Iran Has Revived IAEA’s Legitimacy
Interview with Hosein Sheikh-ol-Eslam, former vice foreign minister on Geneva talks and Iran’s next step in the nuclear course
Iranian Diplomacy: Hassan Sheikh-ol-Eslam’s owns a unique diplomatic record. After entering the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the order of Iran’s later assassinated President Mohammad Ali Rajayi, he immediately received the second most important chair in the office serving as vice minister. Sixteen years as the deputy prime minister on Middle East and African affairs, plus heading Iran’s embassy in Syria, Iran’s strategic ally shows his stature in the diplomatic apparatus. Sheikh-ol-Eslam was elected as a member of the Seventh Parliament in 2007, but returned to the foreign ministry where once again he was appointed as vice minister. Sheikh-ol-Eslam held the position until the recent presidential election. He returned to the parliament after the election, this time as the senior diplomatic advisor to parliament spokesman Ali Larijani. In his interview with Iranian Diplomacy, Sheikh-ol-Eslam responded to our questions not as an official with clichéd answers, but as a veteran analyst. He had us to rethink and polish our judgment about the viewpoints of Iranian diplomats.
As an expert, what is your general assessment of ElBaradei’s last report on Iran’s nuclear program?
I think we should look at the report from two angles. Juxtaposing the report with preceding reports, we see that Iran has chosen sustained cooperation as its strategy and has exhibited adherence to NPT despite all the political or media propaganda around its nuclear program. Iran’s strategy has in fact lent credibility to IAEA in the eyes of global public opinion. It has also created an opportunity to think of revising the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was abused by Western powers in their war campaign against Iraq.
You mean Iran has revived IAEA’s legitimacy?
Exactly. IAEA had been accused of dysfunction in Iraq’s story, at first by West which claimed that UN watchdog has failed to monitor Iraq’s military nuclear program, and then by public opinion that believed it has been deceived by the Americans and has failed to fulfill its duties. Iran’s cooperation which gave IAEA the chance to release regular reports on its nuclear activities returned the organization’s lost prestige. Of course this is despite the distortions in its reports which are the result of political pressures, internal competitions inside IAEA and misleading information given to its officials.
What is the message of the latest IAEA report?
Simple: Iran is continuing its cooperation with IAEA.
Could Iran create or face another situation?
Sure. Just look at IAEA’s relations with countries which pursue a military program, such as Israel and India, or countries which had no military nuclear purposes, like Iraq, or see how Koreas deal with IAEA. None have had cooperation as extensive and effective as Iran. Iran could follow their model but didn’t. I believe this shows our country’s good will and honest intention to solve the dispute in a peaceful manner and build trust. And I’m sorry that Iran’s efforts have never been appraised. Our policy is to reinforce the position of IAEA and NPT against US intervention and manipulation.
But has IAEA appropriately responded to Iran’s good intentions? In the latest IAEA report we see statements which are not constructive and cast doubt on Iran’s honesty.
What you mentioned goes back to the second angle I pointed to at the start of interview. Look, if we view it as a sequel to IAEA’s previous reports on Iran, what I said about sustained cooperation is substantiated. However, we should also analyze the report with regard to the current political and media context. Then, it becomes clear that the report bears the imprint of global powers’ pressures.
I think that in Geneva talks, each Five plus One member intended to outflank the others or remove from the agenda a number of items it deemed as unbeneficial for the entire group. There was a sort of mistrust and internal competition among the members. Russia disfavored the idea of a consortium enriching uranium in Iran under IAEA supervision for two reasons: first, it doesn’t want Iran to outpace its northern neighbors in the course of development; second, it doesn’t want Five plus One negotiations with Iran to serve as a catalyst for normalization of ties between Iran and the United States. On the other hand, Europeans frowned upon the idea of Iran cooperating with Russia in the Arkhangelsk enrichment project. They also don’t want Iran’s plan to construct twenty nuclear reactors turn into a foothold for the Americans to cement their technological hegemony. You may remember that in 2005 a same competition formed between France and the United States over India’s nuclear program. Meanwhile, Americans’ concern was to achieve a formula for action which brought all Five plus One members under one umbrella. As the conclusion, I want to say that Five plus One hadn’t arrived at a consensus before the Geneva talks. Another point was that minor issues had not cast a shadow Iran’s nuclear program until then.
