An Allawi-Maliki Alliance: Who Will Win and Who Will Lose?
The Americans, Iranians, Saudis and Kurds: where will they stand after the possible coalition? By Ali Mousavi Khalkhali.
As the days pass on, an Allawi-Maliki alliance governing Iraq sounds less and less like a fantasy. Informed sources say that an American delegation has visited Baghdad to convince the two ideologically opposed camps to shelve their differences and form a coalition government. Iraqazad.com—reporting this news—also claims that the United States has even suggested that Allawi and Maliki take the largest slices of the power pie; the premiership and the presidency, the latter position extending its authority beyond today’s.
A zero-sum game as it may be, Islamist Shiite groups—Iran’s basic allies—and the Kurds, will suffer from this deal, if it is to happen. There is no doubt that the United States and its Arab allies have concentrated their efforts on defeating Iraq’s Islamist Shiites, which is tantamount to thwarting Iran’s agenda on Iraq’s political stage. Sunni Arab countries, spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, are ardent followers of this cause, and the Saudis are strongly opposed to Maliki’s reelection as the prime minister of Iraq. A source close to the Saudi Foreign Ministry has been even quoted in the daily Asharq alAwsat that the Saudis have warned Iraqi officials that strained relations will persist if Maliki retains his position. An al-Iraqiyah-Rule of Law coalition does not seem to be the worse option for the Saudis, however, as it hypothetically satisfies at least half of their demands.
But would the U.S. in fact back an Allawi-Maliki coalition?
The United States is fully aware that any government formed in Iraq will need to have a constituent Islamist Shiite party, as most of Iraq’s tribal-religious political culture is now dominated by religious Shiites. Nevertheless, the U.S. sees a difference between the Rule of Law and National Alliance (composed of the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI), the Badr organization, the Sadrist movement, the Virtue Party (Fadilah), and smaller Shi’i religious groups). It believes that unlike the National Alliance, Maliki’s Rule of Law has not tied itself to Iran. And Maliki has proved them not wrong. His heavy-handed March 2008 crackdown on the Mahdi Army, his fierce political campaign against Muqtada Sadr (known to some as Iran’s best friend in Iraq), the row over Fakkah oil fields (surely a propaganda game), questioning the 1975 Algiers Accord (on sovereignty over Shatt-al-Arab/Arvandrud)—these are to name just a few instances of Maliki’s independent stance vis-à-vis Iranian interests. Maliki has, however, never stopped promoting himself as a religious figure to win the votes of the Shiite majority, and that seems to please the Americans.
The Kurds’ position may also fall into jeopardy. What makes the matter worse is that unlike Islamist Shiites, they are not a powerful faction inside the parliament, and that strips them of any bargaining chips. Despite their nominally weak position, the United States knows that nothing could be more provocative for Iraq’s Kurds than the forming of an all-Arab cabinet. Northern Iraq’s dwellers are ready to cede a key position such as the ministry of foreign affairs, but as far as they are concerned, the presidency is off-limits. Mahmoud Othman, a leader of the Kurdistan Alliance, has been quoted as saying that the Kurds do not need the foreign ministry; they demand positions that will bring them better service, such as the ministries of oil, transportation or finance. But taking the presidency away from the Kurds? Not likely.
Othman has of course left unsaid what would happen if the presidency, as well as key ministries, were taken away from the Kurds. But there is no need to mention that the Kurds’ bond with the National Alliance could form a powerful opposition in parliament, one that could bog down the next cabinet and render it ineffective. Iraq’s hot spot, the city of Kirkuk, may also turn into the Kurds’ favorite site to take revenge for their marginalization. This is a worrisome fact the Americans, Allawi and Maliki are all aware of. Thus, they will continue to court the Kurds before the formation of a cabinet. The National Alliance also appreciates the political weight of the Kurds, and attempts to keep the Kurdistan Alliance by its side. The Kurds have in fact turned into a balance-maker, and this position helps them to pressure both sides to agree to their demands.
