after election are two totally different things.

 

Maybe the next president (which we anticipate to be Obama) really fulfills his promises about direct talks with Iran with no pre-conditions, but the incumbent president can also seek a positive point in Republicans record by sending signals to Tehran. That is the start of compromises with Iran, after agreements with North Korea.