Iran and Russia; what happened behind the walls of Kremlin?

Wednesday 4^th of May, Kremlin bid farewell to a president that was the first to visit Iran after Stalin, and his supports for Iran had made him the best known leader of contemporary Russia for Iranians. Tehran-Moscow ties reached its zenith during Putin’s presidency, though some believe its potentials were not fully activated.

The most conspicuous aspect of the relations at this era was the mutual support both countries showed for each other in the international stage.

During an era which started since the last days of 1999, when Putin became the acting president, the countries enjoyed warm relations in different areas ranging from military projects (selling Tor-M1 air defense missile systems to Iran by Russia) to carrying out of the one-billion dollar project of Bushehr power plant. Bilateral cooperation in energy has been admirable according to analysts, though both countries energy exporters and ultimate rivals in this area. However, trade between Moscow and Tehran in this period has been relatively low, compared with Russia’s trade with countries like Turkey.

During this period, at the regional we can view Tehran Moscow in triangular relations the most strategic of which was manifested in Iran-Russia-Central Asia and Caucasus and Iran-Russia-Iraq. Of course the latter seems more like an abstract theory put forth by Western analysts and the data presented in this regard have never been confirmed. Tehran-Moscow cooperation in the Caspian Sea has been another part of the regional cooperation between the two countries.

Tehran-Moscow Ties at the International Level

It could be said that during 8 years of Putin’s presidency Tehran used Moscow’s power as a lever to counter recent years’ sanctions due to its nuclear program. On the other hand, Moscow used Tehran as a fort to block West’s infiltration in its traditional sphere of influence and its move towards Russia’s borders. In fact, Russia used Tehran card in various occassions.

Tehran has mostly used Russia on 2006, 2007 and 2008 sanctions of the United Nations to minimize consequences as much as possible. Considering the contracts and economic profits that Russia sees in its cooperation with Iran (especially in nuclear industry and arms deal) and as a result of disputes between Moscow and Washington during Putins’ rule, Russia confronted the United States during approval of sanction resolutions.

Russia’s behavior in the three sanctions has been roughly similar. In each occasion at the first step Russia has ignored repeated requests of other 5+1 members, especially the United States, to agree with a new round of sanctions, later it has disagreed with the plan and finally it has bargained on mitigating some parts of the resolutions. As a result of Russia and China’s (who has adopted a similar approach because of its 14-billion dollar trade volume with Iran) strategy, before each resolution that leads to a new round of sanctions, Iran has found an opportunity to prepare for the consequences and relieve the negative effects.

Another advantage of Russia’s behavior for Tehran has been mitigating the intensity of resolutions after their enforcement. During the recent years along with China and UAE banks, Russian banks have used legal vacuums to keep Iranian boycotted banks connected with the global network.

Providing nuclear technology for Iran has been more or less influenced by the sanctions, but Iran’s activities haven’t been hampered that much due to Tehran-Moscow warm relations. International reactions to Iran-Russia cooperation in this field have brought it under further focus. United States accuses Russia, in addition to China and some European countries, of showing lassitude because of their economic interests on the sanctions against Iran.

Along with China and North Korea, Russia has become the main arms provider of Iran after the revolution and despite US and West’s pressures; Russian arms are enjoying Iran’s booming market. After USSR dissolution, during 1992-1995 conventional weapons such as T-72 tanks, air-to-air missiles and Mig 29 jet fighters were sold to Iran. But Russia, ran by Yeltsin in those years, yielded to United States pressures and signed a treaty to limit its arm sale to Iran.

The course changed substantially after Putin’s rise to power, such that arms’ trade volume increased from 300 million dollar during 1998-2001 to 1.7 billion dollars in 2002-2005 which shows approximately a 600% rise.

The quality of weapons sold should also be regarded. At the end of 2005 Iran and Russia signed a 700-million dollar contract on advanced surface-to-air SA-15 Gauntlet and Tor M1 missiles. The Tor cargo was delivered to Iran in the last days of 2007. Iran-Russia cooperation on military technology was never directly confirmed by both sides but its probability, especially in missile technology has caused concern for Western countries.

What raises the importance of this cooperation is that despite pressures of West, Russia has increased its cooperation with Iran despite the fact that this country hasn’t been its major arms purchaser. Currently two-third of Russian arms are exported to India and China and compared with these two, Iran’s market doesn’t seem so lucrative; however, it seems the cooperation is so important for Russia that the in a 2007 report, Brooking Research Institute has pointed to this matter and said it seems what is important for Russia is its opposition to United States’ diplomacy rather than maintaining ties with Iran.

The other field of Moscow-Tehran cooperation during Putin’s presidency was nuclear cooperation. The cooperation, especially the one on completion of Bushehr nuclear power plant, dates back to 1995. This is going to end in summer 2008 which is after Putin’s presidency. However, the role played by Putin during his term can’t be ignored.

What will be remembered from Russia’s cooperation for constructing the Bushehr power plant are frequent delays that make it no different from Yeltsin’s era. According to the 1995 contract Russia had to complete the Bushehr power plant within 4 ½ years but Yeltsin’s yielding to United States’ pressures and some technical problems caused Iran and Russia to sign a one-billion dollar contract in 2002 for acceleration in construction. According to this contract, the power plant had to be ready up to March 2004, something that never happened. Tehran and Moscow’s last struggle over launching the power plant happened at the final months of 2007 over the money Iran had to pay. The problem was solved with Putin’s visit to Tehran.

But pro-West analysts believe that Moscow’s procrastinations were a part of Putin’s policy, rather than a result of international pressures. By prolonging this project Putin managed to use Tehran-Moscow nuclear cooperation as a card to bargain in international relations. It is said that United States’ missile defense shield in Eastern Europe and NATO’s eastward expansion were factors that continued Iran-Russia cooperation.

The now former president of Russia delivered 82 tons of Bushehr power plant’s nuclear fuel to Iran in 8 cargos. On the last week of his stay in Kremlin, he also forced the Republic of Azerbaijan to deliver Iran the non-radioactive equipments it had frozen. Based on multilateral cooperation agreements the Republic of Azerbaijan has to allow passage of non-radioactive cargos towards Iran through its territory.

Russia’s support for Iran on its nuclear issues and its persistence on non-military nature of Iran’s nuclear activities has also helped counter the anti-Iran propaganda. On the importance of denying Tehran’s military agenda, Christian Science Monitor believes that since Russia is aware that a nuclear Iran is a threat for Russia more than United States or any US ally, Russia’s claims on non-military nature of Tehran’s nuclear activities are reliable.

Currently it seems that Russia’s stance on Iran will not change significantly, even after Putin’s term has ended. Valentin Sobolov, Russia’s representative who visited Tehran two days before Putin’s end of term was carrying the president’s message for Iran. The message, not difficult to predict even before Sobolov’s visit, was that Moscow’s policies on Iran won’t change.