Israel’s Military Clash with the Lebanese Army

Tuesday’s clashes in southern Lebanon are the first manifestation of the physical confrontation which the region unfortunately, according to some analysts, seems to be heading towards. The two sides have presented two conflicting narratives of the incident. According to Israel, the incident took place when the Lebanese Army opened fire on an Israeli force which, with the coordination of UNIFIL, was cutting shrubbery on the Israeli side of the border. The Lebanese military, however, has said in a statement that an Israeli armed force crossed the “technical line” along the Lebanese-Palestinian border on the outskirts of the town of Adaisseh, despite “UNIFIL intervention to stop it” from entering Lebanese territory. It said the Lebanese Army fired warning shots into the air, and from there the situation escalated into clashes in which the Israelis used tank shells and helicopter missile attacks, “targeting army positions and civilian homes”, and the Lebanese reciprocated with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenade fire. The fighting killed a senior Israeli Army officer, two Lebanese soldiers and a Lebanese journalist. Both countries filed a complaint to the UN Security Council.

The first point that should be made is that it is worrying how rapidly the situation escalated, and even more worrying is Israel’s readiness to escalate the situation by sending Apache helicopters to attack the LAF battalion headquarters in the village of Al-Taybeh, near Adaisseh.

Three important backdrops which help contextualise the event are as follows:

1.      The Big Picture: In the wider framework, the US and her allies are attempting through numerous means to not only halt the Iranian nuclear program - which the Iranians are adamant is peaceful while the US and her allies insist is leading to acquirement of nuclear weapons, but also to further isolate and finally eliminate Iran from the power equation of the Middle East. These means include, among others: 1. Sanctions, and the funding and training of dissident groups in Iran such as Jundullah; 2. Promoting regime change; 3. The US special operation teams which were publicly given the directive approximately a year ago to carry out operations in Iran (click here and here); 5. Encouraging the Arab governments of the Persian Gulf to become more verbal and aggressive in their stance against Iran; 6. Public announcement by General Mullen that the US has plans for a military strike against Iran; 7. A campaign of public disinformation and cultural warfare against Iran, both on the international level and within Iran.

The current crisis in Lebanon should be understood in this context, as Lebanon/Hezbollah, Iran, Syria and Hamas form the axis of resistance and have publicly introduced their strategy of common defence. If the aim of the US and Israel, or one of the two, is to attack Iran, one way or another, the mindset of Israel and the US seems to be that a pre-requisite of such a move is the neutralisation of Hezbollah. This could occur either through Hezbollah’s political and social isolation within Lebanon and the region as a whole, and there are a number of ways in which Israel and the US can attempt to achieve this - although recent history demonstrates that such attempts will fail - or through destroying Hezbollah’s military ability before attacking Iran, which would necessitate a military attack against Lebanon/Hezbollah. However, such a scenario was carried out in the 2006 war and was met with failure. Both tracks seem to have been activated.

2.      Information pertaining to the STL’s imminent indictment of members of Hezbollah (for our coverage of the STL and Hezbollah click here): The STL’s attempt to indict members of Hezbollah, regardless of whether it is a US/Israeli ploy or not, might be considered by some as a move which would lead to Hezbollah’s isolation within Lebanon and the Arab world; just as in 2005 when the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri triggered a chain of events, starting with mass anti-Syrian protests on the streets of Lebanon, international condemnation of and pressure on Syria which eventually led to the resignation of the government of Omar Karami and Syrian withdrawal, and then the STL’s formation. The country became politically divided after Hezbollah organised a mass march on March 8 to demonstrate support for Syria, to which anti-Syrian forces responded by holding a mass rally on March 14. Thereafter the country was divided into two camps: March 8 and March 14. Thus, it might be considered by some that this time round, the tribunal will lead to mass anti-Hezbollah protests and national and international calls and pressure on unprecedented levels for the disarmament of Hezbollah. However, such a line of thought is incorrect because the resistance will not surrender its arms and, as the Israeli aggression against Lebanon grows, the need for the resistance becomes more and more highlighted in the public mindset. The differences between Hezbollah and Syria are many, the foremost among them being that Hezbollah is a grass-roots Lebanese movement responsible for putting an end to the Israeli occupation of Lebanon, and therefore it is a movement for the protection of Lebanese sovereignty and freedom. It enjoys wide popular support, both on the basis of its nature as the resistance movement and its identity as a Shi’a Muslim movement and socio-political entity, and it is a great mistake for anyone to assume that the Shi’a of Lebanon will withdraw their support from Hezbollah under any circumstance. Hence, Hezbollah is not an external force as Syria was, but is an integral part of the very fabric of Lebanon, and accordingly, no mass demonstration and no attempt at isolation will result in Hezbollah being disarmed.

3.      Pressure on the Lebanese government and army to disown Hezbollah: Israel has on several occasions warned that it will strike at Lebanese state institutions in case of any renewed violence with Hezbollah. These statements are in contrast with Israel’s behaviour in 2006 when it focused its attacks on Hezbollah strongholds and mainly Shi’a areas in a war that has been dubbed by the western media as the Israel-Hezbollah war. However, since then Hezbollah has become an increasingly influential member of the Lebanese government, which for its part has given the resistance its support and political cover. As such, in any renewed military confrontation, Israel will treat the Lebanese state, army and resistance as an inseparable entity thus giving itself the green light to launch a wider offensive to include those targets. The most recent Israeli warning to that effect was made last month by Defence Minister Ehud Barak, who warned that Israel will attack Lebanese state institutions in case of Hezbollah firing rockets at Israel. In an interview with The Washington Post on July 26^th Barak said, “If Hezbollah fires a rocket into Tel Aviv, we will not run after each Hezbollah terrorist or launcher. . . . We will see it as legitimate to hit any target that belongs to the Lebanese state, not just to Hezbollah.”

The clash took place two days after the Lebanese Army Day, in which President Michel Suleiman asked the Lebanese Armed Forces to defend their frontiers. The clash is important for a number of reasons; it is the first time that the Lebanese army has reacted to Israeli aggression with action instead of complaints, thus, it is of utter significance that the Lebanese army, not the resistance, was the side to retaliate. Israel had expected the Lebanese Army to file a complaint with UNIFIL and was thus surprised that it engaged with the Israeli Army, since past clashes have always taken place with the resistance. The army was thus sending a message to the Israelis that Lebanon’s sovereignty cannot be undermined or attacked and that it will not stand idly by in case of an aggression. Up until yesterday, Israel had believed that the Lebanese Army was deployed along the border as a guarantor for Israel’s security, but Tuesday’s developments served to change this concept and to lead to a reshuffling of considerations on the Israeli side regarding the role of the Lebanese military in the south. Furthermore, that the Lebanese Army’s command gave the order for the retaliation is an indication that such engagement has received both military and political support. The Israeli response to the incident, however it might have occurred, was an Israeli test for Lebanon: first to see how the Lebanese army would react; second to ascertain whether as a result of the clash, disunity would be created in Lebanon or whether the different political factions and confessions within Lebanon would become increasingly united; and third it was a warning to the Lebanese Army and government that in the next war, the target, in both words and actions, will not only be Hezbollah but Lebanon as a whole. The clash was also a continuation of the psychological warfare which is being conducted by Israel against Lebanon as a whole, and which includes many elements such as constant flyovers, trespassing, abduction of civilians (for a few hours) and espionage in violation of Resolution 1701, to place pressure on Hezbollah to disarm. Lebanon yesterday presented a united front on the political, military, resistance and popular levels, thus removing from the equation the opportunity for Israel to bet on divisions among the ranks of the Lebanese.