India’s New Policy in Afghanistan
Throughout history, Afghanistan and India have shared a rich tapestry of cultural and traditional ties. India has arguably exerted the most significant influence on Afghan culture. Conversely, the presence and impact of Afghan culture and traditions in India have been evident, from the “Kabuliwala” neighbourhood to Afghan-origin actors in Indian cinema.
However, the political sphere presents a different picture. The fluctuations in the relations between the various Afghan governments and Pakistan have significantly impacted Kabul-Delhi relations. Despite this, the republican era witnessed a historical development with the signing of a strategic partnership agreement between the two countries. Nevertheless, the agreement’s future became uncertain following the collapse of the Afghan republic and the Taliban takeover. Now, after a period of cautious assessment of the Taliban’s policies, India is taking measured steps to re-establish relations with Afghanistan’s caretaker government. But the limited and cautious nature of these efforts raises serious questions about the prospects of this relationship and its implications for both countries, as well as neighbouring states.
In this interview, Samira Mohammadi, Editor of the Political Service at Irafnews.com, discusses some of these questions with Mandana Tishehyar, a faculty member in the Regional Studies Department at the ECO College of Insurance, Allameh Tabataba’i University, and President of the Board of Directors at the Iranian Peace Studies Scientific Association.
1. India and the Taliban were once staunch opponents; in fact, India was one of the countries that seemed to be most affected by the fall of the Republic era in Afghanistan. However, the two sides have opened their doors to engagement. What factors and events on both sides paved the way for this engagement?
- Historical ties between the peoples of India and Afghanistan go back to previous centuries. Since 2001, bilateral relations have expanded significantly in various fields. However, in examining the developments in India-Afghanistan relations, it is better to consider and analyze the issues from a regional perspective. India has always strived to maintain its traditional influence in Afghanistan against Pakistan. However, recent developments in Afghanistan since August 2021, which led to the Taliban’s return to power in this country, have placed India in a new situation. As it was understanding the nature of the talks and the possibility of the Taliban’s future presence in power in Afghanistan, India had established unofficial contacts with some Taliban individuals during the Doha talks, thereby expanding these engagements. Therefore, although the Indian embassy was closed immediately after the fall of Kabul, India made an effort in the first months after the Taliban’s rise to power to preserve Indian dialogues with Kabul by holding regional meetings and sending medicines and wheat to Afghanistan as humanitarian aid.
As a matter of fact, since the beginning of the Republic era in Afghanistan, India has always benefited from the US military presence in Afghanistan. However, with the US withdrawal from this country, it seemed that Pakistan could have better opportunities to increase its presence in Afghanistan, and many believed that the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan would grant Pakistan greater strategic influence and empower groups aligned with their interests. This would mark a significant geopolitical shift for India.
Adding to India’s concerns, China is reportedly forming a “Himalayan Quad” with Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bhutan, and Nepal. Accordingly, seeming to be encircled by the Taliban, China, and Pakistan, India had to find a way to break out of this situation.
Moreover, while some moderate Taliban members initially advocated for expanding ties with Delhi, most were supporters of Kashmiri Muslims. The Taliban had established the "Panipat Operational Unit" (1) near the Pakistani border in Nangarhar province during the early days of the Taliban rule. Equipped with American weaponry, this unit posed a direct threat to India. Additionally, many members of the Haqqani network who had been released from prison were increasing their influence in Kashmir.
These realities have driven India to adjust its approach to Afghanistan over the past three years. Also the escalating tensions between Pakistan and the Taliban government, coupled with the resurgence of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), have presented new opportunities for India.
2. What is the current level and scope of India's relations with the caretaker government?
While some Indian media outlets still express displeasure over the Pashtun Ghilzai rule over India six centuries ago and Sher Shah Suri's reign over a vast region stretching from Peshawar to Kolkata, Indian statesmen are striving to forge new ties with the rulers in Kabul. After about a year’s closure, Delhi reopened its embassy in Kabul and has provided substantial humanitarian aid to the caretaker government in Kabul, along with tens of thousands of tons of wheat shipments from Karachi over the past three years.
India's current policy prioritizes an "Afghanistan without Terror." Taliban officials have also shown a willingness to cooperate with India in controlling extremist groups, seeking recognition from India in return. Additionally, the Taliban declared in the fall of 2022 that they would support India’s investment in Iran’s Chabahar port and expressed their interest in completing India’s unfinished dam construction projects to improve Kabul’s water supply. India, in turn, implemented nearly 20 infrastructure projects in Afghanistan in 2023.