What were these ‘minor’ issues?
Tehran’s research reactor and Iran’s enriched uranium reserves. In fact, when Iranian negotiators went to Geneva, they had planned to discuss Iran’s proposal package in which NPT was just one of the items for negotiation. And Tehran’s research reactor had never been an issue. The reactor was constructed and followed its activities based on 1956 and 1974 agreements between Iran and the United States. It was a part of the ‘Atom for Peace’ program which included Iran, Indonesia, India etc. By providing these countries with research reactors, Americans intended to guarantee that the world will not fall under any nuclear threat. So any possible constriction of the activity of these peaceful reactors by the United States is in fact a challenge to international peace and security and would undermine NPT. Iran’s enriched uranium supply has also become an interesting issue for Five plus One. Prior to the Geneva talks, Western countries denied our right to uranium enrichment. All their political pressure aimed to discourage us from following enrichment activities. Instead of our rights, we had to think merely of our responsibilities. Since Iran’s resistance and prolongation of the dispute thwarted their efforts, they cunningly tied the uranium reserves with Tehran’s research reactor fuel, which according to agreements, they are obliged to supply.
So you believe that Geneva was a turning point. Do you think the domestic protests to the agreements made by Geneva share the same grounds with your analysis?
Geneva talks were a defining moment in our nuclear course for sure. However, I think there is a larger context to the protests against Iran’s agreement with Five plus One. Our collective memory is something you should not ignore. When an Iranian citizen hears that our country has to transfer its uranium reserves to Russia, he remembers eleven tons of gold that Soviet Union owed to Iran as its war debt and refused to return despite Dr. Mosaddeq’s government dire need and West pressures after nationalization of the oil industry. An Iranian may also remember that in breach of the Algiers Treaty, United States froze Iran’s assets and refused to deliver military hardware spare parts Iran had purchased during the Pahlavi regime.
Regardless of all the propaganda or all the talks, when Iran negotiates with West, citizens start to think how it can be guaranteed that they regain their national uranium supply? The bitter experiences of past make us hesitate over the uranium exchange offer.
So the mistrust is much deeper than it is supposed.
Exactly. Our bitter experiences date back to a not-so-distant future. There is no difference between East and West, neighbor or stranger.
You give a considerable weight to our past experiences which have led to the present mistrust. Can you further instantiate it?
The failure of our lengthy negotiations with West, or the failure of agreements made a couple of years ago. Iran’s started constructive negotiations in 2007 under the supervision of Ali Larijani, which led to a modality plan. We had step-by-step progress but just as the problem appeared to be solved, the United States came up with fake claims about a military nuclear program followed by Iran and things went back to square one. West’s dual standards have made the mistrust deeper.
Back to Geneva negotiations, how do you, as a diplomat who once served as vice minsiter, analyze Iran’s moves?
I have no responsibility at the diplomatic apparatus at the moment and I have followed the proceedings through the media, just as you did. I believe that Iran wanted to exhibit its sense of responsibility by attending the Geneva talks, but the abnormal insistence of West to receive the entire supply of Iran’s enriched uranium stock worsened the mistrust. I believe that Iran wanted to provide a solid framework for the continuation of negotiations when it offered a proposal package before the talks.
Besides the nuclear talks, we observed the highest level of diplomatic encounter since the revolution between Iranian and American officials. As senior diplomats with a thirty-year record, how do you view this event?
As much as I’ve heard, and as Iranian chief negotiator Mr. Said Jalili recently explained, it was merely a diplomatic contact, not a negotiation. Diplomatic contacts are separate from diplomatic relations. Even when we cut off ties with a country, we are obliged to maintain consular affairs.
Is there an easy way to tackle this crisis? What is your proposal?
No. Despite the apparent simplicity of the issue, there is no easy way to solve it. I think we should find a middle solution to problem, a pilot scheme that in case of success could be followed and lead to a final formula for solution of the problem. The best example is Tehran’s research reactor. Everybody knows that fuel rods have no military application. Now Iran needs to convert its enriched uranium supply into fuel rods. For this, it has to enrich its uranium up to twenty percent. Iran claims that it has the capability to carry out the process by itself; Russia says that it possesses the technology; France has expressed readiness to convert the low-enriched uranium into fuel rods and West says that if this happens, there will be no more worries. The simplest formula that alleviates the concerns of every party involved is to conduct the conversion process via a multinational consortium and carry out the process inside Iran at a limited level which guarantees peaceful application, under IAEA’s supervision. One year of cooperation would suffice to see if the experience could extend to a higher level.
