The strategic triangle: Iran, Iraq and United States

In his last progress report on United States’ military state in Iraq, Gen. Petraeus –top U.S. commander in Iraq- talked of a proxy war between Iran and the United States. This was by far the harshest remark by an American official against Iran’s presence in Iraq.

 

What the General said, besides remarks by Crocker –U.S. ambassador to Iraq- about Iran-Iraq relations have to be closely analyzed. On the one hand, Crocker talked of Iran’s interference in Iraq and on the other hand, he referred to Iran-Iraq interactions and Ahmadinejhad’s visit of the Arab country.

 

Talks about Iraq in the United States have missed pointing out concerns over Iran and its presence in Iraq. Some statements have been repeated such that they are now constituents of United States’ strategy discourse on Iraq: Iran has been the winner of U.S. war against Iraq, Iran is emerging as a regional power, a Shiite crescent led by Iran is taking shape, Iran will use the power vacuum if American troops leave Iraq, Iran is supporting Iraqi insurgents, Muqtada Sadr is Iran’s agent, Iran is meddling in Iraq’s affairs, Qods Brigade has taken control over Iraq, Iran is fomenting Sunni-Shiite strife and similar statements that characterize Iran as a malign force in Iraq’s chaotic stage.

 

How can we analyze such statements which are repeatedly paraphrased and embedded within different narrations? Why do American officials focus on Iran’s increasing role? How is Iran’s presence represented in strategy and political discourses of United States? These are the important questions posed as to Iran, Iraq and the United States’ strategic triangle. Providing an answer for these questions is difficult but possible if we look up at U.S. officials’ intentions and historical, political and international realities.

 

Answer to these questions can be provided by elaborating on United States’ strategic paradoxes, unfamiliarity with complex nature of Iran-Iraq relations, seeking excuses for failure and further interference, role of countries of the region and seeking chances for limited cooperation which increase in future.

 

a)      Strategic paradoxes: the real drive for United States’ occupation of Iraq is still under debate. There are about thirty items mentioned, from controlling oil resources of Iraq to spread of democracy, taking revenge from Saddam after Bush sr. failed to dethrone him, Israel’s wish to eliminate an Arab military power and creating a launch pad to change Iran’s regime.

 

All of these were a driving force for United States’ war machine to some extent, though it is truly difficult to specify a weight for each. But what we can say with certainty is that America’s major strategic objective was to reinforce its presence in this region, which would inevitably lead to weakening of Iran’s position.

 

Undoubtedly United States could exert an unrelenting pressure on Iran if it could control Iraq successfully. Some American neo-cons said it bluntly that Baghdad is the gate to democracy and transformation into the entire region, including Iran.

 

Shortly after its swift victory over Saddam’s worn-out war machine, the United States was so drunk with victory that it mocked strategic advices, even from its closest allies. The world was worried about continuation of Bush’s military adventures. But in reality, not only strategic dreams of Bush weren’t realized, but also United States entered an intertwining maze in Iraq and after four years of strenuous war, to solve the security problems, United States has stepped into official negotiations with Iran with the Iraqi government’s initiative.

 

Although the talks haven’t been held at a high level and also they have faced major challenges, they display to a large extent a strategic paradox in Washington’s plans, which aimed to crush Iran under strategic pressures after the super power had occupied Iraq, but now it has to sit at the table of negotiations with Iran to establish security in Iraq. This strategic paradox also shows that Iran-U.S. relations have become more complicated and new factors introduced into the relations have limited United States freedom of maneuver.

 

On the other hand, we shouldn’t forget that according to military, political and security institutions of America, Iran is a permanent threat, or as Bush said last year, the greatest threat against United States. Iran’s threat is so serious in United States’ strategic outlook that no strategic discussion ignores Iran and the importance of confrontation with this country.

 

The strategic paradox has been compounded with considering Iran as a threat, failure in military operation in Iraq -and ascribing it to Iran- and the necessity of regarding Iran’s role in security establishment in Iraq. These issues heavily influence strategy discourse inside United States about Iran and Iraq.

 

b)      Unfamiliarity with the complex nature of Iran-Iraq relations: there is another problem with United States’ strategic outlook and that is unfamiliarity with the complex nature of Iran-Iraq relation- not only after Iraq’s independence since 1921, but also throughout the history when Iraq was part of a greater geopolitical entity.

 

Apart from geographical aspects, Iraq’s ties with Iran have strong cultural roots. Before the rise of Baath Party in 1960s, the life of Iranians and Iraqis was incomparably intertwined. Iranians’ cultural presence in Iraq was so conspicuous that after the Baath party rose to power, one of the top agendas of radical Arab nationalists was fighting against Iranian entity and trying to remove signs of Iranian culture.

