The Elusive Quest for Pax Saudica

The advent of Trump administration has coincided with a renewed effort to impose a unipolar moment in Persian Gulf, i.e., a Pax Saudica, whereby the traditional balance of power approach would be overturned in favor of an uncontested Saudi hegemony, which is the hidden motive of Riyadh's ambitious Vision 2030 seeking to turn the country into the heartland of the Arab and Muslim world.

In this effort, the Saudis are much assisted by Trump, who has given a carte blanche to the Saudi rulers in the region while beefing them up militarily, turning a blind eye to their repressive mischiefs, and applying "maximum pressure" on Iran, the other regional pillar. Trump's confrontational Iran policy is not a recipe for war with Iran, nor an extension of the traditional containment strategy, rather it is calculated as a war of attrition to weaken Iran economically and (geo) strategically while simultaneously assisting the Saudis to improve their economy and military and security prowess to the point that a precious few years from now an economically-squeezed Iran would be "shrunk to size" and ultimately submit to the Saudi hegemony.

From the White House's vantage, this approach is working: Iran has been hit with a tsunami of capital flight, sanctions, and the related pain of a depressed economy that has turned recessionary after a couple of years of rapid post-JCPOA bloom. On a parallel track, the Trump administration is seeking to build a Saudi-led military bloc in part through the so-called "Arab NATO," which is not really germane to a Pax Saudica as it would involve out of area countries such as Egypt that harbor their own Arab ambitions. Thus, although this idea may not pan out, the gist of it in terms of expanding the wings of Saudi security domination will likely persist under one veneer or another.

For Riyadh, on the other hand, concrete progress toward their hegemonic ambitions has been made, which must be viewed in a comparative logic, e.g., whereas the Saudi and the entire GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) economic forecast for 2019 is robust, Iran's economy this year is expected to have a negative growth rate, which may extend to next year or so if the pinching sanctions bite deeper, particularly after April when the renewal of the present US sanctions waivers is due, which may or may not happen. As a result, Iran is grappling with an alarmingly growing unemployment and inflation rate, budget shortfalls, etc., inevitably tapping into the national reserve and future generation fund, with little prospect of any major relief from Europe, this while even the Chinese and Russian companies and banks have begun to shy away from the Iran market due to the US's "secondary sanctions."

Needless to say, this is a worrisome trend from the prism of Iran's national (security) interests that may become even more vexing if the regional security environment deteriorates and tensions between Iran and other powers escalate, which could add to Iran's economic woes. Saudi Arabia is nowadays accused by Iran's authorities of bankrolling the terrorists operating from their Pakistan sanctuary, and the closer ties between Riyadh and Islamabad, reflected in the recent visit of Saudi Crown Prince only a few days after a deadly terrorist attack inside Iran, is yet another piece of the Pax Saudica puzzle carefully being orchestrated in several capitals. New revelations regarding the Trump administration's nuclear know-how transfer to Saudi Arabia irrespective of the US's own regulations is also key in this impending scenario, raising the specter of Saudi nuclearization at a time when Iran, under the terms of the JCPOA, has agreed to key nuclear self-limitations. In a worst case scenario, Iran and the rest of the Shia world would face not one but two Sunni nuclear-armed states, potentially threatening the world's Shia minority.

But, of course one does not need to succumb to paranoia and overlook the significant hurdles facing the Saudis and their American protectorate power in sowing the seeds of a Pax Americana. For one thing, there is a lack of fit between the economic and military indexes of power in the region and Iran has certain advantages in the latter category that will not be easily compromised, just as Iran's solidarity network in the region is also a formidable force that must be taken into account in any power comparison. Still, an important question is: how will Iran's current economic downturn, hit by sanctions, impact its military power and can the latter insulate itself from the dwindling budget allocated to military expenditure and if so, for how long? There is after all an organic connection in the long run between economic well-being and military capability that feeds on the economic resources of the nation. A realist interpretation of the regional trend in the realm of comparative military expenditures indeed leaves little doubt that by being outspent 7 to 1 (on a conservative estimate) does not bode well for Iran, particularly when there is a widening economic gulf between the traditional "twin pillars" favoring Iran's nemesis.

This aside, another challenge facing a Pax Saudica is, of course, the presently fractious GCC politics, which must be overcome in the Saudi favor for this goal to be materialized. That would mean an end to the present Saudi-Qatar tension, actively sought by the Trump administration after an initial nod to the Saudi-UAE-Bahrain blockade, which resulted in Qatar moving closer to Iran and Turkey. How this issue will be negotiated in the near future is relevant to the Saudi hegemonic ambition, which requires flexibility and compromise and not just an iron fist, which has proved less than effective in the Yemen quagmire. If the Saudis with Western assistance manage to get themselves out of this quagmire and bring Qatar back to their fold, then two important hurdles will have been removed. On both these however there is much work to be done and the likelihood of success is uncertain.

The above-said points should not be misconstrued as a negative appraisal of Iran's policies or actions, but rather to assess the regional situation objectively and then to consider the various options and counterstrategies at Iran's disposal -- that would neutralize the prospect of a Pax Saudica to the detriment of Iran (as well as Shia Iraq). One counterstrategy is to utilize Iran's hard power leverages as circuit-breakers even to the point of brinksmanship since the American strategy is to diminish Iran's power without incurring any costs. Another antidote would be to set aside Iran's traditional aversions toward entering into military alliances and forge a better military strategy that would substantially increase the strategic support received by Iran from other powers. A third option is to mirror the Saudi hegemonic effort by enhanced power projections that go beyond the familiar discourse on "strategic depth," which is essentially a defensive concept. A main criticism of Iran's security approach is that it is too defensive in orientation and not adequately preemptive, prone to incrementalism instead of being cemented in a longitudinal strategic power perspective. Such important adjustments are necessary to bolster Iran's position in the region, to counter the American pressures and with it the expansionist and hegemonic aims of Saudi rulers, who sense a historic opportunity through the Trump administration to knock Iran out of the contest for regional primacy; the latter, reflected in Iran's 20-Year Strategic Outlook, has received a major setback by the combination of US sanctions and the anti-Iran axis of US-Saudi Arabia-Israel, but which must be re-introduced in a more elaborate and project-specific manner analogous to the Saudi Vision 2030 if Iran is to have any chance of impeding Riyadh's hegemony.