This scheme entirely complies with NPT regulations according to which advanced countries should provide other members with nuclear technology and material. I seriously recommend the government to start the high-enrichment process if the negotiations and bids fail to bear a fruit. We have applied domestic technology to produce fuel rods for Esfahan reactor. We could use the same technology to manufacture fuel rods for Tehran reactor which as everyone knows, pursues peaceful nuclear activities and produces radioisotopes with medical application. Tehran research reactor’s nuclear fuel should have been provided by other countries according to NPT regulations. The fuel rods have to be replaced in less than two years, so we have no more time to waste and we should set an ultimatum for the end of 2009.
As an expert, what is your general assessment of ElBaradei’s last report on Iran’s nuclear program?
I think we should look at the report from two angles. Juxtaposing the report with preceding reports, we see that Iran has chosen sustained cooperation as its strategy and has exhibited adherence to NPT despite all the political or media propaganda around its nuclear program. Iran’s strategy has in fact lent credibility to IAEA in the eyes of global public opinion. It has also created an opportunity to think of revising the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was abused by Western powers in their war campaign against Iraq.
You mean Iran has revived IAEA’s legitimacy?
Exactly. IAEA had been accused of dysfunction in Iraq’s story, at first by West which claimed that UN watchdog has failed to monitor Iraq’s military nuclear program, and then by public opinion that believed it has been deceived by the Americans and has failed to fulfill its duties. Iran’s cooperation which gave IAEA the chance to release regular reports on its nuclear activities returned the organization’s lost prestige. Of course this is despite the distortions in its reports which are the result of political pressures, internal competitions inside IAEA and misleading information given to its officials.
What is the message of the latest IAEA report?
Simple: Iran is continuing its cooperation with IAEA.
Could Iran create or face another situation?
Sure. Just look at IAEA’s relations with countries which pursue a military program, such as Israel and India, or countries which had no military nuclear purposes, like Iraq, or see how Koreas deal with IAEA. None have had cooperation as extensive and effective as Iran. Iran could follow their model but didn’t. I believe this shows our country’s good will and honest intention to solve the dispute in a peaceful manner and build trust. And I’m sorry that Iran’s efforts have never been appraised. Our policy is to reinforce the position of IAEA and NPT against US intervention and manipulation.
But has IAEA appropriately responded to Iran’s good intentions? In the latest IAEA report we see statements which are not constructive and cast doubt on Iran’s honesty.
What you mentioned goes back to the second angle I pointed to at the start of interview. Look, if we view it as a sequel to IAEA’s previous reports on Iran, what I said about sustained cooperation is substantiated. However, we should also analyze the report with regard to the current political and media context. Then, it becomes clear that the report bears the imprint of global powers’ pressures.
I think that in Geneva talks, each Five plus One member intended to outflank the others or remove from the agenda a number of items it deemed as unbeneficial for the entire group. There was a sort of mistrust and internal competition among the members. Russia disfavored the idea of a consortium enriching uranium in Iran under IAEA supervision for two reasons: first, it doesn’t want Iran to outpace its northern neighbors in the course of development; second, it doesn’t want Five plus One negotiations with Iran to serve as a catalyst for normalization of ties between Iran and the United States. On the other hand, Europeans frowned upon the idea of Iran cooperating with Russia in the Arkhangelsk enrichment project. They also don’t want Iran’s plan to construct twenty nuclear reactors turn into a foothold for the Americans to cement their technological hegemony. You may remember that in 2005 a same competition formed between France and the United States over India’s nuclear program. Meanwhile, Americans’ concern was to achieve a formula for action which brought all Five plus One members under one umbrella. As the conclusion, I want to say that Five plus One hadn’t arrived at a consensus before the Geneva talks. Another point was that minor issues had not cast a shadow Iran’s nuclear program until then.
What were these ‘minor’ issues?