 

It may not be an exaggeration to say the whole Baathi project was to stand against the Iranian parts of Iraq’s society and culture. Due to their longstanding disregard towards history, American strategists couldn’t notice the failure of all anti-Iranian projects in the long history of Mesopotamia and Iraq.

 

Cultural and humane ties between Iran and this region move beyond rigid political and racial clichés. With collapse of political barriers which promoted separation, hatred and war, the old atmosphere resurged in Iraq. That’s when Americans found out that the leader of Iraqi Shiites, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani is Iranian, millions of Iranian pilgrims visit Shiite holy sites every year and a great number of Saddam’s opposition have lived in Iran for years. During their life in Tehran these people have immersed in this culture to an extent that despite natural and political differences, they can’t forget their connection to Iran, its society, people and culture and these have become a part of their identity.

 

Along with these connections, geographical realities add to the complexity of Iran-Iraq relations. Iran is the only county neighboring the Shiite-inhabited south, Sunni-inhabited center, and Kurd-inhabited north of Iraq. Also we shouldn’t forget that the majority of Iraq’s population is concentrated near Iranian borders. Such realities are gradually getting discovered by Americans –especially those making decisions at the strategic circles- but not confirmed, since it is not for their interest.

 

c)      Seeking excuses for failure: there’s one common point among the many books and articles published on war in Iraq, and that is the failure of Bush’s administration. Comparison between the Iraq War and the Vietnam War has been the subject of many researches. In 2007 Kenneth Campbell published a book titled: " A tale of two quagmires: Iraq, Vietnam and the hard lesson so far". John Dumbrell co-edited a book with David Ryan published in 2006 and titled "Vietnam in Iraq: Tactics, lessons, legacies and ghosts".

 

Match-up between the Iraq War and Vietnam War may be a mixture of exaggeration and reality; however, the fact mentioned by all is failure in realization of primary objectives. The war in Iraq is facing many problems the roots of which are ideological neo-conservative principles and disregarding realities of Iraq and Middle East. However, Bush administration tries to name Iran as the culprit. Such a projection can even have application in whitewashing domestic problems.

 

In the United States’ current election atmosphere, Bush, conservatives and Republicans are under heavy pressure because of the war. The withdrawal discourse is becoming increasingly powerful and even Obama has talked of immediate pull-out if becoming president. By the order of Congress, the government has to decrease the number of troops in Iraq, while it can’t and doesn’t want to do so. In such an atmosphere, demonizing Iran is a tool to prevent withdrawal. According to foreign relations’ experts in America, overplaying Iranians’ presence and fostering an anti-Iranian air is Bush’s new tactic to avoid pulling out the troops.

 

Anti-Iranian statements can be a sign of Bush’s plan for further interference in the region. All experts agree that no major military adventurism against Iran will happen in the remaining time of Bush’s term, but things can happen if Bush tries to create a security atmosphere inside the United States which may be beneficial for McCain. Whatever the case, accusing Iran is more like making excuses.

 

d)      Role of countries of the region: undoubtedly the course of events during the last five years has disturbed the traditional security structure favored by many political elites of the region. During the rule of Saddam and Baath party –which was truly a case of the minority ruling over the majority- a large group of Arab elites had no complaints about his behavior towards the majority of Iraqis and some even showed substantial support.

 

Probably they could not foresee transformation of Iraq’s political structure in which after decades or even centuries, the majority have gained the political weight they naturally deserve. In such an atmosphere, anti-Iranian sentiments are fueled and in a broader perspective, it is tried to intensify United States’ anti-Iranian sensitivities. A clear outcome are the remarks of Petraeus and Crocker on Iran’s threatening presence in Iraq.

 

e)      Seeking chances for cooperation: amid anti-Iran propaganda, there’s a group which tries to create an opening for cooperation between Iran and America. Of course this is not a homogeneous group. Some view cooperation with Iran as the only way that leads to United States military disengagement from Iraq. Steven Simon’s “After the surge: the case of U.S. military disengagement from Iraq” published by Council for Foreign Relations exemplifies this attitude. This is in accord with Baker-Hamilton’s proposed policy. But there’s another group that believes Iran-U.S. cooperation in Iraq can be the starting point for solving the problems of the region can start from. They believe Iraq is the gate to transform complex, multilayered Iran-U.S. relation.

 

Whatever the case, talks about Iran’s presence in Iraq have different aspects when discussed in United States strategic circles. Paradoxes in the strategic outlook of American elite, unfamiliarity with the strong cultural connection between Iranians and Iraqis, projection of failures, role of anti-Iranian elite of the region and looking at Iraq as a gate to Iran-U.S. cooperation are all discussed. This also shows the nuances and challenges of maintaining Iran’s security during United States’ occupation.

 

In a nutshell, the Iran-Iraq-United States triangle is one of the strategic foundations which shape relations not only in the Middle East but also in the world in future. This triangle enjoys various –sometimes contradictory- multilayered opportunities.