The Unabated Grudge of Hashemi Rafsanjani
By: Ali Akbar Javanfekr
[IRD introduction: historical analogy has been a powerful and popular discursive tool in Iranian politics. Comparing political figures to reputable/ figures of the early Islamic era, or to figures of the early post-Revolution years, is quite common a phenomenon. Two weeks ago, Ahmadinejad's arch-enemy and former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani republished a 1979 letter that he, along with four other prominent revolutionary clerics of the time, had sent to Ayatollah Khomeini, complaining about his impartiality in the battle between the Islamic Republic Party-- among its key members Ayatollah Khamenei, Ayatollah Beheshti and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani-- and the first president of the Islamic Republic, Abolhassan Bani-Sadr (who later fled Iran after being ousted from power by the parliament.)
The letter started without a greeting, certainly a breach of etiquette in Iranian culture; just as Hashemi Rafsanjani’s much-criticized letter of 2009 to Ayatollah Khamenei, after Ahmadinejad accused his family of corruption in a historical debate with Mir-Hossein Mousavi. Perhaps there’s no need to mention that comparing Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to Abolhassan Banisadr has been a part and parcel of the anti-Ahmadinejad campaign since the early years of his presidency.
Hashemi Rafsanjani’s republishing of his 1979 letter received a trenchant response from the pro-Ahmadinejad media. Ali-Akbar Javanfekr, Editor-in-Chief of the government organ Iran Daily and the president’s media advisor showed perhaps the harshest reaction, reflected in his last Saturday’s editorial. His acidic tone may remind one of the early months after the 2009 presidential election, when opponents did not bother to restrain themselves in attacking Rafsanjani. What follows is a translation of the editorial --with minor modifications.]
Editorial:
An analysis of Hashemi Rafsanjani’s political behavior reveals that just as in 1979, he is fretting over his marginalization in Iranian politics and policy-making circles. Whether in 1979 with the greeting-less letter to Imam Khomeini penned by himself, or in 2009 with his other greeting-less letter to the sage Leader of the Islamic Revolution, Hashemi Rafsanjani has made extensive efforts to remove obstacles in order to return to center stage in any way possible.
Since the day he was appointed as head of the Expediency Council by the Supreme Leader of the Revolution, Hashemi has seen the portfolio as unfitting for him to play a cardinal role in the establishment. Thinking so, he launched an electoral campaign in Tehran to enter the [Sixth] Iranian parliament [in early 2000] and to secure the position of Majles’ speakership for himself. Nonetheless, the polls proved that Tehran citizens have turned their backs on Hashemi and do not see him qualified for legislation. Hashemi did not stop his machinations though, and sought a greater role in policy-making procedures through partisanship. To preserve his zone of influence, Hashemi even introduced a number of his agents into Khatami's administration.
The 2005 presidential election was seen by Hashemi Rafsanjani as the opportunity to reap the fruit of his efforts and return to power. Hashemi’s mission would have been accomplished if it weren’t for Ahmadinejad's brilliance, tact, courage, his rejection of latent and manifest threats, and his determination to enter the presidential contest to revive Islamic Revolutionary discourse. The mission was assumed accomplished by Hashemi, as there seemed to be no truly serious contenders to challenge him.
Nonetheless, Ahmadinejad turned into a thorn in the side of Hashemi as the one who made all his plans go up in smoke. Ahmadinejad's crushing victory over Hashemi Rafsanjani in the presidential election and the rise of a religious [Islam’s and the Revolution’s] value-bound, educated, qualified figure to the presidential portfolio brought tough times for Hashemi Rafsanjani, and fostered within him a grudge against Ahmadinejad. Rafsanjani mustered all his efforts to undermine Ahmadinejad's government. Nonetheless, the huge wave of smear campaigns ultimately backfired, as they ultimately strengthened Ahmadinejad's government. The government responded to such measures with a redoubled endeavor to advance the country towards prosperity and serving the citizens.
