Iran Seeks to Reverse Referral Process of Iran’s Nuclear Issue to Security Council
January 18th, 2014 - by Sara Massoumi
Iran’s complex nuclear dossier has experienced many ups and downs in the past thirty years. Even though Iran’s nuclear issue could have been resolved in the IAEA due to its technical and legal nature, it took on a political and security aspect when it was referred to the UN Security Council from the IAEA Board of Governors. Now, despite the signing of the Geneva Agreement, it seems that, more than the need for technical evaluations, there is a need for strong political determination to finally be able to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue. Iranian Diplomacy spoke with Hamid Baeidinejad, a member of Iran’s nuclear negotiating team and the head of Iran’s expert delegation to these talks, about certain details of the Geneva Joint Plan of Action.
How and to what extent has Iran’s nuclear dossier been transformed from a legal and technical issue into a political and security one during the last ten years of complex and long process?
This question is multi-faceted and involves different aspects. But, to put it in simple terms, as far as an issue is pursued from the nuclear technological and industrial angle and within the framework of the IAEA’s responsibilities defined in its Statute and the NPT, the predominant nature of the issue is technical and legal. IAEA is entitled under its Statute to provide technical assistance to the member countries within areas such as power plants, nuclear safety, and safety standards, training and the utilization of nuclear energy in health and medicine as well as for combating diseases.
Furthermore, based on Article 3 of the NPT, the IAEA is in charge of supervising the commitments of the member countries with regard to non-deviation from the peaceful nuclear objectives. On this particular aspect numerous legal documents have been adopted within the IAEA.
Thus, as long as this framework of responsibilities advances based on the IAEA Statute, the issues move forward within a legal and technical framework.
But when the IAEA considers an issue to develop beyond its legal and technical capacities, it decides to resort to the UN Security Council and refers the issue to the Council. It is here then that we can say that issue is turned into a predominantly political and security issue.
Iran for years made great efforts to prevent Its nuclear issue from being referred to the Security Council but due to the developments of the past few years, the issue was referred to the Security Council and accordingly the Security Council imposed sanctions against Iran. Through this process Iran’s nuclear issue was transformed from a technical and legal issue into a political one and it was unfortunately securitized.
What procedure must be followed in order to transform this dossier back into a legal and technical one?
In fact, the answer to this question can be found in the answer to the previous question. This means that the process of pursuing the case must be reversed and the issue must once again be returned to the IAEA and become normalized. When the Security Council decides to end or technically speaking concludes its consideration of Iran’s nuclear issue, the issue will once again will be continued to be considered within the framework of the IAEA, namely from a legal and technical perspective. This is the reverse action which we continue to pursue during the course of the negotiations.
Therefore, could we say that a political decision is needed in order to return the issue from the Security Council to the IAEA?
Absolutely. In reality, referral of Iran's nuclear issue to the Security Council was itself a political decision but in order to give international credibility and legitimacy to this decision, the sponsors have tried to cover this political decision with technical and legal justifications.
Considering the fact that the date for the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action has been determined, there are still some points that are not clear regarding Iran’s access to its oil revenues during these six months. Based on this document, Iran’s oil exports will remain constant during this period, and the previous plan aiming at bringing these exports down to zero, will not be implemented for the next few months. On this basis, to what extent will Iran have direct access to its revenues from the sale of oil during these months?
In order to better understand the impact of the Joint Plan of Action, let me say that if this plan had not been agreed, Iran’s oil exports would have been reduced to 800000 barrels from the existing 1 million barrels because of the regulations of the sanctions which are in force. The JPA entails that the revenue for these 200000 barrels of oil will be repatriated to Iran, and this is a major part of the 4.2 billion dollars that has been announced. Therefore, a large part of this declared amount is the sum of the income which will be gained in addition to those 800000 barrels in these six months. But the rest of our oil revenues will be deposited into accounts which are not frozen but are rather faced with certain limitations. As an example of these limitations, I can state that these amounts need to be spent in local currency in the related countries and will be placed in special accounts, ultimately being faced with special limitations for withdrawal. These limitations will continue to exist and the removal of these sanctions will be worked out within the framework of negotiations on a long-term solution.
