The Iranian Role in the Regional Stability
Presented by Luciano Zaccara in the 18th International Conference on the Persian Gulf
Since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, as a result of intervention by the United States, the Middle East and Persian Gulf have been subjected to pressures and tensions that have shown the precarious balance in the region. In this sea of uncertainty Iran has become an essential player, as an effect of the evolution of several regional situations. The arrival of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to the presidency of Iran in June 2005, with a change in diplomatic style in relation to that developed by Mohamed Khatami (1997-2005) has made the Iranian regional protagonist role was seen by some governments as destabilizing in the region. However, the role it can play in bringing peace to Iraq, favoring an honorable withdrawal of United States of the country, could help to recognize the importance of Iran in the regional system.
Taking into account the role that Iran could exercise in the regional context, the objective of this paper is to identify areas where Iran has potential and actual regional influence, particularly in relation to Iraq, in light of changes and developments that have taken in recent times, since the fall of the Hussein regime trough President Ahmadinejad’s visit to Iraq in February 2008 and the recently visit of Nouri al Maliki to Iran.
Studies on the international behavior of Iran that have been reviewed in this work agree to characterize the country as a very important international player in the Persian Gulf region and Middle East. First, we take Ramazani’s classification of small; medium and large powers, asserting that Iran has complied with, both at the time of Shah Reza Pahlevi as the Islamic Republic period with the role assigned to a medium power. That’s mean, a state capable to create and maintain a favorable regional context and also to aspire to a global political status.
But how can we measure a regional power? As international relations are relations of power, one could say that the regional powers can be distinguished better in terms of possessing the strength and power exerted: "if the power of a nation is defined as its ability to impose its will on others states, and to resist attempts by other states imposed on it, the strength of a nation can be defined as the means with which exercises its power. An attempt to estimate the power of a nation usually begins with an effort to assess the strength of its disposal. However, the total force is composed of several elements including the military, economic and moral, each of which comprises many components and some of them are harder to measure than others. "
At this point we can ask two questions: What are the resources available to Iran to meet its foreign policy objectives? And what resources compared with the states of the environment in which Iran is acting? For the Iranian case, we compare with the immediate environment where Iran has historically sought to exercise its role as regional power: the Persian Gulf and Middle East.
We can briefly answer these questions here by saying that Iran possesses enough natural, economic, human and military resources capable of being converted into political resources to help achieve the objectives of foreign policy raised. However, the theoretical and methodological discussions to determine the true weight of a country within the international system or in relation to a regional system has evolved considerably since the breakup of the Soviet Union, helped by the emergence of new countries, new relationships between states that previously were in the periphery of the centers of power and new international political and economic realities in many countries or America, Asia and Africa.
For example, other classifications that could be used to categorize Iran stem from mixing economical and strategic-political conceptions. In these cases there is talk of "emerging powers"; "pivotal states" and "rogue states" as defined by U.S. think tanks in the early 90’s. In this case Iran was designated as "rogue state", which automatically excluded from being considered an "emergent state", beyond which their suitability for this designation, based primarily on economic growth and access to advanced technologies, could well apply to Iran.
This leads us to appreciate also a key element in the categorization of a particular status as a regional power: the acceptance of their status by the states with which it shares the system or sub-regional, and also by large powers that control or determine the ground rules of the international system.
According to the different approaches seen here, it is clear that a regional power is based on their regional system, where it can exert the most influence, beyond the intention of projecting its power at the international level. In this regard, Iran has shown some priorities in foreign policy generally consistent with its resources and capabilities, beyond that, sometimes have sought to carry out political and diplomatic initiatives beyond its regional scope. This predisposition to exceed its sphere of influence, often successfully, as can be proven through acceptance of the proposal for Dialogue of Civilizations within the Islamic Conference and United Nations, for example-would be an element to take into account to characterize Iran as no longer merely a regional power, according to the previous classification, but even as a state with aspirations of "great power".
The Iranian regional leadership and its ability to influence in the region can be evidenced in two situations.
1 – First, the unfinished diplomat contentious on military or civilian character of its nuclear program, which is generating a lot of debate between the Western governments and international organizations. United States, the European Union, the agency International Atomic Energy Agency and United Nations are engaged in a process of tough negotiations to agree on a policy of pressure the Iranian government, but avoiding a break of negotiations and the isolation of the Iranian government, which could result in a new Iraq. Their position is that the Iranian nuclear pretensions, dating back to the government of Shah Reza Pahlevi in the 60 and were resumed at the end of the war with Iraq, showed some dark aspects related to smuggling and acquisition of documents and materials from the atomic network of Pakistani scientist Abdul Kadar Khan in 2003, that Iran does not end to clarify to the IAEA. But Iran insists the civilian nature of its nuclear program and is continuing under the supervision of international inspectors in accordance with the provisions of the NPT, which Iran subscribes since 1968 without interruption. The third round of sanctions established by the United Nations in February 2008, and the last visit of Javier Solana, the representative of the European Union, did not seem to have changed the correlation of international forces, either for or against the Iranian position. On the one hand, support from Russia and China, major trading partners of Iran and defenders of their position in the international forum-and in the Russian case, a main supplier of nuclear technology for the Bushehr plant-had already shown its conditionality before a privileged relationship with the United States and Europe over Iran. So it was not surprising that in this third Security Council resolution consensus of 14 members (less Indonesia) achieved more quickly than in the other two occasions. The situation appears to be stalled before the positions of Iran and the international community. Iran in this regard, has demonstrated its ability to resist international pressure, using own resources and a low political profile in relation to other conflict situations that develop around their borders.
2 – Second, the recognition of Iranian influence in resolving the conflict in Iraq made explicit by representatives of the U.S. government since November 2005. A recognition that gave several signals that a direct conversation between representatives of Iran and the United States is possible. The visit of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, to Baghdad in March 2008, being the first to visit Iraq since the establishment of the Islamic republic, has meant a milestone in contemporary history of the region. This visit it would mean a dual recognition. First, Iraq recognizes Iran as a regional partner and as a partner in maintaining regional stability and of Iraq itself. Secondly, and most important for me, a recognition by the United States that Iran can exercise that role. Taking into account that at this time occupied Iraqi’s foreign policy can not be considered fully independent, presumably, or invitation or acceptance of the visit would have been prior consulted with the U.S. authorities, who would have given the “green light”, giving a clear signal from Washington to Tehran.
From reviewing these two situations, which adds the role that Iran has been developing in resolving the Afghan conflict since the fall of Taliban regime in 2002 and in support of the Shia groups, shows that it is undeniable that Iran plays and will play a key role in shaping the new regional balance in the Middle East, and even more so considering that the Iranian political stability is a factor that few states in the region can show. That is why the analysis of the mechanisms of decision in foreign policy and the evolution of institutional arrangements is vital to anticipate the future regional policy, taking into account the scenarios in that Iran can exercise influence at present, and depending on the definitions of regional power earlier described, to which Iran is certainly appropriate.