Iran and Iraq-US Security Pact

A collective security pact between Iran and Persian Gulf Arab states can make the region safer

1. Recently, UN’s mandate for foreign troops to stay in Iraq was extended until the end of 2008. Regarding the international circumstances, it is unlikely that UN extends this mandate. So, to justify deployment of its troops in Iraq, US have suggested signing a security pact with Iraq. The contents of this pact totally disregard Iraq’s independence and freedom and many Iraqi leaders have opposed contraction of such a pact.

Though the Iraqi PM announced on June 20th that US has accepted revisions in the draft and has agreed to withdraw a request of legislative immunity for American security firms’ staff and has consented to establish a joint headquarter with Iraqis –so that they know in advance about US army’s plans in Iraq- the security pact is still unacceptable.

For instance, the US government has the right to have as many military bases in Iraq as it wants and US forces can seize and detain Iraqi citizens. Nouri al-Maleki has officially stated that the pact –which was supposed to be signed in a few montehs- violates Iraq’s independence and territorial integrity. If signed, it will turn Iraq into a US protectorate. Contraction of such a pact should be rejected by Iraqi leaders and neighboring Arab countries. Iran has understandably expressed its concern over this pact.

Of course this is not United States’ first military-security pact with Iran’s Arab neighbors. The US government has signed similar pacts –not as inclusive as this one- with Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, UAE and Oman. By the virtue of these pacts US holds multiple military facilities in these countries.

Signing such agreements was understandable during the Cold War and political-military competition between West and East. Iraq and Syria had signed such treaties with Soviet Union; Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Qatar (plus Iran and Turkey) had contracted military treaties with the United States. Although these military-political contracts maintained power balance in the region, there were times they set off proxy wars in the region.

With nearly twenty years passed the Cold War, the United States is wielding power in Middle East. As the superior military and economic power US considers Middle East as its national security backyard, wants to bolster its position there and implement the "Great Middle East" initiative.

2. While from thousands of kilometers away UK and US have dispatched their army to the region and have occupied Iraq, they constantly accuse Iran of meddling with Iraq’s affairs and consider Iran’s moves a threat for US national security. How do they expect Iran to keep cool with US and UK troops along its eastern and western borders?

Iran’s concern would have seemed irrelevant if the country had normal ties with US, but United States finds no reason to conceal its hostile policies against Iran and besides repeating its serious threats, takes every chance to harm Iran economically and politically.

Meanwhile, Iran can’prevent signing of a security pact between Iraq and US. Contraction of bilateral military-security pacts is a well-known procedure in the world, sometimes registered in UN. On the other hand, using religious and political potentials in Iraq to give US a blow will not reduce security threats against Iran; on the contrary, they’ll aggravate the situation which will be of no good to Iranians, Iraqis and the entire region. Iran must look for other approaches.

3. One –and probably the best- solution for Iran and Iraq that implies strategic impacts, will be membership in GCC ([Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council). This Council was established in 1981 with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Oman and Bahrain excluding two other Persian Gulf states, i.e. Iran and Iraq.

The initially declared goals were economic, commercial and academic exchanges, but gradually (and especially after the Second Persian Gulf War) political, security and military agenda were incorporated. Currently, security affairs and confronting domestic and foreign threats have become the priority.

The Iranian Revolution and its regional aftermath and events such as 1979 riot in Mecca were factors which precipitated formation of GCC. It is clear why Iran and Iraq weren’invited to join the Council. While there was concordance among the six founding countries on domestic and regional issues, Iran and Iraq’s policies were at odds with theirs. Also Iraq had supported insurgents during the Dhofar revolt in Oman.

Although during Shah’s reign Iran had dispatched troops to Oman to counter the insurgents, with the Islamic Revolution and Shah’s fall Iranian military were called back to the country and Iran-Arab ties entered a stormy era. The only Arab country that will probably join the Council and has started negotiation is Yemen.

But the strategic importance of the region calls for an attitudinal revision towards Iran and Iraq’s membership which can have a remarkable impact on mitigating the tensions. The First and Second Persian Gulf War may not have happened if Iran and Iraq had joined the Council despite their differences with GCC members as to political structure and policies. Functionality of this council will be low without Iran and Iraq’s membership.

There aren’any serious obstacles against Iraq’s membership after Saddam’s fall. But Iran’s story is different. With some Arab states of Persian Gulf’s southern coast Iran has friendly relationships, with some others unfriendly or even hostile. Iran and Saudi Arabia signed a security agreement in 2001 but there are at least two major obstacles against Iran’s membership in this council: Arabs’ insistence to use Arabian Gulf instead of the genuine name Persian Gulf, and UAE’s baseless claims on the triple islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs.

How are these problems supposed to be solved without any serious confrontation, especially when a world power holds stakes in the region? Unfortunately policies of the present Iranian government towards Arabs lack coherence and show signs of non-existence of a clear strategy. The Iranian president has attended GCC summit without any consideration and diplomatic pre-arrangements. And the Iranian FM joins the Arab League summit in Damascus while an anti-Iranian resolution is passed by the members without any reaction from the minister. The former Iranian FM also asked the Arab League to accept Iran’s membership. This was rejected, while Iran’s membership in the Arab League, whether as a member or as an observer, is senseless and humiliating without any invitation.

However, these efforts reveal that Iranian policymakers appreciate friendly ties between Iran and Arab countries, despite the political-ethical attitude of Arab rulers. The consideration is worthy, but the approaches adopted are incorrect.

Iran and Iraq’s membership in GCC and signing a collective security pact will have significant strategic and security merits for Iran. It will also restore friendly relations between Iran and Arab states and will reduce tensions in the region. Additionally, such a pact means the possibility of US using bases in these countries to attack Iran will decrease. It will also ensure Arabs that Iran doesn’intend to attack them or meddle in their domestic affairs.

Of course the Arab countries will not sign such an agreement without US consent. But in the current circumstances, when foreign troops’ presence in Iraq is approaching its end of the term and in both United States and the world voices of protest against continued presence in Iraq are rising, the super power has proposed signing a security pact with Iraq.

For the pact to be signed, the United States must not only revise its contents so that it becomes acceptable by the Iraqi side, but also it must take Iran’s concerns into consideration. To remove Iran’s worries over the potential threat of this pact, Iran and Iraq can sign a bilateral security agreement. But as mentioned before, a collective security pact between Iran and Persian Gulf Arab states can do the same job in a broader range.

Some Iranian officials have suggested a security pact between southwestern Asian countries (excluding Israel and Egypt) just like the one which is contracted among southeastern Asian countries. But such a think is just impossible in present.

However, chances of success for a limited security pact between Persian Gulf states are not low. The practical solution is carrying out intensive diplomatic negotiations with Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Iraq. To sign a security pact with US, the Iraqi government needs to convince Iran and reduce its opposition.

Qatar has warm ties with Iran, and about Saudi Arabia, although the relations aren’that close, but Rafsanjani’s recent visit to this country and his talks with King Abdullah can facilitate the procedure. Gaining Saudi Arabia’s consent is seminal. However, Saudi Arabia will not agree with the proposal without consulting US and gaining its consent. If the United States intends to ease the tensions and finalize its security pact with Iraq, naturally it should support Iran’s membership in GCC.

Keywords: Iran. Iraq. Saudi Arabia. GCC. Iraq-US security pact.