India has furthered cooperation by training over 200 Taliban diplomats online through specialized courses offered by the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Conducting training courses in banking has also been a collaborative area. In 2023, India participated in both the Russia-hosted Kazan program and the Kabul meeting, both aimed at establishing stability and security in Afghanistan and the region, and welcomed Iran’s proposal for a regional contact group for Afghanistan.
These developments in the power and security game at the regional level signify a shift in India’s policies towards Afghanistan under the Taliban’s second term in power. India has both refrained from overt support to opposition groups and, unlike in the past, engaged in strategic talks with Russia and other regional and global powers.
Following Pakistan, India has become the second-largest export destination for Afghan goods. In 2023, bilateral trade between the two countries reached $779 million, with $579 million attributed to Afghan exports of fresh and dried fruits, and spices to India. Afghanistan has also expressed interest in importing Indian sugar. Most of these exchanges were made through the Wagah crossing (in local dialect: Wageh). However, as Pakistan has stopped trading with India since 2019, only Afghanistan can export through this crossing, and India has to use other routes. The caretaker government of Afghanistan has requested India to utilize Chabahar port as a route for its commercial ships, but India’s close ties with the US and US sanctions on Iran have limited its use so far.
All in all, the dynamic regional situation continues to reshape equations. With the Red Sea’s growing insecurity, India announced plans to increase its activity in Chabahar in January 2023. This was followed by a high-level Taliban economic delegation visiting Chabahar in February 2023 and signing memorandums of understanding with Iran. Talks between Taliban and Indian Foreign Ministry officials regarding Chabahar were held in Kabul in March 2023, culminating in new agreements between Iran and India for Chabahar’s use in April 2024.
3. Why has India, according to analysts, adopted a cautious approach towards the Taliban? What are Delhi’s considerations for establishing relations with the caretaker government?
- I don't believe India has adopted a cautious approach. India is striving to maintain a balance of power among various actors within Afghanistan and the region. While cooperating with the Taliban and pursuing the idea of strengthening Afghanistan’s capacity to counter terrorism, India has also continued informal talks with some Taliban opposition groups and individuals and has also expanded ties with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Meanwhile, as an active player on the international stage, India is trying to address the issues of women and human rights in Afghanistan, in line with the Western allies' and international organizations’ positions. Thomas West, the US Special Representative for Afghanistan, visited Delhi recently to discuss the situation in Afghanistan with Indian officials. Nevertheless, Delhi has not yet recognized the caretaker government in Kabul.
4. Has the relationship between the two sides reached a level of trust where India would consider sending an ambassador to Kabul?
In September 2021, India hosted the third round of regional security talks on Afghanistan. This meeting, held at the national security advisors level, brought together representatives from Iran, Russia, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, and notably absents were Pakistan and China. Despite its closed embassy in Kabul at the time, India used this platform to demonstrate its enduring political and strategic interests in Afghanistan. This position found support from Iran, Russia, and Central Asian countries. Interestingly, the Taliban welcomed the meeting’s final statement, allowing India’s embassy to reopen in this country. However, India’s long-standing problems with the Haqqani network, responsible for the 2008 Kabul embassy attack that claimed the lives of four Indians and fifty Afghans, necessitated a cautious approach, and India remained hesitant to engage directly with the group for roughly a year.
Nevertheless, India reopened its Kabul embassy in the summer of 2022, followed by the establishment of two weekly flights between Kabul and Delhi. This momentum continued in the fall of 2022 with a signed agreement enabling trade via the air corridor. Winter of 2023 saw the Delhi embassy in Abu Dhabi extend an invitation to the Taliban for India’s Republic Day celebrations. Further engagement came in February 2023 when Indian representatives participated in a regional meeting held in Kabul. The process of reopening the Indian consulate in Kandahar is also underway. Finally, a three-day visit by an official Indian Foreign Ministry delegation, led by J.P. Singh (head of the Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran desk), took place in Kabul in March 2023. The delegation met with various Afghan officials, including Amir Khan Muttaqi and Hamid Karzai, along with Afghan business representatives.
As you know, India currently shelters around 15,000 Afghan refugees registered with the UN Refugee Agency. Beyond that, a significant number of Afghan nationals reside in India, including those with Indian spouses, students, patients seeking medical care, and businessmen who all need consular assistance. The Taliban takeover disrupted the education of 2,000 Afghan students in India, whose visas were not renewed, forcing them to either drop out or resort to remote learning. Recognizing these challenges, both Hamid Karzai and the Taliban have urged Indian authorities to increase visa issuance, which has been limited to medical treatment and trade purposes in recent years.
Overall, while engaging in dialogue with the Taliban-led caretaker government to further its regional interests, India appears in no rush to appoint an ambassador to the country.
