The Istanbul Negotiations and the Necessity of a New Ostpolitik

Can Istanbul play a bridge role between Iran and the transatlantic partners? Geographically, it is located between East and West, and politically it has the capacity to play such a role. However, the real answer depends on the political will and support of those who are not at the table.

Reviewing the latest news on the next round of nuclear negotiations shows clearly that after three decades of pressure, sanctions, and threats as well as five years of UNSC resolutions and sanctions, the US and some of its allies need a success story before going to Istanbul. That’s why they attempt illegal[i] cyber attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities, and engage in terrorist attacks against Iranian scientists. Of course, this is understandable because the US needs a face-saving strategy prior to sitting at a table in front of an Iranian delegation that has been targeted for several years.

Regardless of the media coverage that they think necessary (but I do not agree with), if the P5+1 seek meaningful negotiations—as president Obama mentioned in his interview with the Turkish newspaper Hurriyet[ii]—it is necessary that they do not believe in self-developed fairy tales, and seek a meaningful confidence building process.

Beginning such a process needs a correct understanding of each player’s moves. Misinterpreting Iranian moves and capabilities has been a big problem during past years. At least three trends of misinterpretation are evident, and they continue to be so. The first wrong perception pertains to Iranian capabilities. At first, it was said that Iran has no enrichment capability, then no industrial enrichment capability, then no enrichment capability at the 20 percent level; and now it is said that Iran does not have the capability to produce fuel for its Tehran Research Reactor. None of the past evaluations of Iranian technical capabilities have been correct.

The second long-term misinterpretation concerns the consequences of sanctions and threats. At the beginning it was supposed that Iran would submit to the threat of sanctions and military action. Iran’s cooperation with the EU3 from 2003 to 2005 was misinterpreted as a result of the US show of force in Iraq. The EU3 expected that the threat of sanctions would force Tehran to put aside its enrichment program. Now, after five years of sanctions, military threats, sabotage and terror, it is clear that all the past calculations have been wrong.

The third kind of misperception has occurred with regard to Iran’s intentions. All along it has been assumed that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons, and will reach its target within a specific timetable. But when such a scenario does not materialize, it is interpreted as US success in weakening Iranian nuclear capability and postponing the timetable. During the past two decades the US and Israeli officials have repeatedly postponed the date of Iran’s alleged acquisition of nuclear weapons. For twenty years it has repeatedly been mentioned that Iran will acquire a nuclear weapon within the next two years. Based on the last prediction of that sort, Iran was supposed to have a nuclear weapon by 2011—now the timing has been postponed to 2015.

There may have been several reasons for pushing back the dates, such as giving negotiations more opportunity to succeed, decreasing pressure on decision makers,[iii] being able to present a good record of achievements thanks to sanctions and cyber attacks, etc. However, the main reason for the failure of such predictions is that Iran in fact does not have such an intention. It is hard for the West to accept this fact because it would undermine their policies and put into question their credibility. However, postponing the timing repeatedly has had the same repercussion. A meaningful confidence building process will not emerge as long as such misinterpretations and misperceptions over Iran’s intentions and behavior persist.

Iran has already done its utmost to engage in a confidence building process. The implementation of the Additional Protocol (to the NPT) for two years, solving outstanding issues with IAEA, and finally the Tehran declaration to swap enriched uranium in Turkey are a few examples. It is the transatlantic partners’ turn to show that they seek meaningful negotiations in Istanbul and are interested in a successful confidence-building process. The Iranian invitation to representatives of the international community for a visit to its nuclear facilities shows Iran’s will for transparency and proves that the US-Israeli cyber attacks[iv] have not been able to slow down its peaceful nuclear activities. The sabotaging efforts have just tarnished the already negative image of the US and Israel, something that they have been suffering from throughout the greater Middle East and the wider Muslim world, and which Obama has tried to change over the past two years. Finding common ground for closer cooperation could start with goodwill, positive steps, and constructive behavior. Taking “constructive approaches”[v] must be mutual. If the US is interested in following such an approach, the Istanbul negotiations can be a good beginning. The US needs to know that Iran has long-term legitimate concerns and complaints which need to be taken into account.

Furthermore, the Istanbul negotiations can pave the way for a EU-Turkey-Iran strategic dialogue. Such a dialogue will contribute to the EU’s energy security as well as peace and stability in Afghanistan, Iraq, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Middle East - the very areas that the EU and its partners will be most concerned with during the next decade.

In sum, following a new Ostpolitik is necessary for both Germany and its transatlantic partners. As the new developments in Tunisia show, the West needs to pay attention to the hearts and minds of the people, not just the voices that they prefer to listen to. Isolation, sanctions, military threats, sabotage, and terror are not things that create a positive image of the West in Iranian society, the Middle East and the Muslim world. Targeting the people through sanctions not only weakens democracy but also is a violation of human rights. Trade, economic and scientific development are also among the basic rights of the people, and current policies against Iran have created an image of the West of in fact opposing the country’s development, its stability and well-being.