Links of a Chain: Lebanon and Middle East

18 August 2010 | 16:14 Code : 1935 General category
How does the recent crisis in Lebanon influence regional developments
Links of a Chain: Lebanon and Middle East

Analyses that tend to view Lebanon as a country on the verge of a civil war prevent a correct understanding of the recent developments. Such analyses are seriously questioned if we heed the geopolitical features of Lebanon and the rationale ruling the political sphere of the country during the recent decades.

 

The reality is that the course of events in Lebanon is the resultant of both international and regional decisions. At least a case like civil war will happen only when there’s no opposition at the international level. However, currently global powers and many Arab and regional powers believe that start of another civil war is against their interests.

 

Start of another civil war in Lebanon equals formation of a terrorist haven in Middle East’s most important strategic region. Also don’t forget that Lebanon is not similar to Afghanistan or Iraq; terrorism in Lebanon will not contain to the country’s borders and it’ll affect other countries in the region or Europe. A 15-years civil war has proved this.

 

This is the reality which the Egyptian al-Ahram daily newspaper has warned of. Al-Ahram believes if the conflagration spreads, hopes for its containment to Lebanon are all vain and Arabs and Lebanese should avoid any behavior that worsens the situation. They should just confide in the table of negotiations.

 

On the other hand, Lebanese don’t want to experience dislocation and insecurity of civil war once more. The war has also taught all factions and ethno-religious groups in Lebanon that resort to violence will not only fail in wiping out opponents but starts a conflagration that will bring no one good.

 

However, being sure that no new civil war is going to start doesn’t mean that Lebanon awaits no incident. Undoubtedly reducing the recent event to domestic political disputes will not lead us with a correct understanding.

 

Currently the most important problems and plans in the region which are in direct connection with crucial international issues have faced a deadlock. Afghanistan’s security and political status is still vague after five years. No bright future in Iraq can be seen as to establishment of peace and security. The crisis in Palestine still remains unsolved with the schism among Palestinians and Gaza has undergone a literally human catastrophe. No progress can be seen in the presidential crisis of Lebanon after one year. Iran’s nuclear program has not reached a clear end and Bush’s administration is approaching the end of its term without any success in these issues.

 

Despite their superficially independent nature, these crises are in connection at a regional and international level and make up links of a single chain, or they’re viewed so by global powers.

 

A significant change in the balance of power which sustains the current Middle Eastern chain is enough to separate all the links from each other. Those familiar with the Middle Eastern context easily understand that US believes Lebanon is the best point to start breaking the chain. Lebanon is the heart of Middle East, the strategic depth for all regional powers. From the Zionist regime [Israel] to Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran every regional power closely follows the course of developments vital to its interests. The connection between regional issues and Lebanon’s strategic importance has attracted also the attention of global powers.

 

These can clarify why a pro-West government in Lebanon has so suddenly attempted to change the head of security of Beirut’s international airport –which lies within Hezbollah-controlled area- and tries to deprive Hezbollah from its powerful, vital communications network. It becomes more important when we consider that Hezbollah is one of the most powerful parties of the region and the world as to its intelligence and security system and it has been due to this ability that it has reduced its vulnerability against assassination plots of the Zionist regime.

 

Siniora cabinet’s measure was of course not that unexpected. After the assassination of Imad Mughniya, Hezbollah’s senior intelligence office in Syria, it was the second step towards undermining Hezbollah’s security and intelligence power to make the movement open to against Zionist regime’s terror plots.

 

If successful, this could change the balance of power in Lebanon in favor of pro-US groups and regional powers like Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and play a decisive role in ending the stalemates in the region and developments in Iraq, Palestine and Iran.

 

Against Siniora cabinet’s decision, Hezbollah, who had shown reservation against start of a civil war, acted determinedly.

 

Hassan Nasrullah’s point-blank stance, Hezbollah’s quick move in taking control of Beirut airport, occupying Saad Hariri’s Future TV channel and pushing back pro-government forces were all clear messages not to cross Hezbollah’s red lines and to keep clearance.

 

The message was clear enough to control the crisis as there is consensus on avoiding a civil war. Siniora’s withdrawal from the recent bill of the government on Hezbollah’s communications network and keeping former head of security of Beirut airport at his post is definitely a letdown for Siniora’s administration and its foreign backers in shifting the balance of power, and a short-term victory for Hezbollah.

 

But at the strategic level still there is no clear prospect. Support for Siniora and his allies by nearly all the powerful states and regional powers against national forces of Lebanon that are backed only by Iran and Syria has created a threatening disequilibrium which quells any optimistic projections for future of Lebanon and the region. Due to international support, Siniora and his Lebanese allies have the upper hand as to propaganda and diplomacy. By using this capacity they can downgrade their failure and overplay their victories.

 

What happened after Hezbollah-Israel war in 2006 is a good example. Release of resolution 1701 that enjoyed US and Europe’s support was in fact an attempt to counterbalance the result of the war. What keeps the balance for Hezbollah and other national forces of Lebanon in front of the pro-West cabinet that has the international support is the strong popular support.

 

However, this can become an Achilles heel for Hezbollah and its allies if economic pressures, political impasse, increasing problems due to the chaotic status and non-existence of a truly efficient administration continue. In long, these can reduce Lebanese’ trust in and support for Hezbollah.

 

The last point is the effect of Lebanon’s recent developments on the Islamic Republic of Iran. No doubt the developments will increase the suspicion of regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt against Iran. Suleiman Evad’s, advisor to the Egyptian president, explicit stance against Syria is significant in this regard. According to Evad Syria’s obstructive role in Lebanon hampers progress in Egypt-Syria and Saudi Arabia-Syria ties. Both the Egyptian and Saudi leaders have reached the conclusion that Lebanon is the key to progress in Arab ties.

  Such a harsh stance against an Arab state clearly shows how Arab countries take position against Iran on Lebanon. On the other hand the United States will ascribe the recent crisis in Lebanon to Iran, the chief supporter of Hezbollah, and persuade its European allies to take a stricter action against Iran as a supporter of terrorism and hindrance against peace progress in Middle East. So we may expect that Lebanon’s recent crisis accelerates passing of another resolution against Iran.