20% Enrichment Is Not Iran’s Need Today
February 8th, 2014 - by Sara Massoumi, Hamed Shafiei
After four rounds of talks, from New York to Geneva, Iran and the P5+1 signed the Joint Plan of Action in the final days of the month of November. This agreement will be for an initial period of six months, but could be extended by both sides if the ongoing talks go well. It seems that, in the new administration, the Iranian nuclear team, with its new members, is following a new strategy in negotiations. The Islamic Republic of Iran’s policy during these six months will be based on confidence-building. It is on this basis that Iran has accepted to suspend part of its nuclear activities, including the halt of 20% enrichment. Iranian Diplomacy recently spoke with Behrouz Kamalvandi, Spokesman for the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization, about Iran’s commitments in its agreements with the P5+1 and the IAEA and the consequences of these commitments for Iran’s nuclear program.
In what stage is Iran’s nuclear program right now in the scientific and commerical areas?
After decades of planned activities, the Islamic Republic of Iran has passed the border of nuclear science and reached the nuclear industry. Following the stage of industrialization, there is another look at the nuclear activities called post-industrial which is a commercial look at the nuclear activities and achievements. Iran’s future horizon must also include this matter.
In Iran, the horizon had been considered as a broad horizon from the beginning and Iran has entered different areas. Our sites are not exclusively enrichment sites but the issue of enrichment has been talked about more in the media and highlighted more in the reports.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is the second Islamic country which has achieved the technology of electricity production in the nuclear plants and is among the few Islamic countries which have pursued the production of numerous isotopes. Right now the collection of atomic energy is active in producing nuclear medicine for about one million patients.
The issue of the Arak reactor became one of the top issues during the nuclear negotiations. Has there been any sign of sensitivity about this reactor prior to this negotiation? What groups of planned activities in this reactor are considered as IAEA red lines?
The point that the West claims that the operations of the Arak reactor are dangerous because using natural uranium in this reactor could lead to the production of plutonium has been discussed several times by Mr. Salehi. But there are technical solutions to such concerns which could be regarded by the IAEA safeguards. Right now many of the nuclear countries have heavy water reactors and have not necessarily moved towards military usage of these reactors and Iran could also be one of them.
If these concerns are legitimate and technical concerns, there are solutions for them. Neither in the Safeguards Agreement nor in the IAEA principles is there any mention of this point that the countries do not have the right to build heavy water reactors. One of the solutions to this concern could be increasing the number of inspections and supervisions.
In the Joint Plan of Action, our demands with regard to the Arak reactor have, to some extent, been considered. The issue of more supervisions has been proposed and of course the Islamic Republic of Iran has no problem with such supervisions to remove the concerns. In our opinion, the concerns of the West with regard to the Arak reactor do not have a realistic nature and are more artificial. Nevertheless, we are ready to remove these concerns.
Since the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action, which commitments has Iran fulfilled?
Iran has fulfilled its voluntary commitments which it had accepted based on the Joint Plan of Action. Voluntary suspension of 20% enrichment is done. Those machines which prior to this date were producing 20% uranium are now producing 5% uranium. Furthermore, since that date, more inspections of Iran’s nuclear installations have been performed. Since Iran does not pursue any secret operation in the nuclear field, it has agreed with the policy of open gates to inspection during these six months.
What is the practical meaning of the term “managed access”? Does Iran create limitations for the inspectors under this term?
Managed access is an access with which, by considering the security considerations and sensitivities of the inspected country, a determined part of the installations would be inspected by the IAEA inspectors through an agreed and planned process. Therefore, it is natural that the inspectors are faced with certain limitations in the level and process of their inspection which are related to the considerations of the inspected country.
What will be the inspection plans of the IAEA of Iran’s nuclear installations based on the Joint Plan of Action? Apparently the number of inspectors has doubled. What is the timetable of the inspections of Iran’s installations? Is there any possibility of the stationing of a resident inspector?
Based on the Joint Plan of Action, Iran has accepted these inspections and at the present time, we are negotiating with the IAEA with regard to these inspections. At first, some of the six countries of the P5+1 pursued other types of inspections such as having a resident inspector in Iran. Due to certain legal issues, we do not accept this matter for it could create certain problems for us in the future. But Iran has, many times, repeated that it does not have any problem with the presence and visits of the inspectors inside the country.
Is there any special method for the IAEA inspectors? Does Iran accept just any inspector?
No. There are certain rules with regard to the dispatching of these inspectors. Based on the agreed regulations with the IAEA, the inspectors are introduced to us. Iran may refuse to accept certain inspectors from a specific country. Finally, those inspectors who are approved by Iran and Iran states that it has no problem with their presence inside the country will be among the approved inspectors.
When will Iran be informed of snap inspections?
The issue of snap inspections about which we are informed only a few hours prior to depends on the type of agreement which Iran has reached with the P5+1. Of course there have been snap inspections before and at that time they were enforced based on the agreement which was reached between Iran and the IAEA. But at the present time when Iran has signed the Joint Plan of Action with the P5+1, we have no problem with snap inspections. Iran will make all its efforts so that the other party would not feel that we are creating obstacles in this regard. Iran will take all these steps to prove that the nuclear activities of this country are peaceful.
