Assassination Allegations: Prelude to a comprehensive scenario
Saudi Arabia is using the ambiguous scenario of the assassination of Adel al-Jubeir, its ambassador to Washington, as an instrument to attract the Arab World’s and the international community’s support against Iran; the [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League and some of the European countries have joined Saudi Arabia and the US so far to condemn Iran. But just a day after announcement of the issue by the US Justice Department, experts in regional affairs and terrorism, even those inside the US, have described the scenario as weak.
As proof, Kenneth Katzman, an expert in the ME affairs and a member of the Congressional Research Services, exposed several ambiguities and unanswered questions about the recent scenario, as his collogues carrying out researches about Iran for many years have evaluated this scenario as suspicious. New York Times in a review quoted David Sanger who believes the scenario “sounds a little bit B-movie clumsy” and reminds us that within 24 hours after the announcement of the scenario, the regional experts questioned its credibility. Foreign Policy in a report by Stephan Walt titled “Something just doesn’t add up…” writes: “[u]nless the Obama administration (and in particular, Attorney General Eric Holder), has more smoking gun evidence than they've revealed so far, they are in danger of a diplomatic gaffe on a par with Colin Powell's famous U.N. Security Council briefing about Iraq's supposed WMD programs.”
In another review, Walt adds in this regard: “[b]ut if this turns out to be a much more ambiguous business […] then what are we trying to accomplish by rolling out a seemingly well-orchestrated round of new accusations, especially when there's little chance of getting the sort of "crippling sanctions" that might actually alter Iran's behavior? Are we just trying to divert attention from other issues (the economy, the "Arab Spring," the failed diplomacy on Israel-Palestine, etc.), or is this somehow linked to the 2012 campaign?”
The results of a survey carried out by al-Jazeera website show that more than 66 percent of its Arab audience does not believe the scenario.
Undoubtedly, Iran and Saudi Arabia are rivals –to describe it in benign terms- in the energy arena, regional power balance and influence on the Muslim World. In the last three decades, Saudi Arabia replaced Iran as the top energy supplier, improved its economic indices while Iran was occupied by war, sanctions and international problems. With its population one-third of Iran's, Saudi Arabia has larger GDP, oil revenues and foreign exchange reserves than those of Iran.
In the security arena, Saudi Arabia is US’s key strategic ally in the region, while Iran enjoys a better position due to its geostrategic situation, located between the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, its dominance over the Strait of Hormuz and the entire northern coast of the Gulf, its 70-million population, technological achievements in military, scientific, and nuclear areas and its influence in the Middle East.
In the last three decades, except for a short period in the Reformist government, the relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia have been full of challenges, most important of which can be listed as follows:
Saudis’ support for Saddam in his war with Iran, the US’s allegations concerning Iran’s cooperation in the 1996 Khobar bombings, the two country’s rivalry in the post-Saddam Iraq, their different viewpoints in Lebanon, struggle over outperform each other in the energy market and ultimately the extreme tension between two countries after the Arab Spring hit Bahrain.
The scenario, by which the US has targeted the Iran-Saudi Arabia relations, although containing many ambiguities, reveals a new foreign policy and security approach towards Saudi Arabia against Iran, as Riyadh’s prompt reaction and insistence over formation of an international front to condemn Iran indicates.
Trying not lose face, Saudis have been constantly angry about the fact that in the recent years Iran has taken advantage of the regional developments, especially the fall of Saddam, having the opportunity to wield influence over Iraq and the Middle East. The Arab revolutions in 2011 were nonetheless the limit to their patience. Suffering the senility of their key figures, Saudis cannot make landmark decision. In this situation, they also face the waves of the Arab Spring adjacent to their borders. Saudis’ petrodollars and global financial clout have so far contained the revolutions in Bahrain and Yemen, but evidently Saudi Arabia does not have enough political and security power to suppress the uprisings of its eastern and southern neighbors. In the Arab World, Saudi Arabia is known as the guardian of the status quo, resisting against the pro-democracy waves.
Saudis are used to viewing the ME developments from the purview of power balance with Iran. To them, Iran has been the chief beneficiary of the Arab Spring. Whether correct or misled in its interpretation, Riyadh has tried to curb the transformations in the Arab World. The strongly anti-Iranian atmosphere of the Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy provided the favorable context for the US to follow the policy of Iran’s isolation and impose sanctions against the country by relying over the financial credits and Saudis’ strategic misconception.