The Struggle between Ideology and Bureaucracy

 

Middle East has been a tough ground for all of the US presidents during the recent decades. They have entered the White House with various plans to bring about changes for the region, but implementation of these plans has always faced serious challenges in a labyrinth of different procedures, developments and realities, and usually the final outcome of the plans, becomes different from what was expected at the beginning.

 

Among the multitude of complexities that challenge Middle East plans of United States’ presidents in their operational phases, there are a range of domestic political factors. The interaction of these factors with political and international realities determines the destiny of America’s Middle East policy. Based on the recent developments in Bush’s Middle East policy, the question raised here is that: what are the domestic roots of Bush’s Middle East policy?

 

To answer this question, in this article three interconnected phenomena, “United States’ permanent objectives and Middle East’s engineering during Bush’s tenure”, “struggle between bureaucracy and ideology in Washington”, and “Bush’s legacy” are investigated. This will shed light on political shifts in United States decision-making centers that focus on Middle East.

 

One- United States’ permanent objectives and Middle East’s engineering during Bush’s tenure: after WWII and presence of the United States, as a global power, in Middle East, this country has more or less pursued permanent objectives in the region. United States seeks to establish the security of energy routes, be sure of normal flow in oil pipelines, provide the security of Israel, support friendly and dependent states, and prevent the emergence of radical anti-American movements.

 

These permanent aims have witnessed different levels of intensity, major differences at micro level processing and implementation in different historical contexts; however, they have always existed at the core of the United States’ Middle East policy. Battle against radicalism, for example, has been followed in forms of battle against Communism, Pan-Arabism, Nasserism, fundamentalism and terrorism, but all these are evidence for the United States’ permanent objective that is battle, confrontation and control of any type of political-intellectual movement that seeks to challenge this country’s hegemony in the Middle East.

 

As to protecting friendly states, debates have always taken place around the way to protect and support these regimes and the priorities in this regard, but undoubtedly, strengthening United States’ friends and supporters has been a permanent constituent of America’s Middle East policy. Even in cases when Washington has criticized or acted against Middle Eastern friends, the ultimate goal has been reinforcing groups that supposedly serve its interests in a better way.

 

But Bush’s administration entered the scene with a new appearance. With a set of ideas that it presented in its first years of office, Bush’s administration showed that it seeks for an extensive social engineering in Middle East. Chief objectives of Washington’s diplomacy were still evident in this agenda. Of course new words were heard on supporting friendly regimes. Some key figures of Bush’s first administration such as David Frum and Richard Pearl openly called for changes in Middle East, stating that advocating stability has lead to reinforcement of corrupt regimes.

 

But beyond all these words, evident was the stability of the United States’ Middle East policy. In fact, the new figures advocated supporting friendly regimes, but in their opinion, friendly regimes were ones which were selected in a more direct way by the United States.

 

11^th of September shed more light on the United States’ new process of social engineering for the Middle East, notwithstanding the unchanging nature of principal objectives. Spread of democracy through imposing structural changes to the nature of regimes, even by military power; emphasis on war against terrorism, as the macro-framework that shapes hegemonic movements in the region, even by altering the educational content in Middle Eastern countries; and exertion of power at the price of overlooking public opinion across the world, were the key elements of Middle East’s social engineering during Bush’s administration.

 

Inside the United States, the driving force of this extensive architecture was the small, but highly persistent and determined group of neo-conservatives. Through military occupation of Iraq in April 2003, they heedlessly sought to democratize Middle East, establish Israel’s supremacy in the region, put an end to likely troubles caused by Iran –even by military power-, and construct a Middle East in which the hegemon America would organize the strategic relations and would become a model for all states and nations in cultural, social and economic aspects, but to no avail.

 

The realities of the region, proved the visionary nature of Bush’s social engineering for the region. Not only the occupation of Iraq did not become a beginning for democratization of Middle East, but it plunged the United States’ into plight which is full of challenge and distress in every single moment.

 

Iraq’s situation is so that even a figure of 90 security incidents per day, according to UN’s special envoy to Iraq, Staffen De Mistra, shows improvement, compared with the previous figure of 300 incidents per day. However, Iraq has not been the only challenge of the extensive social engineering agenda of the United States in Middle East, since related plans on Lebanon, Palestine, Iran, and democratization have faced serious problems.

 

 It was Iraq that ruined the ideological dream palace of Washington’s neo-conservatives and in the struggle between ideology and bureaucracy, gradually the veterans of executive bodies, found more opportunities to direct and moderate Washington’s Middle East policy. This explains recent shifts in domestic roots of United States’ foreign policies in the region.

 

Two- the struggle between bureaucracy and ideology in Washington continued throughout the last year and it culminated with the Congress elections and strategic defeat of Republicans, Rumsfeld’s dismissal, and Wolfowitz’s scandal.

 

Wolfowitz, who was accused of paying rises and promotions to his Arab girlfriend, resigned from his position and joined the group of hardliners who had parted from Bush’s administration. Due to realities of Middle East, bureaucrats such as Robert Gates, the present Secretary of Defense, and Condoleezza Rice, gradually shifted the operational course of America’s policies in the region from ideological to realistic and still they’re in the middle of the battle.

 

This battle is neither an easy battle nor a battle of good and evil. Gates and Rice are both close and trusted friends of Bush. In their ideals, they have political affinities with neo-conservatives but obviously there are differences between them and Cheney –Bush’s Deputy who is still the pillar of neo-conservatives in the government- in attitude and practice. These differences are evident in the case of military attack to Iran on its nuclear issue.