But another change has also taken place based on the Joint Plan of Action which must be notably considered. Based on the agreement, a financial channel has been formed by the plan of action which can be regarded as a special mechanism for providing the means for utilizing oil revenues. From now on, we will be able to make unlimited use of the oil revenues which are deposited into foreign accounts to purchase agricultural products, food stuff, and medicine, and for other payments such as paying the medical costs of patients being treated abroad and paying the costs of students who are studying in foreign countries with a ceiling of 400 million dollars and some other costs including the payment of Iran’s contributions to the United Nations system.
Therefore, 4.2 billion dollars of the oil revenues will be released and the rest could be spent for the above mentioned payments. In other words, it can be said that through the Joint Plan of Action, for the first time a rift within the whole system of sanctions, a system which aims to put in place complete limitations against Iranian oil revenues, has been created.
What will happen to the income earned with the removal of petrochemical sanctions starting January 20th?
As you know, Iran’s petrochemical exports had been banned by the decree of the European Union and the US. Thus, a significant part of Iran’s oil industry was faced with export limitations. From January 20th, Iran’s petrochemical exports will restart and all limitations for the prevention of these exports will be removed. The income which will be earned by Iranian companies from petrochemical exports will be entirely returned to the country. The information given to us by the related officials indicates that, before the imposition of these sanctions, Iran’s petrochemical exports had reached 17 billion dollars, and 10 billion dollars prior to the severe problems of recent months, hence, even if we consider the average of these amounts for the six-month period, it will still be a significant amount.
In the Joint Plan of Action, it has twice been explicitly mentioned that, “With respect to the final step and any steps in between, the standard principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed" applies.” How can this phrase be interpreted in legal terms?
This phrase is commonly used in international negotiations. The reason is that the text that is agreed upon in the negotiation naturally includes different elements which do not have similar political value for both sides. Since such texts are some type of a political deal, different priorities exist as regards considerations and concerns of different parties. We are faced with a text in which the articles cannot be similarly valued for all parties from a political perspective. Some of the articles are important for one party and others are significant for the other. When we use this phrase, we mean that this text must be considered with all of its articles in its entirety.
In the text of the Joint Plan of action, it is mentioned as one of Iran’s voluntary measures that “Iran will continue its safeguarded R&D practices, including its current enrichment R&D practices, which are not designed for accumulation of the enriched uranium.” This is while there were some differences between Iran and the other parties over the issue of the installation of the new generation of centrifuges in Iran after the signature of this plan. Based on the agreed document, what is the scope of Iran’s activities with regard to research and development?
From the beginning of the negotiations, Iran has always reiterated that the issue of research and development cannot be limited, for research and development is an issue which is defined by its title. Research and development is an issue which, by nature, no one can create limitations for. Research is related to the unlimited nature of science and development is related to the manifestation of the result of research at the level below of production and industrial scale. Research without development is incomplete. Furthermore, research and development are the necessary ingredient for any industry. The nature of science and research, apart from practical achievement at the production level, is an issue which has never been limited. But there is another point that must be considered in implementing the Joint Plan of Action and that is that our agreements were made within the framework of two timeframes: a six-month period and a long-term period. We have considered certain preparatory measures for the first period but the bulk of the issues will be discussed in their general framework during the long-term period. The issue of research and development is among the cases over which there are differences between the two parties. In general, Iran believes in a broad interpretation of the issue of research and development while the other party has a more limited interpretation. The other party claims that since Iran's nuclear issue is still faced with certain ambiguities, research and development must be limited for Iran for a certain time period. Therefore, there is this difference of opinion between the two parties, but we have reached an agreement for this six-month period based on which all of the plans which Iran has made by now will continue. But in the phase of the comprehensive negotiations, this issue must be discussed more thoroughly in details. Hopefully both parties will be able to reach a common understanding on research and development.