When political issues are discussed, convincing the other party becomes difficult. You know that the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran has issued a decree stating that using nuclear arms is forbidden. This means that the highest official of the country has attempted to build confidence. But when the other party pursues political objectives, it intentionally bypasses this important decree.
Is 20% uranium enrichment economically justifiable or would it be better from the economic aspect to buy fuel rods from outside the country?
Economically, production of this amount of enrichment is not beneficial for a country must operationalize expensive installations to provide a small need. The fact is that when we started to produce this fuel, we were not certain whether we could succeed in this matter. Even when this process reached its end stage, our colleagues were not ascertained of the desired function of this fuel in the reactor. We have achieved this technology through the efforts made by our nuclear scientists and this was unbelievable for the West. During the previous administration, there were negotiations with officials from Turkey and Brazil about the transfer of 3.5% enriched uranium to outside the country and returning it after it was transformed into the fuel plate. At that time the West, particularly the US, expressed its opposition. When Iran stated that it was preparing the ground for the production of 20% uranium, the West assumed that first Iran was not capable of doing this and it was bluffing and second, in case of a serious decision made in this regard, due to the numerous problems and the slow nature of the process of research and development and timed programs, this process would take many years to succeed. But Iran was able to achieve fuel plates for the Tehran research reactor within 18 months. This was while, based on the timetable for the purchase of this fuel, we must have waited 24 months. Thus, earlier than the needed time for the purchase of this product, we succeeded in its manufacture and production inside the country.
Now that we have agreed with the halting of 20% enrichment, will we be faced with problems in providing fuel for the research reactors? In case of agreeing with the suspension of this enrichment in the comprehensive plan within a certain period of time, do we have enough reservoirs?
In order to provide the needed fuel for the Tehran research reactor, we could use half of the 196 kilograms of 20% uranium which are to be diluted and transformed into fuel plates. Right now we have the necessary reservoirs of fuel for 5 years for the Tehran research reactor. Therefore, we do not need 20% fuel for at least the next 7 or 8 years. But this does not mean that we will never need this fuel because another reactor might need this amount of fuel.
In an interview with al-Alam, you had reiterated that Iran will certainly need different levels of enrichment in the future but this would not mean that Iran would move towards 60% enrichment. Considering Iran’s nuclear technology today, is 60% enrichment useful?
I believe that today Iran does not need 60% enrichment and of course it is of no use either. But researches in this regard must not be banned if long-term plans are made for its testing. If your question is whether we need 60% enrichment at the present time or for the next five years or not, the answer is negative. Right now when Iran does not need and use a certain level of enrichment, it should not propose an issue which might later become a problem for us. If today we claim that we are producing 60% enrichment and the other party asks us what the usage of this level of enrichment is, we will not have any response. But in the long-term horizon, we may need different levels of enrichment.
In a joint statement called the Framework for Cooperation which was signed by Mr. Amano and Mr. Salehi on November 11th, 2013, Iran was committed to present necessary access and information about six issues to the IAEA within three months after this date. Those three months are almost up. What reports have been presented to the IAEA and which cases have been left to be reported later?
We have advanced based on the schedule which was agreed upon in this statement and we are not behind the program. Of course it should be mentioned that the objective of this joint statement was to build confidence for Iran does not have any obligation for such cooperation with the IAEA. There were two paths which could be pursued:
1. Iran opposing this cooperation and the IAEA continuing the previous trend and presenting reports with regard to the existence of ambiguities in Iran’s nuclear dossier.
2. Giving an opportunity to the IAEA to propose the existing ambiguities and Iran helping in removing these ambiguities and doubts.
Legally when we do not execute the Additional Protocol, certain accesses are meaningless but Iran accepted the defined and agreed cooperation to remove these ambiguities.
Cooperation between the countries and the IAEA beyond the models of agreement of safeguards or the Additional Protocol can be defined by both sides. This cooperation is voluntary and not obligatory. Six items were proposed in the first step. Two of them were related to the demands to access the heavy water plant and the Gchin mine in Bandar Abbas. It should be noted that they demanded the visit of the heavy water plant and not heavy water reactor. Inspections of the heavy water reactor were performed regularly every three months during the previous administration and it is now mentioned in the Joint Plan of Action that it should be performed every month. With regard to the inspection of the heavy water plant, Iran was not obligated to issue permission in this matter for there is no nuclear and atomic materials in this plant. Nevertheless, Iran agreed with the demand of the IAEA for inspection to show its good will. On this basis, the Gchin mine was inspected. Four other items were related to the presentation of information with regard to certain issues about which questions were proposed. Three of these questions were answered and even in one case our response was faced with another question proposed by them to which more explanations were given. The only remaining item will be responded to by February 9th. It seems that this move taken by Iran will remove the excuses of the IAEA.
Based on the resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, Iran’s reprocessing activities must be suspended. In the Geneva Agreement, Iran is also committed to non-reprocessing. What improvements has Iran had in this regard?
Right now Iran does not have reprocessing. Reprocessing means that when the fuel is finished, you separate certain materials from it. Of course in the long run this technology is also among Iran’s nuclear rights and must be provided and safeguarded. When you have access to a power plant and have access to fuel, you should be able to use parts of the used fuel. Iran is not supposed to ignore its nuclear rights. But based on the Joint Plan of Action, Tehran has accepted to refrain from pursuing this activity for a short period of time.