5. The deepening engagement between India and the Taliban has coincided with recent escalations in tensions and conflicts between the caretaker government and Pakistan. Given this backdrop, how will the deterioration of relations between the caretaker government and Pakistan impact the nature and extent of Kabul's interactions with Delhi?
Some analysts believe India’s positive response to the Taliban's calls for cooperation stems from a calculated strategy to outmaneuver its rival Pakistan and simultaneously edge closer to Central Asia. The Taliban, in turn, perceive India as a counterweight and an actor that can help them maintain their independence from Pakistan.
The Taliban's Ministry of Justice has embarked on an initiative to restore confiscated lands and properties belonging to Hindus and Sikhs in Afghanistan. They have established a commission tasked with returning even those assets seized from Hindus and Sikhs of Afghanistan by warlords during the republic era. Several Sikhs are also making their way back to Kabul from Delhi.
Given the prevailing situation, any form of cooperation between Delhi and Kabul is likely to be construed as an anti-Pakistan move. The Indians are now confident that their security will not be jeopardized by the Taliban. However, it is crucial to remember that Pakistan considers Afghanistan its strategic backyard and is unlikely to allow its rival to easily gain a foothold in this country.
6. One of the driving forces behind India’s rapprochement with its long-standing enemy’s friend, the Taliban, is to pursue its economic objectives in Afghanistan and subsequently in Central Asia. Given this goal, how can Taliban-led Afghanistan contribute to advancing Delhi’s economic ambitions in the region?
In the spring of 2023, India hosted the inaugural joint meeting with Central Asian nations on Afghanistan, with the participation of the UN World Food Program representative. While Iran was not invited to this meeting, the significance of Chabahar port in facilitating food aid deliveries to Afghanistan was highlighted.
The autumn of 2023 saw the convening of a meeting of National Security Advisors from India and Central Asia in Kazakhstan. This meeting focused on the security situation in Afghanistan and explored avenues for establishing transport connectivity between India and Central Asia. It is noteworthy that India shares no land borders with either Afghanistan or Central Asia, and given the India-Pakistan rift, the Iranian route stands as the only viable option for expanding regional transport in this context.
India's key military partners in the region are Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Collaboration in areas such as arms, uranium, energy, and pharmaceutical procurement forms the cornerstone of India's cooperation with these countries. The overarching theme of India's engagement with Central Asian nations about Afghanistan is security and the prevention of the proliferation of extremist religious groups. It is anticipated that new regional security initiatives involving India, Central Asian republics, Kabul's rulers, and other key regional players will emerge in the future, fostering broader economic and security cooperation.
7. What are the geopolitical gains for Delhi in rebuilding its relationship with the caretaker government?
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has recently secured its third consecutive term in power, retaining the majority in the Indian Parliament. Hindu politicians in the country have been advocating for the implementation of the concept of Akhand Bharat, the “Undivided India,” in recent years, envisioning a unified territory stretching from Afghanistan to Myanmar and from Tibet to Sri Lanka. They aim to establish a cultural confederation to showcase India’s civilisational prowess. In light of this idea, Afghanistan’s geopolitical significance for India becomes self-evident. While India faces numerous obstacles in realising this dream, with China and Pakistan determined to block its progress, this vision remains a driving force for Delhi’s ruling party.
8. And the final question is about the future outlook: Will the Taliban replace Islamabad for Delhi?
India is prepared to embrace the new geopolitical realities in Afghanistan. It has adopted a pragmatic approach in its dealings with Afghanistan. India’s perspective on Afghanistan is inherently geopolitical and can be analysed within the context of South Asian rivalries. Regardless of who governs in Kabul, India remains open to engagement and establishing relations with Afghanistan based on power dynamics and competition in South Asia.
In the meantime, India will coordinate its future steps in Afghanistan with Russia on one hand and its Western allies on the other, determining how to engage with the Taliban. It will also continue to compete with China over Afghanistan. However, Pakistan and Iran are likely to remain the most significant regional players in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Iran stands as the only country that maintains cordial relations with all domestic and regional stakeholders, from the caretaker government and its opposition to India, China, Pakistan, Russia, and Central Asian republics, on the Afghan issue.
Interviewer: Samira Mohammadi (MA in International Relations and Editor of the Political Service at Irafnews.com)
Interviewee: Mandana Tishehyar (Faculty Member at Regional Studies Department, ECO College of Insurance, Allameh Tabataba’i University, and President of the Iranian Peace Studies Scientific Association)
Note: Panipat is a local name in the Indian state of Haryana, where the battle between Ahmad Shah Abdali and the Marathas took place in 1761, resulting in the victory of Ahmad Shah and the death of more than 60,000 Indian troops. Following this, hundreds of thousands of Indian prisoners were taken to Afghanistan and settled in a region that is now Pakistan’s Baluchistan.