Iraqi political dynamics are becoming increasingly complicated and sensitive. This is no cause for alarm, of course: it is part of the glory of democracy. It can turn Iraq into a role model for tyranny-ridden countries of the region. The picture will remain glorious as long as inter-ethnic or inter-party violence remains a taboo, and the good of the nation is not forgotten under the shadow of political games. The Shiite religious leadership of Iraq in Najaf is, naturally, abundantly aware of this fact, and that is why it has demanded that political rivals reach a consensus as soon as possible.
A zero-sum game as it may be, Islamist Shiite groups—Iran’s basic allies—and the Kurds, will suffer from this deal, if it is to happen. There is no doubt that the United States and its Arab allies have concentrated their efforts on defeating Iraq’s Islamist Shiites, which is tantamount to thwarting Iran’s agenda on Iraq’s political stage. Sunni Arab countries, spearheaded by Saudi Arabia, are ardent followers of this cause, and the Saudis are strongly opposed to Maliki’s reelection as the prime minister of Iraq. A source close to the Saudi Foreign Ministry has been even quoted in the daily Asharq alAwsat that the Saudis have warned Iraqi officials that strained relations will persist if Maliki retains his position. An al-Iraqiyah-Rule of Law coalition does not seem to be the worse option for the Saudis, however, as it hypothetically satisfies at least half of their demands.
But would the U.S. in fact back an Allawi-Maliki coalition?
The United States is fully aware that any government formed in Iraq will need to have a constituent Islamist Shiite party, as most of Iraq’s tribal-religious political culture is now dominated by religious Shiites. Nevertheless, the U.S. sees a difference between the Rule of Law and National Alliance (composed of the Islamic Supreme Council in Iraq (ISCI), the Badr organization, the Sadrist movement, the Virtue Party (Fadilah), and smaller Shi’i religious groups). It believes that unlike the National Alliance, Maliki’s Rule of Law has not tied itself to Iran. And Maliki has proved them not wrong. His heavy-handed March 2008 crackdown on the Mahdi Army, his fierce political campaign against Muqtada Sadr (known to some as Iran’s best friend in Iraq), the row over Fakkah oil fields (surely a propaganda game), questioning the 1975 Algiers Accord (on sovereignty over Shatt-al-Arab/Arvandrud)—these are to name just a few instances of Maliki’s independent stance vis-à-vis Iranian interests. Maliki has, however, never stopped promoting himself as a religious figure to win the votes of the Shiite majority, and that seems to please the Americans.
The Kurds’ position may also fall into jeopardy. What makes the matter worse is that unlike Islamist Shiites, they are not a powerful faction inside the parliament, and that strips them of any bargaining chips. Despite their nominally weak position, the United States knows that nothing could be more provocative for Iraq’s Kurds than the forming of an all-Arab cabinet. Northern Iraq’s dwellers are ready to cede a key position such as the ministry of foreign affairs, but as far as they are concerned, the presidency is off-limits. Mahmoud Othman, a leader of the Kurdistan Alliance, has been quoted as saying that the Kurds do not need the foreign ministry; they demand positions that will bring them better service, such as the ministries of oil, transportation or finance. But taking the presidency away from the Kurds? Not likely.
Othman has of course left unsaid what would happen if the presidency, as well as key ministries, were taken away from the Kurds. But there is no need to mention that the Kurds’ bond with the National Alliance could form a powerful opposition in parliament, one that could bog down the next cabinet and render it ineffective. Iraq’s hot spot, the city of Kirkuk, may also turn into the Kurds’ favorite site to take revenge for their marginalization. This is a worrisome fact the Americans, Allawi and Maliki are all aware of. Thus, they will continue to court the Kurds before the formation of a cabinet. The National Alliance also appreciates the political weight of the Kurds, and attempts to keep the Kurdistan Alliance by its side. The Kurds have in fact turned into a balance-maker, and this position helps them to pressure both sides to agree to their demands.
Iraqi political dynamics are becoming increasingly complicated and sensitive. This is no cause for alarm, of course: it is part of the glory of democracy. It can turn Iraq into a role model for tyranny-ridden countries of the region. The picture will remain glorious as long as inter-ethnic or inter-party violence remains a taboo, and the good of the nation is not forgotten under the shadow of political games. The Shiite religious leadership of Iraq in Najaf is, naturally, abundantly aware of this fact, and that is why it has demanded that political rivals reach a consensus as soon as possible.