 

It is noteworthy that before the release of NIE’s recent report, the possibility of United States’ attack on Iran had become a major cause of concern for all the political and strategic circles of the world because of its unpredictable consequences. Release of this report, because it stated that Iran has stopped its military nuclear activities since 2003, reduced the possibility of attack. Although the current situation of United States’ diplomacy cannot be trusted, clearly Cheney front is in a weak position against Gates-Rice axis.

 

The Gates-Rice axis is a phenomenon worthy of study in the domestic policy labyrinth of the United States. Gates –a CIA veteran- has worked with 6 US presidents and has started his career as a low-level analyst Before becoming Secretary of Defense, he served in United States’ National Security Council for a long time. Interestingly, Rice was his deputy at that time. Gates has management approaches are different from his dismissed predecessor. Of these differences, one is allowing military commanders to speak openly about the futility of military solutions in Iran-US dispute over nuclear issues.

 

Unlike Rumsfeld, Gates emphasizes reinforcement of America’s soft power in the region. His support for the Secretary of Foreign Affairs’ receiving a higher budget for soft activities is unprecedented in intergovernmental relations of America –where rarely occurs any support for another ministry for an increased budget- is manifestation of the struggle between bureaucrats and ideologues.

 

In fact, Rice is closer to Bush and not all the point of views of Rice and Gates are necessarily similar, but at any rate, an alliance between these two –of course due to global and regional realities- has taken place. With regard to this alliance and these realities Gates’ “I have got Cheney under control” becomes understandable.

 

The importance of Gates-Rice axis can be appreciated if we consider the chain of events in the United States domestic policy, which have put ideologues under pressure. These events are not necessarily connected to Middle East developments but they’re not irrelevant either.

 

John Bolton’s dismissal, and opening of a new file on destruction of the interrogation files of Guantanamo prisoners and other terrorist suspects by CIA, and rising doubts against private security companies like Black Water, are links of the chain of unfavorable developments against neo-conservatives.

 

About the latter, it should be mentioned that after Bush took office, a policy of privatization of foreign aids was adopted. Therefore, instead of giving the aids to state-run organizations such as United States Agency for Development, or major NGOs like CARE or World Vision, Bush’s administration decided to sign contracts with private companies, assuming that their effectiveness of the private sector is higher; another conservative economic idea.

 

In addition to educational, health and developmental issues, the realm of activity of these private companies, stretched to security domains. But in practice, these companies became a big problem for the US government in all areas, both in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The domestic atmosphere of America reveals that ideologues are having hard times and bureaucrats feel that they can realize the objectives of foreign policy better than before, relying on realistic and practical considerations.

Meanwhile let’s remember that it’s the last year of Bush’s administration and all US presidents face a phenomenon called legacy; what do they hand down?

 

Three- “what is Bush’s legacy?” This question has turned into a serious issue in domestic debates of United States and it has several answers. Bush’s presidency can’t be separated from 9/11 and the military occupation of Iraq. In addition to this legacy, in a historical view, his legacy will be compared with that of other presidents –especially in a year that electoral campaigns for presidency have started. This comparison will have certain political consequences, both for Bush and for Republican candidates. Hence, it will become a major factor that determines Bush’s foreign policies in the Middle East.

For his legacy, Bush needs to prove that he has succeeded in constructing a new Iraq; bringing changes for Palestinians and Israelis and embarking on a peace process; progressing on the nuclear issue of Iran and stopping its military plans through diplomacy and by implementation of multidimensional mechanisms; and spreading democracy in Middle East.

 

The legacy logic explains all the attempts to make the Annapolis conference appear successful. Similar are focus on stabilization of Iraq and preparedness to confront Iran in the case of Iraq. Release of the NIE report can be interpreted in the same frame of reference.

 

The gist of this report is that Iran, based on rational calculations and international pressures, has quitted its military nuclear plans and it can’t achieve nuclear weapons in near future. The legacy logic can be also used to explain Bush’s moderated stance on developments of Lebanon.

Bush’s legacy is a domestic issue which will influence foreign relations extensively, especially on Middle East. Meanwhile we should keep in mind that Bush’s character is unconventional and totally different from that of former US presidents.

 

His calculation mechanisms are not necessarily predictable with ordinary procedures. He may have other plans for his legacy and based on developments that can take place in Middle East or his government in the remaining year he can make special decisions and leave a unique legacy.

 

In response to a question about the domestic roots of recent shifts in Bush’s Middle East policy, it was clarified that the principles and fundamental goals of United States foreign policy in Middle East have experienced a relative stability during the recent decades. However, different governments have adopted different approaches to realize these goals.

Under the influence of neo-conservative doctrines, Bush’s government sought for a broad social and strategic engineering to form a new, different Middle East. Occupation of Iraq was the first step of this plan but regional and global realities, especially the aftermath of Iraq’s occupation, heavily affected the arrangement of political forces inside the United States and in the battle between ideologues and bureaucrats, the latter who rely on the increasingly powerful Gates-Rice axis, gradually held the upper hand.

As to Bush’s legacy, especially in a year which presidential elections are going to be held, the Middle East policy witnessed moderations. But what will happen in the remaining year?

The answer is not clear. What is clear is that the neo-conservatives have not been faded from the circle of political power in White House entirely. Also it is clear that the developments of Middle East in this year can’t be predicted.

Amid the twilight of the United States’ tense domestic policy, still the shadow of Middle East can be seen, a great riddle for US’s foreign diplomacy as before.