Hashemi’s agents in power, including the parliament, also endorsed efforts to create impediments in the way of the Ninth Administration and tried to turn public opinion against the government and the president. Nonetheless, the sheer volume of government service on the one hand and its direct contact with the citizens on the other increased the country’s power and wealth and helped the nation sense the sweet taste of value-based, revolutionary governance-- enough so to foil the revengeful attempts against the government. The 85% turnout of Iranians in the 2009 presidential election signified the government’s success in encouraging political participation among citizens.
Knowing that he is not able to topple Ahmadinejad single-handedly, Hashemi Rafsanjani introduced Ayatollah Khomeini’s Prime Minister, Mir-Hossein Mousavi –as an aged wine- in rivalry with Ahmadinejad. He believed that with Mousavi’s relative popularity and the Reformists’ media, he could tarnish the glorious image of Ahmadinejad in the election-provided opportunity and take revenge for his comprehensive defeat four years earlier.
Hashemi and company were determined to upset the table in case of losing the election and to not allow the governance of Ahmadinejad to continue. They thought that through disturbing the game and creating division in society they could force the establishment to comply with their demands. However, they had ignored the fact that the far-sighted, wise Leader of the Revolution and President Ahmadinejad already knew what they had up their sleeves and how to defuse it. Although the post-election incidents inflicted some cost for the establishment and the country, it had the benefit of burning Hashemi Rafsanjani’s pawns and putting him in a more difficult situation.
Despite the post-election incidents and lessons for Hashemi Rafsanjani, his family and companions, he has proved to be not a man who leaves the stage so easily and keeps hindering the nation’s control over its own destiny. He has proven himself to have a deep grudge against Ahmadinejad and considers him as the cause of all his failures, and takes advantage of every opportunity to blow a strike against him.
When the sage Leader of the Revolution advised Dr. Ahmadinejad in a private letter to dispense with the decision to appoint Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei as vice president, he was not at all willing to undermine the authority of the president. Nonetheless, Hashemi’s agent instantly publicized the letter in order to imply a rift between the president and the Leader and to make the most by undermining his authority inside and outside the country. Interestingly, many of the self-proclaimed Principlists who have always opposed Hashemi turned into his tools either intentionally or unintentionally. Ahmadinejad's brightness and Mashaei’s unquestionable obedience to the velayat neutralized the goals behind the premeditated efforts; though they managed to create doubts about Ahmadinejad inside some minds.
In the early spring, Mr. Ahmadinejad accepted Heydar Moslehi’s resignation from the intelligence ministry portfolio and appointed him as his intelligence advisor. Once again, the Supreme Leader reminded the president of certain national interests in a private letter [in order for him to rescind the decision]. Finding out about the development, Hashemi Rafsanjani’s agents were prompted to action and as they had no access to the Supreme Leader’s letter, mobilized their media networks to corner Ahmadinejad in the guise of supporting the velayat-e faqih. No orders were given by the Supreme Leader that Mr. Moslehi return to the Intelligence Ministry when on April 17th the same media reported of the Supreme Leader’s letter, while it was only published three days later. This riddle has not been yet answered by these media.
A certain group took advantage of this saga to undermine the authority of the establishment and the Leadership, and consequently the president, to imply the existence of a diarchy inside the establishment. Expectedly, Mr. Ahmadinejad explicitly emphasized the government’s obedience to the Leadership and curtailed efforts to imply a fissure between the president and the Leadership.
The line followed by Hashemi and his team proves that since the 2009 presidential election, he has concentrated his efforts on pursuing an organized propaganda plan which has on its agenda tarnishing the image of Ahmadinejad's confidantes such that in the near future, there are no chances for the presence of those loyal to the president’s ideology in the political stage, and also precludes any possibilities for the rise of another educated figure from the lower class, such as Dr. Ahmadinejad, to rise up to the higher echelon of the ruling class, and the gates of power would be closed forever. Thus, Hashemi still continues to wield his effective leverage to defame the government of Ahmadinejad, coming up with a new ruse every day.
Massive propaganda against a delusive entity called the “Astray Current” is being orchestrated by Hashemi Rafsanjani, a key actor of the Fetneh. However, not only has the Principlist camp disregarded the warnings, but it has also kept itself occupied with the “Astray Current” fantasy, a term coined by Hashemi Rafsanjani.