Bahrain, Not Another Libya

18 April 2011 | 20:00 Code : 12009 General category
Interview with Dr. Hossein Salimi, university professor and expert in Middle East issues
Bahrain, Not Another Libya

IRD: Can common features be found in the movements of people in various Arab countries from Egypt to Libya, Yemen and Bahrain?

HS: The social changes that occur in the same period have differences and similarities. Our work in the social sciences is to identify similarities and differences, and to evaluate their different effects.

The recent movements in the region have common points. Including that the middle class, especially the educated middle class, is involved in all of them, and was one of the main causes of the social protests. Universal social networks distributing social awareness are also decisive; economic problems and protests on livelihoods are essential; and they all occurred after a brief period of economic boom and an increase in public expectations.

In all the movements that have occurred, there was no apparent directing leader, but a spreading movement distributed in the social arena that acts in diverse ways. In all these movements of people, different attitudes came together: Islamists, nationalists, liberals, democrats and even secularists. Seeking democracy, more democratic demands, and conditional political power is a common request to most of these movements.

These are the common features found in all these movements.

IRD: So why, despite these similarities, are not the results of popular movements in different countries the same?

HS: As I said there are fundamental differences. For example, in a country such as Libya, these movements finally manifested themselves in the form of differences and tribal conflicts. This means that there are some tribes that reacted positively before popular affiliations, and allied against Qaddafi’s government, or acted in the opposite way. Namely, the product of those social protests was tribal clashes.

Or in a country like Bahrain, the oppositions were transformed to the protests and clashes between religious affiliations and Shiites and Sunnis. In Yemen, there was a combination of political ideological competition and rivalries among tribal and even independence movements like the al-Houthis that use the social process.

Therefore, there are different political results in different societies, especially given that the governments’ determination to suppress or be flexible toward the people was very effective in the political results of the popular movements. The governments determined to suppress and having the tools to do so, like Libya, bring crisis or even civil war to society. But in the societies where there is no intention to seriously suppress, political transformation occurs earlier.

IRD: In a country like Yemen, are social structures and civil society consistent enough to accept the collapse of the established order and to substitute a new one? Is there a concern that a situation similar to that of Libya could occur in Yemen?

IRD: Naturally, the type of power structure in a society such as Yemen is different, and it is possible that a civil war like that in Libya does not occur in Yemen, as Ali Abdullah Saleh’s government is not as determined as Gaddafi’s to repress the people who claim a highly charismatic leader. Ali Abdullah Saleh himself announced that he would withdraw from power after one year, while Gaddafi rejected such a notion and claimed to be a popular leader among the Libyan people and community.

But there are issues in Yemeni society that cause concern. Due to the existence of independence and separatist tendencies in Yemen and the lack of civil society organizations, stable political institutions and moderate economics bringing social economic life to society, there is a fear that the collapse of the regime can lead to a breakdown of the country or many conflicts within the community.

Therefore, many political groups or the international forces influential in this area are to follow the Egyptian model to move the people. For example, Ali Abdollah Saleh leaves power after a few months and a more reasonable and moderate figure comes to office; later during a long-term process, new legal and civil institutions can be formed to keep the conflicting forces within it, and to have political balance in the Yemeni community.

Otherwise, many political experts agree that a sudden collapse in a society such as Yemen may cause a severance of or long political conflicts in Yemeni society.

IRD: What is the long-term landscape of the West regarding the changes in the Middle? Does the West seek the weakening of the countries with interests against those of the West's?

HS: The Western governments’ outlook in this regard can be interpreted based on a concept drafted as the Greater Middle East plan a few years ago. The four major principles mentioned in the Greater Middle East plan were expanding democratic governments and the middle class, and increasing the role of women in various Middle Eastern communities.

For foreign policy strategy, it is natural that the US and European governments will attempt to undermine the countries incompatible with their interests with the pretext of development, and to empower more moderate regimes in those countries.

But it should be remembered that these movements did not occur only in countries that oppose some of the West's policies, such as Libya and Syria; but in many countries considered allies of the West such as Egypt and Bahrain.

It seems that since a few years ago, Americans and Europeans have been concerned about the situation of their allied countries, and for that reason they would encourage them to adopt political reforms and to expand democratic institutions to have greater stability.

So it seems that the main concern is not in the anti-West countries. The major concern of Westerners is their allies; to see how they handle the new movements and to ensure that they do not lead to radical revolutions and new governments coming to office in these countries. So that they can continue to cooperate in the implementation of long-term strategic-security plans desirable to the West in the Middle East.

In the long run, the desirable Middle East to the West is a Middle East with a strategic peace capable of forming long-term pacts and economic unity. So, if those governments can somehow manage the process leading to such conditions, they will achieve optimum success.