Loss of Momentum If No Agreement in Geneva-3

November 15th, 2013 - by Sara Massoumi

You were present as a journalist in Geneva. What happened in the talks that caused the positive atmosphere of the first day to end in a non-agreement on the third day?

For all the reporters there, it was obvious that a deal had essentially been made by the end of the first day. John Kerry announced he was canceling his trip to North Africa and was coming to Geneva (from Amman, with a brief stop in Jerusalem), and one by one, the other foreign ministers announced they were also coming. As such, the atmosphere was optimistic, among the delegations and the journalists, since no one believed that all the foreign ministers (and deputy FM of China) would make the effort to fly to Geneva if a deal wasn’t at hand. We understood on the second day, in the morning, and first from French Foreign Minister Fabius through an interview he gave (against protocol) to a French radio station that France was unhappy with the deal. Subsequently Kerry arrived and there were long sessions, bilateral and trilateral and among the P5+1, so it became obvious to those waiting that there were problems with the deal—and since the French had already announced their displeasure, we assumed it was due to their objections. As the negotiations dragged on into the night, and the talks were extended another day, it also was clear it wasn’t going to be easy to resolve the differences between the French position and the draft agreement that had seemingly been accepted by everyone else. By midnight Saturday, as talks were about to enter a 4th day, we were not surprised to hear from Fabius first, as he walked out of the hotel and against protocol before Zarif and Ashton had a chance to give their press conference, that there would be no agreement. 

How serious do you consider France’s role in this issue? Was it Paris that disrupted the game, as has been claimed in many media outlets?

Based on what I outlined above, I don’t see how anyone could think otherwise. The French were quite public about their disagreement, and up until they arrived on the scene, it seemed as though the talks were going well. Whether the French were able to persuade the rest of the P5+1 to go along with their stance, or whether the P5+1 felt they had no choice, is a question only they can answer, but clearly the rest of the P5+1 decided, probably to show unity, to take on the French position. Sergei Lavrov, the Russian FM, seemed particularly unhappy as he left the hotel after midnight and went straight home.

Even if we disregard France’s role in generally disrupting an agreement, we cannot deny the fact that Paris created some changes in the text initially agreed upon. Why was Paris the only member to demonstrate its opposition in such a manner?

Again, based on events, it seems the French were playing a role—whether it was their initiative or it was planned by theP5+1 all along is impossible to say. But I doubt that the foreign ministers of all these countries would fly to Geneva if they knew in advance that the French would be spoilers, publicly at that, and it’s hard to believe that the US, Russia, and Great Britain wouldn’t know in advance that the deal the French wanted wasn’t something that Iran could accept on the spot.

To what extent do you believe that the role Paris played was just what we saw on the surface and that in reality the other members had serious disagreements with Iran?

I’m sure other P5+1 members had issues, but probably issues they believed could be overcome. Otherwise, the effort wouldn’t have been that serious, with the Chinese deputy FM delegation flying 11 hours from Beijing to arrive late, and still not get a deal. So it’s my belief that without the strong French objection, despite the fact that some aspects of the draft would have had to be changed to satisfy various members of the P5+1, that there would have been an agreement, and I believe the other P5+1 members believed that, too.

A few days before the start of this round of negotiations, Wendy Sherman announced that the US does not recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium. Some have speculated that this issue was one of the main reasons why Iran and the West did not reach an agreement in Geneva. Based on the NPT, does Iran have the right to enrich uranium? If yes, why do the Americans oppose this issue to such an extent?

Many legal experts in the West believe that Iran does have an implicit right to enrich uranium, despite the word “enrichment” not being in the treaty. Sherman’s stance is that that right is accepted, as she said, “on a case by case basis”, which allows the US to accept Iran’s right at a future date. But since it’s an important deal aspect for Iran, I think it was always intended to be part of the “end game” and not the interim first step. I don’t think that in this draft the “right” was a problem…and I’m not sure Iran insisted on it, not unless they wanted it in return for freezing construction at Arak, or some other concession. It shouldn’t be a problem if it is something that comes at the end, as part of a comprehensive agreement, and when all sanctions are lifted because the West is satisfied that the nuclear program poses no danger.

The US Congress and Senate have begun a countdown to ratify further sanctions against Iran and this is while Obama has said that new sanctions would risk war. What effect does the non-agreement between Iran and the West have on the Congress’ decision? Should we expect new sanctions in the following weeks?

The administration is trying hard to persuade Congress to hold off for another ten days or so, to see if this next round produces results. We’ll see if they are successful. I imagine that new sanctions won’t be imposed before the next round, which is next week, but if there is no concrete agreement, I have no doubt that the administration will have a very difficult time stopping Congress from moving forward with a sanctions bill. And so if no agreement is reached next week, I think we’re in a precarious situation where the momentum might be lost, and a deal slip away.