Turkey’s Pragmatism Will Solve the Mavi Marmara Crisis

The tensions in Tel Aviv-Ankara relations have several years of history behind them. More precisely, it was in the second term of the AK Party’s rule in Turkey, in 2007, that tensions escalated. Israel's Operation Cast Lead in Gaza, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s scuffle with Shimon Peres in Davos, indicated a turn of the page in what were once intimate relations.

During these years, Erdogan and his strategists have tried to portray their country as the champion of the Palestinian cause. The waving of Turkey’s flag in the hands of Palestinians and Lebanese indicates the success of AKP’s project.

Relations between Israel and Turkey became particularly strained when the Mavi Marmara ship-- part of a Gaza aid flotilla-- was raided by Israeli commandoes in international waters. Nine Turkish activists were killed, filling Turks with consternation and fury.

Since the incident Turkey’s demands from Israel have revolved around three issues: a formal apology, compensation for the victims of the attack and the lifting of the siege on Gaza. Compensation would have been easy for Tel Aviv, but eating humble pie and apologizing, or even worse, ending the Gaza siege, was not something Israel could stomach. Nevertheless, Turkey’s response to Israel's refusal to meet the demands was not as strong as expected. Neither the Turkish ambassador was recalled from Tel Aviv nor were relations severed or downgraded. It seems that the Turks are showing patience and waiting for Israelis to express their regret in one way or another to put an end to the story and return bilateral relations to a normal track.

The UN report on the Mavi Marmara incident touched a raw nerve and did not satisfy the expectations of Turks. The report called Israel's naval blockade “a legitimate security measure” while criticizing Tel Aviv for using “excessive and unreasonable” force. The report made a harsh response from the Turkish side inevitable. Besides the UN report, three other factors seem to have instigated Ankara’s serious reaction:

1. The magnitude of the incident had raised expectations in Turkey, blocking an approach toward a compromise.
2. Turkey needed to prove that it follows policies independent from US or Israeli pressure. The expulsion of the Israeli ambassador –which was a media surprise- was regarded as an appropriate measure after 15 months of waiting.
3. Turkey’s redefined Middle Eastern role during recent years-- as a regional leader-- dictated such a measure.

The UN report was in fact the last straw which instigated Turkey’s action. From this point on, there are two possibilities in Ankara-Tel Aviv relations:

1. The strained relations continue for some time until sensitivities lapse or die down. The two parties could resume relations then, provided that they abstain from any provocative actions in this period. Some analysts believe that Israel should be the more appeasing party to prevent any further challenges.
2. Third parties may try to broker peace between the once close friends. The most likely option for a broker is the United States. Washington is Tel Aviv’s patron, while having strategic ties with Ankara. The schism between two old friends will definitely undermine Washington’s regional interests.

In the meantime, Ankara has agreed to install NATO’s missile defense shield on its soil. There was talk about Turkey replacing Poland and the Czech Republic in that regard in the last two years. The Turks have now accepted the demand –of course as a NATO project- despite their increasingly close relations with Iran and a disgruntled Russia. The Iranian long-range Shahab missiles, once defined as a threat to Turkey in the country’s national security document –the so-called Red Book– were removed from the list last year; a measure construed as Turkey’s further intimacy with Iran. Turkey's hosting of the missile shield-- which stands in contradiction to last year’s decision-- indicates that:

1. Turkey defines its national security and military strategies within the NATO framework.
2. National interests override neighboring countries’ concerns in Ankara’s interaction with world powers.
3. Despite Turkey’s self-proclaimed ‘turn towards the East’, the country’s interests and long-term strategies are still West-oriented.

Turkey is negotiating the line between its relations with strategic Western allies and Middle Eastern neighbors. It also seems that the Turks will wait for Tel Aviv to move one step forward for reconciliation. Neither Turkey nor Israel wants to sever ties. In the meantime, there are other countries who want them remain allies. Israel itself still needs Turkey as its Middle East lifeline, and falling into an unconstructive rivalry with Tel Aviv will challenge Ankara’s progressive position in the region. The Turks’ pragmatism so far has proven that these days will be over sooner or later.