The Problem with a Collective Security System in the Persian Gulf
Three major wars in 25 years, the threat of terrorist groups and WMD proliferation have made security affairs in Persian Gulf a critical issue. Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait caused Persian Gulf’s small countries to change the course of their attention from issues such as Israel and super powers’ competition towards domestic and regional threats (Iraq and Iran).
But up to now no coherent and acceptable security framework has been devised due to difference between Persian Gulf countries. In fact, there is a sense of suspicion among three centers of power in the region (Iran, Iraq, and [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council). This is compounded by geopolitical, political, economic and social differences between these political units. The most important reason for non-formation of a collective security system by Persian Gulf countries is:
1. There are three potential centers of power in the region: GCC (mainly Saudi Arabia), Iran and Iraq. Although Saudi Arabia believes in sustention of the strategic and political status quo of the region despite its attitude in the first half of the 20th century, Iran and Iraq think differently. In fact, none of these central powers are satisfied with the current balance of power.
Saudi Arabia doesn’t support full intervention of U.S. in the region for security establishment; Iran believes it deserves to be the chief regional power. Iraq, once vying for Arab leadership, doesn’t have the potential to reassert the claim because of its geopolitical limitations in the Persian Gulf, passing of its oil pipes from rivals’ territories and most important of all, internal problems emerged after invasion.
2. The second problem is lack of harmony between these three poles. Iran has a better position and strategic depth because of its population and geography. Iraq had militarized its society in the 1970s to compete against Iran.
But while GCC members, ahead of them Saudi Arabia, have a high financial potential, they can’t actualize and wield this potential to gain strategic superiority over Iran and Iraq1. GCC members have been aware of their security problems. Their individual and collective power can’t quell regional threats, despite their massive spending on arms. They have implicitly accepted that focusing on the military issues –manifested in heavy arms trade- is not equal to security. The cornerstone of Persian Gulf Arab states’ military strategy during the last 30 years has been buying excessive loads of weapons. Little investment has taken place on establishing a national military force, though low population has been a main reason for this. But indeed there have been other reasons such as social structure, suspecting citizens, depriving minorities from entering military organizations and inclination towards recruiting foreign - especially Western – forces. These have led to non-participation of Arab youth in forming a national army2.
3. Problems in ruling are another reason that diverts Arabs’ attention from establishing security in the region. For GCC members, internal security is a more important matter. Since its establishment, GCC has put internal security on the top of its agenda, and in its meetings, the Council condemns subversive actions that tend to undermine security and peace of the members. Increasing political demands and the democratic tide in these countries has caused concerns for the rulers. But Iran’s story in this regard is different.
4. Arab states of Persian Gulf claim that Iran’s arms policy and its attitude towards these countries is a threat towards their security. Since the end of 8-year war with Iraq, Iran has started a military development and hired a great number of fighters, submarines and tanks. The development can lead to Iran’s control –and threat- over maritime navigation in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea.
Iran’s increasing military power and the triple Iranian islands became a cause of tension in regional affairs between Iran and Arabs during the 1990s while there were talks of Iran joining security arrangements of the region3.
5. Iraq is another source of friction between Iran and GCC members. Iran supports the Shiite government of Iraq, while other neighbors of Iraq –Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia- are against this trend.
U.S. believes that every demonstration supporting Iraq’s Shiite government is intrigued by Iran. Islamic fundamentalism has been opposed not only by U.S. and Europe, but also by Middle Eastern countries4.
6. Iraq’s post-invasion status has become another factor compounding problems in front of establishing a collective security system in the Persian Gulf. Arab states face a dilemma: a powerful Iraq can be both a threat –as it became for Kuwait- and a blessing - if it stands against Iran.
Iran is aware of Iraqis’ intense pan-Arab sentiment. Iran-Iraq honeymoon will be a short one if Shiites dominate Iraq and the bilateral ties won’t lead to cooperation, if not to hostility5. So neither Iran nor the Arab states –as regional centers of power- wish for a re-empowered Iraq and its powerful national army.
7. Peace in Middle East is another factor influencing collective security system. The issue is such a sensitive one for both Iran and Arab sheikhdoms. Iran’s stance is full support for Palestinians and recognizing Israel as an invader. Ahmadinejhad speaks point-blank about wiping Israel off the map. No Arab country has ever been so blunt.
Recent global developments and Arabs’ concession in Arab-Israeli peace process show that Arabs have decided to solve this problem in anyway possible. A significant turn in Syria and other Arab states stance on the Middle East peace process has taken place after Saddam’s fall and UK and U.S. presence in the region. For example, according to Jalal Talabani, Kurds have agreed with U.S. to restore their relations with Israel if not disarmed6.
Many Arab countries are interested to decrease frictions in Arab-Israeli dispute and solve the problems through negotiations. U.S. is taking advantage of this inclination and tries to replace Israel by Iran and divert Arabs’ attention towards Iran. In fact, Arabs’ permanent worry from Israel is directed towards Iran. Israel, on the other hand, welcomes the trend and strives to prevent restoration of friendly ties between Iran and U.S.
Currently Arab states of the Persian Gulf emphasize on forming 4 security circles. The first is each country’s military force. Second is the joint military force of GCC members. Third is the one related to their friends in Middle East and South Asia. Finally, the most important of all, the fourth one, consists of Western countries, headed by U.S. and UK, France, Germany and Japan7. Apparently this system is not acceptable for Iran as a regional power with a high population. Definitely no stable security system can be established without Tehran’s consent.
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Reference:
1. اندرو راثمل، سيستم امنيتى جديد خليج فارس، ترجمهء پريسا کريمى نيا، نگاه، 1382، مرداد، جلد 4، شماره 37. ص. 81.
2. محمد على امامى، عوامل تاثير گذار داخلى در خليج فارس، تهران، دفتر مطالعات سياسى و بين الملل، 1380. ص. 337.
3. Shahram Chubin, Iran National Security Policy, The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Washington, D. C. 1994, P. 137.
4. هرميداس باوند، فرصت ها و تهديدهاى جمهورى اسلامى ايران در محيط جديد روابط بينالملل، فصلنامه مطالعات راهبردى، سال ششم، شماره دوم، تابستان، 1382، ص 60-59.
5. اجلاس شرمالشيخ، معاونت سياست خارجى، گاهنامه برداشت اول، سال سوم، 1382، شماره بيست دوم و بيست سوم، ص 38.
6. هرميداس باوند، پيشين، ص. 61.
7. محمد على امامى، پيشين. ص. 335.