Therefore, can we say that the installation of the new-generation centrifuges is not against the Geneva plan?
Different types of centrifuges which are referred to as being part of the research and development plan are defined in Iran’s nuclear program and are described by the IAEA in its reports. This means that both the centrifuges which have been installed in Natanz and carry out enrichment and also the different types of machines including the IR5, IR4, IR3, IR2M and IR6 centrifuges are all included in the research and development plan. Iran hence has not accepted any limitation for research and development on other types of machines. Ultimately, both parties have reached an agreement for this six-month period and there is no problem in this regard.
For this six-month period, has Iran accepted limitations in quantitative areas or in qualitative advancements?
These limitations are related to quantities and to centrifuges which are involved in enrichment. We have accepted that no expansion will be made in that area. But quality expansion is related to the issue of research and development which is not limited, hence, all of Iran's R&D plans will continue.
Up until now, Iran has experienced unprecedented sanctions due to the 6 resolutions adopted by the Security Council. One of the main reasons behind the adoption of these sanctions was the issue of uranium enrichment inside Iran. Could enrichment possibly be suspended in the next steps in order to bypass these resolutions and what solutions have you proposed to ‘address’ the Security Council resolutions?
As I mentioned in reply to your question, with the agreement on the plan of action we have in fact moved past the implementation of the Security Council resolutions and this aspect is one of Iran's important achievements during the negotiations which was not really paid attention by many in Iran as it should have been. Under these conditions, one of the most important issues of the Joint Plan of Action is the relation between this agreement and the resolutions of the Security Council.
As you know, in the Security Council resolutions, Iran has been asked to pause without any delay its nuclear enrichment program. This is while with the agreement of the six countries during these six months including the agreement of the permanent members of the Security Council, Iran will continue its 5% enrichment in different areas and transform its 20% enrichment into uranium oxide and then fuel. This means that the Security Council’s previous demand from Iran has been already bypassed. It means that enrichment will continue in all its aspects. Now that the P5+1 has accepted enrichment, then what would be the implications of this decision on the status of the Security Council resolutions? This is a serious issue. We have had a clear position regarding the Security Council resolutions.
Mr. Zarif stated from the first meeting with 5+1 countries in New York that we do not recognize the resolutions of the Security Council as viable and our negotiations would not mean that we have recognized these resolutions. So we see important political developments in this regard.
What we see today therefore is the result of the resistance of the Iranian people which has led the other side to review some of its very basic positions. Despite the fact that 6 resolutions were adopted by the Security Council calling for the suspension of Iran’s enrichment program, today we see that five permanent members of the Security Council have agreed that Iran continue to enrich both in the short-term and the long-term.
As you mentioned, a phrase has been mentioned in this agreement which states that the resolutions of the Security Council must be ‘addressed’. One of the basic demands of the P5+1 was that it must be stated in this phrase that the Security Council resolutions must be “implemented” which we strongly objected and reiterated that Iran will never accept the implementation of resolutions which it does not recognize as legitimate. This issue became very complicated during the course of the negotiations and a solution must have been found. This issue became one of our challenges in negotiating with the P5+1. At the end, the other side accepted that, instead of the term “implementation of the resolutions”, the term “address” be used. We accepted it, because, from a legal point of view, in order to reach a comprehensive solution, the fate of these resolutions must be anyhow determined. Since Iran does not recognize these resolutions and considers them to be against international laws, it will naturally not agree with their implementation but those who have adopted these resolutions must find a way to address them. It is the responsibility of the P5+1 to find a solution for these resolutions in order to pave the way for an agreement and a comprehensive solution. Iran considers the Security Council measures to be unjust and will not implement them.