Will Israel Attack Iran?

18 August 2010 | 16:12 Code : 1950 General category
Etemaad’s Editorial by Seyyed Hossein Mousavi; Director of Middle East Research Center
Will Israel Attack Iran?
Regional and international discussions on Iran’s nuclear program have increased in the recent months. After UN Security Council approved the third resolution against Iran, inside Middle East and the world’s political circles the discussions chiefly focused on various threats against Iran and several speculations were made in this regard.
 
Along with these speculations, a war of words broke out between military officials of Iran and Israel leading to mutual threats. In addition, Israel launched its largest ever civil defense drill based on the possibility of missile -and even nuclear- strike. Reports had it that U.S. and Israel have executed a joint air force maneuver in the Negev Desert. The operation included air raids on maquettes of Iran’s nuclear sites.
 
In the middle of April this war of words cooled down however and Iran’s nuclear program witnessed overtures. Israel’s threats against Iran changed mode and Olmert rejected the possibility of Iran going nuclear in short-term and the chances of a military clash between Iran and Israel.
 
This article elaborates on different aspects of Israel’s military attack on Iran’s nuclear sites and the speculations proposed in this regard. The speculations start from the most optimistic and move towards the most radical and pessimistic.
 
It is noteworthy that the evaluations of this text have short-term and medium-term usage and do not elaborate on strategic variables, since the chief parties involved in the nuclear dispute, i.e. Iran and U.S., show a sort of flexibility called "creative pragmatism" by political observers.
 
The first hypothesis is based on theoretical principles of psychological warfare. Based on this theory, one side of the struggle forms a battle array so that the other side takes the possibility of war serious and surrenders to its demands.
 
As the leading opposition against Iran’s nuclear program, United States is carrying out two parallel policies. First, increasing political pressures on Iran through the six group as evident in the process which led to UN Security Council’ three relatively weak resolutions; second, unprecedented increase of psychological pressures on Iran.
 
True that Washington has emphasized its reluctance towards military face-off with Iran, but deployment of a great number of U.S. marine forces in the Persian Gulf and repeating “all options against Iran are on the desk” by senior political and military officials shows that America is using all potentials of psychological war to force the Iranian side to accept its terms, the most important of which is halting uranium enrichment.
 
U.S. believes that the outcome of this bifacial strategy so far has been Iran’s showing more transparency in its nuclear program, especially on the history of its nuclear activities. So it can be expected that the policy continues until United States becomes sure about the non-military nature of Iran’s nuclear program. The most important question here is that: will United States face towards another option or shift its phase if these two parallel policies failed?
 
Giving a definite answer to this question is difficult, since moving beyond skin-deep analyses the United States will face a myriad of troubles if it selects the military option, so grave troubles that have turned America into one of those countries which do not wish Iran’s instability with regard to West’s strategic interests.
 
If Iran comes under military attack, despite the extent of its reaction, there is the challenge of “geographical connectivity of crisis” which comprises a region from north Afghanistan to west Iraq. In other words, a region including twice as big as Europe’s area will face unpredictable crises that no power, whether the United States or any other country, can control in short-term.
 
This is only one of the strategic obstacles which we can point to in this article. But do they prevent a likely attack on Iran’s nuclear sites? The answer is that every thing will become different if a country like Israel launches attack on Iran’s nuclear sites.
 
About the second hypothesis, with regard to the reasons discussed in the first hypothesis and if United States withdraws from military plans against Iran, the most likely country to replace it will be the Zionist regime [Israel].
 
So we must now point to the possibility of Israel’s military attack. As we know during the last 6 months Israel has demanded global community’s serious reaction to Iran’s nuclearization.
 
Joint U.S.-Israel air force maneuver in Negev, unprecedented civil defense drill to test the capacity of military units in rescue operations, testing anti-missile shields’ efficiency against Iran’s missile attacks and finally, bombing Deir ez-Zor nuclear site in Syria were all carried out to send Iranian leaders a message: Tel Aviv is determined to prevent Iran from becoming nuclear and it intends to undermine its missile power.
 
During the recent months, Iran and Israel’s threats, both in diplomatic stage and in war of words have passed the conventional limits. Noteworthy that Israeli officials have made the first move and responses by Iranian military and diplomatic officials have always been a reaction. Israel’s only pretext within the recent years has been Iranian president’s threat to wipe out Israel off the map and its other military threats and remarks which have flowed towards Tehran have had no such basis.
 
Recently, Binyamin Ben-Eliezar, Israel’s Minister of National Infrastructure threatened that if Iran attacks Israel, Israel will destroy the Iranian nation. In response, several senior military officials of Iran stated that Israel is too small to have a military confrontation with Iran.
 
Israel’s military policy in Middle East clearly shows that the country is afraid of rise of a ’nuclear’ power in the region. The epithet isn’t necessarily used to point to a country that wields military nuclear power, but rather to conflateIran’s missile power with nuclear power and threat, so as to disregard the right of all countries –including Iran- to build and extend the range of its missiles.
 
Due to its vulnerability and small area, despite all the guarantees Israel greatly fears a balance of power between regional powers. In the 33-day war against Lebanon in 2006 the Islamic Resistance [Hezbollah] created a balance of terror with its limited missile power which shattered the invincible image of the Israeli army. Observe how fearful Israel will be if its enemy happens to be Iran.
 
Many regional strategists believe that the current deadlock in Lebanon is a result of Israel’s policy to weaken Hezbollah in the domestic political strife. Disarmament of Hezbollah is Israel’s key demand, voiced by pro-U.S. camp in Lebanon.
 
This brings us to an important question: how serious is Israel’s threat to attack Iran’s nuclear sites? The answer depends on one speculation made by the United States: what will be the extent and the targets when Iran intends to retaliate?