Design of Arak Reactor Could Be Modified

December 4th, 2013 - by Azadeh Eftekhari

Following the Geneva nuclear agreement, expert delegations from Iran and the P5+1 will meet next week to take the first step on the difficult path of the months to come. Many analysts and experts inside and outside of Iran are of the opinion that the two sides will be faced with challenges far more complicated than what has been seen before. Iranian Diplomacy recently spoke with Peter Jenkins, a former British diplomat who was the British Ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency from 2001 to 2006, about the Geneva agreement and the future of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1.

How do you evaluate the recent nuclear deal in Geneva between Iran and the P5+1?

The understandings reached in Geneva are a credit to all who were involved in the negotiations. The terms of the agreement are well-balanced and practical.  They suggest that lessons have been learned from the nuclear negotiations that took place between October 2003 and June 2005 – in which President Rouhani and Minister Zarif, among others, were involved. 

Can you specify the positive and negative points?

It is particularly encouraging that the parties have already identified elements of the final step of a comprehensive solution.  This suggests that the risk of misunderstandings proving to be an obstacle to Iran engaging long-term in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is low.  It is also helpful that Iran was able to offer certain voluntary measures that signal Iran’s lack of interest in developing nuclear weapons, especially enhanced monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency. In that connection the creation of a Joint Commission that will work with the IAEA to facilitate resolution of past and present issues of concern should be welcomed: it can lead to a rebuilding of Iranian confidence in the objectivity and impartiality of the IAEA.

It would have been good if Iran could have offered to reapply the Additional Protocol and to submit it to the Majles for approval.  As long as that protocol is not in force, the IAEA will be unable to give the global community credible assurances that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or material in Iran.  It is as much in Iran’s interest to enable the giving of those assurances as it is in the rest of the world’s interest to receive them.  Those assurances will open the way to the normalisation of Iran’s position as a Non-Nuclear-Weapon State-Party to the NPT.

Does it preserve the right to enrich for Iran?

I think so.  The agreement indicates that the comprehensive solution will “involve a mutually defined enrichment programme with mutually agreed parameters consistent with practical needs”. That suggests to me that the US has given Iran an undertaking that the US will not object to Iran enriching uranium as long as Iran can demonstrate that it needs low enriched uranium to fuel nuclear reactors producing medical isotopes or generating electricity.

Regarding the Arak reactor, why did this reactor become more important in this agreement while Mr. Albright says it won’t produce plutonium until 2016?

The 40MW reactor under construction at Arak has been a source of concern in many countries for at least ten years.  When I was representing the UK on the Board of the IAEA, I used to draft resolutions for adoption by the Board which requested Iran not to start construction, and which Iran systematically ignored.  The problem is that this reactor is designed to be an inefficient producer of medical isotopes and a very efficient producer of plutonium.  There was a consensus in the Board that construction was undesirable.  Abandonment now may not be a practical option, although I am sure the E3+3 will be pressing for it.  But perhaps even at this late stage the design can be modified to reduce the efficiency of the reactor as a plutonium producer, and enhance its efficiency as a producer of medical isotopes.

Why did no one talk about Fordow in Geneva? Is it not important anymore?

I’m sure Fordow featured prominently in the discussions in Geneva.  Iran has volunteered to allay the E3+3’s paramount concern by refraining from enrichment above 5% for at least six months, and from starting up any centrifuges that have been installed at Fordow but not yet put to use. Iran also volunteered enhanced monitoring at Fordow.  Together these measures go a long way towards reassuring the E3+3 that Iran has no thought of using Fordow to produce weapons-grade uranium.

If the 6 months of confidence-building measures are successful, what are the next steps in the eyes of the West? Some people in the US talk about decreasing the quality and quantity of centrifuges in Iran.

Yes, some people in the US talk about “roll-back” by which they mean reducing Iran’s installed centrifuge capacity to a few thousand machines and shutting Fordow.  But President Rouhani made it clear last week that Iran would not dismantle any of its nuclear facilities.  So, personally, I think the outlook for “roll-back” is not as promising as US hawks would like.  The hawks have only themselves to blame: the Bush administration should have encouraged the EU negotiators to accept an Iranian offer in 2005 to limit centrifuge capacity to 3000 machines.

The negotiation over quantity and quality in the context of devising the comprehensive solution, which will be the next step, will clearly be very tough.  I hope the 24 November understanding that Iran’s enrichment programme will be consistent with practical needs will offer a way forward. 

It seems that hard work remains. What challenges might exist?

Defining the parameters of Iran’s enrichment programme is going to be a big challenge.  Fully resolving concerns relating to Arak will also be challenging. And a third major challenge will be the challenge of implementing the comprehensive lift of all nuclear-related sanctions.  The US administration will need the approval of Congress to lift US sanctions. The administration has created a problem for itself by encouraging Congress to believe that recent progress towards a settlement is due to sanctions, and not to the election of a wise Iranian president who understands how much Iran has to gain from ending this dispute and what needs to be done to end it.

I suspect that some intelligent diplomacy can make a difference.  Ways should be found of persuading the rational, sensible majority in Israel’s foreign and security establishment that the comprehensive solution envisaged in the 24 November Joint Plan is preferable to any of the likely alternatives, and will provide better security for Israel than any of the alternatives. That message can then be passed by the Israeli government to the US Congress. These days all too many US Senators and Representatives are readier to heed the Israeli government than to cooperate with their own executive branch!

If both sides reach the final deal, how long would it take for everything to become normal for Iran? Some in the US talk about 15 to 20 years.

I don’t know. Defining the length of the transitional period will be another challenging feature of the upcoming negotiations.  US mistrust of Iran is still such that the US will bid for a very long confidence-building transition.  But perhaps the issue can be finessed by calibrating Iran’s enrichment programme to practical needs, modifying the design of the Arak reactor and applying the Additional Protocol.  Iran’s practical needs are likely to be low for a good number of years; and modifying Arak and applying the Additional Protocol can send very effective signals about Iran’s future intentions. Ideally, everything ought to return to normal once the IAEA has reached a point where it feels able to give credible assurances that there are no undeclared nuclear activities in Iran and no undeclared nuclear material.