Why Is Turkey Reluctant over Iran Sanctions?

The Turkish government is a major customer of Iran’s energy, especially its gas, and the increasingly powerful Turkish private sector enjoys lucrative trade deals with Iranian enterprises. Dispensing with its needs and interests would be a torturous parting for Turkey. Trade exchanges between Ankara and Tehran, particularly during recent years, have been significantly boosted and abandoning massive profits earned from economic transactions with Iran would be too difficult a task for Ankara (Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan had recently called for upgrading the level of trade ties with Iran to an annual 30 billion dollars). At the same time, in Turkey’s new diplomatic agenda functioning a central role in regional challenges is an imperative, an aim that cannot be achieved unless Turkey engages with Iran, particularly over its nuclear program.

Nevertheless, it seems that Turkey’s relative indifference to the West’s demand can be tackled if Ankara receives the incentives it wishes. As many political observers maintain, Turkey won’t hesitate to get on board with the United States as soon as its demands are met. There are certain political and financial perks Turkey expects from the West in order to rethink the direction of its flexible and balanced diplomacy. In this context, Erdogan’s government-granted freedom to Turkish banks can be interpreted as a gesture of partnership to the West: to enforce tougher sanctions against Iran without fear of any economic or political loss, the Turks need objective economic and political guarantees from West.

This, of course, won’t amount to full severance of ties between Tehran and Ankara. It seems that the Turkish administration will follow a mini-max policy: convincing Tehran to endure a minimum level of sanctions while demanding from the West the maximum of incentives. The pitch of this mini=max policy will be determined by regional political developments.

Bahram Golzadeh is a Turkish affairs analyst.