We Represent the Establishment

Interview by: Saeid Seif

International reactions to IAEA Director Yukia Amano's report on possible military dimensions in the history of Iran's nuclear program, the notorious PMD report, have been generally positive, or 'white', in Iranian negotiators' lingo; though inside Iran, political groups opposed to the deal observed shades of gray. With removal of the Western countries' concern about the history of Iran's nuclear program, the time has come for them to fulfill their commitments and implement the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the JCPOA, or BARJAAM, as it is called in Iran.

For its part, Iran's Foreign Ministry has stressed that implementation of the JCPOA fully rests on conclusion of Iran's nuclear dossier in IAEA and its upcoming Board of Governors' meeting. With implementation of the JCPOA, sanctions will by and large come to an end, and Iran's banking and commercial sectors will return to the normal state. Vaghaye' Ettefaghieh Daily has interviewed Mohammad-Javad Zarif about his two-year engagement with the nuclear dossier:

VE: You have negotiated with P5+1 [five UN Security Council senior members plus Germany] and you have attended the parliament's briefing sessions to answer questions on JCPOA. Which one did you find more challenging?

MJZ: Each had its own difficulty. Negotiations with P5+1 had to follow certain rules and it was carried out in a more formal mode. In these types of talks, I am aware that the other party has different interests and different policies, so my attitude would differ. But in domestic debates I don't expect to see such divergence. That is why I hardly get furious in international talks, but inside Iran, I have shown my anger in various occasions.

VE: Before our interview, I was speaking to [hardliner Principlist MP] Mehrdad Bazrpash and he still had his doubts whether the JCPOA would remain effective after Obama's presidency. Does Iran have any guarantees that JCPOA will be sustained?

MJZ: The US has imposed sanctions against Iran since 35 years ago. The strongest sanction, the D'Amato bill, was imposed at the height of Washington's power in the mid-90s, but faced resistance from its allies. So how did Americans manage to form a global consensus against Iran during the past ten years? Washington was able to take advantage of the UN Security Council platform to add legitimacy to its campaign against Iran. Compare the situation with the 1990s and the D'Amato bill. The bill had placed certain limits for investment in Iran's oil and gas sector beyond which companies would face penalties. But Total, Shell, Eni and many other oil companies disregarded the bill. European countries even threatened Washington with a lawsuit in World Trade Organization for imposing such extraterritorial sanctions.

Look at the recent years. The US' Congress threatened to impose penalties on parties who sell Iran oil products, even gasoline. Even Iran's closest friends stopped selling gasoline to us. This is the key difference between the broad sanctions that we experienced during the past 8 years, and sanctions that were in effect in the preceding three decades.

JCPOA has changed the international atmosphere for Iran. Any new sanction will be a violation of the UN Resolution 2231. If the next US president decides to take a step against the JCPOA, he has to form a new consensus against Iran and change the post-JCPOA atmosphere. That means we will return to the 'neutral' state of the 1990s. There is now a global consensus in favor of cooperation with Iran and against the sanctions. For hardliners, to impose new sanctions on Iran would be harder than the days in 1990s. New US' sanctions equal violation of the agreement.

Time is another factor. Look at the existing sanctions. It took Europe six months to stop purchasing our oil. Sanctions will not snap back with a single speech by the US president. At any rate, it is easier for Iran to revert to its previous nuclear state than for sanctions to be restored.

VE: Could you guarantee that P5+1 will keep its word?

MJZ: I cannot guarantee how others behave in future, but I can say that restoring the centrifuges will be much faster than restoring the sanctions.

VE: A few days ago, a foreign ministry official had stated that Iran does not trust P5+1. Why did he make such remarks?

MJZ: There is a fundamental principle in diplomacy and that is you should not take the other side's good will as granted. We should block the other side's path towards reneging on the agreement. We have our own options and alternatives, and we proved that during the negotiations.

We followed certain goals in the nuclear talks. One was to discard the Iranophobic atmosphere in order to show that the real threat is actually coming from those parties who obstruct the nuclear deal: ISIS' supporters and Zionists. We could not allow nurturers of ISIS and Al-Qaeda to introduce Iran as a threat to the region. On the other hand, we could not allow the Zionist regime which possesses nuclear weapons and is the biggest violator of human rights to call Iran a threat.

VE: Inside Iran, some have claimed that JCPOA has paved the ground for 'infiltration'. Is that true?

MJZ: JCPOA is an opportunity for the Islamic Republic to reveal lies by adventurous countries that had embarked on the Iranophobia platform, and to strip the enemies off the chance to isolate Iran through a global consensus. JCPOA has created new regional and international opportunities for Iran. If we don’t seize the moment, JCPOA will either lose its potential effect or even turn into a threat.

VE: Is there any difference between the foreign policy of different administrations of Iran?

MJZ: The Supreme Leader insists on one point, and that is the Foreign Ministry is the representative of the establishment in its totality. He regularly stresses this point during his meetings with Iran's foreign missions. We don’t have 'foreign policies' in Iran; we have a single foreign policy, and that is the foreign policy of the establishment. This is the line we are following in the Foreign Ministry.

* This piece was originally published in Vaghaye' Ettefaghieh, a recently-established Reformist newspaper which is owned by Sadegh Kharrazi, Iran's former ambassador to the UN and France. The translation is an abridged version of the original interview.