Tehran’s research reactor and Iran’s enriched uranium reserves. In fact, when Iranian negotiators went to Geneva, they had planned to discuss Iran’s proposal package in which NPT was just one of the items for negotiation. And Tehran’s research reactor had never been an issue. The reactor was constructed and followed its activities based on 1956 and 1974 agreements between Iran and the United States. It was a part of the ‘Atom for Peace’ program which included Iran, Indonesia, India etc. By providing these countries with research reactors, Americans intended to guarantee that the world will not fall under any nuclear threat. So any possible constriction of the activity of these peaceful reactors by the United States is in fact a challenge to international peace and security and would undermine NPT. Iran’s enriched uranium supply has also become an interesting issue for Five plus One. Prior to the Geneva talks, Western countries denied our right to uranium enrichment. All their political pressure aimed to discourage us from following enrichment activities. Instead of our rights, we had to think merely of our responsibilities. Since Iran’s resistance and prolongation of the dispute thwarted their efforts, they cunningly tied the uranium reserves with Tehran’s research reactor fuel, which according to agreements, they are obliged to supply.
So you believe that Geneva was a turning point. Do you think the domestic protests to the agreements made by Geneva share the same grounds with your analysis?
Geneva talks were a defining moment in our nuclear course for sure. However, I think there is a larger context to the protests against Iran’s agreement with Five plus One. Our collective memory is something you should not ignore. When an Iranian citizen hears that our country has to transfer its uranium reserves to Russia, he remembers eleven tons of gold that Soviet Union owed to Iran as its war debt and refused to return despite Dr. Mosaddeq’s government dire need and West pressures after nationalization of the oil industry. An Iranian may also remember that in breach of the Algiers Treaty, United States froze Iran’s assets and refused to deliver military hardware spare parts Iran had purchased during the Pahlavi regime.
Regardless of all the propaganda or all the talks, when Iran negotiates with West, citizens start to think how it can be guaranteed that they regain their national uranium supply? The bitter experiences of past make us hesitate over the uranium exchange offer.
So the mistrust is much deeper than it is supposed.
Exactly. Our bitter experiences date back to a not-so-distant future. There is no difference between East and West, neighbor or stranger.
You give a considerable weight to our past experiences which have led to the present mistrust. Can you further instantiate it?
The failure of our lengthy negotiations with West, or the failure of agreements made a couple of years ago. Iran’s started constructive negotiations in 2007 under the supervision of Ali Larijani, which led to a modality plan. We had step-by-step progress but just as the problem appeared to be solved, the United States came up with fake claims about a military nuclear program followed by Iran and things went back to square one. West’s dual standards have made the mistrust deeper.
Back to Geneva negotiations, how do you, as a diplomat who once served as vice minsiter, analyze Iran’s moves?
I have no responsibility at the diplomatic apparatus at the moment and I have followed the proceedings through the media, just as you did. I believe that Iran wanted to exhibit its sense of responsibility by attending the Geneva talks, but the abnormal insistence of West to receive the entire supply of Iran’s enriched uranium stock worsened the mistrust. I believe that Iran wanted to provide a solid framework for the continuation of negotiations when it offered a proposal package before the talks.
Besides the nuclear talks, we observed the highest level of diplomatic encounter since the revolution between Iranian and American officials. As senior diplomats with a thirty-year record, how do you view this event?
As much as I’ve heard, and as Iranian chief negotiator Mr. Said Jalili recently explained, it was merely a diplomatic contact, not a negotiation. Diplomatic contacts are separate from diplomatic relations. Even when we cut off ties with a country, we are obliged to maintain consular affairs.
Is there an easy way to tackle this crisis? What is your proposal?
No. Despite the apparent simplicity of the issue, there is no easy way to solve it. I think we should find a middle solution to problem, a pilot scheme that in case of success could be followed and lead to a final formula for solution of the problem. The best example is Tehran’s research reactor. Everybody knows that fuel rods have no military application. Now Iran needs to convert its enriched uranium supply into fuel rods. For this, it has to enrich its uranium up to twenty percent. Iran claims that it has the capability to carry out the process by itself; Russia says that it possesses the technology; France has expressed readiness to convert the low-enriched uranium into fuel rods and West says that if this happens, there will be no more worries. The simplest formula that alleviates the concerns of every party involved is to conduct the conversion process via a multinational consortium and carry out the process inside Iran at a limited level which guarantees peaceful application, under IAEA’s supervision. One year of cooperation would suffice to see if the experience could extend to a higher level.
This scheme entirely complies with NPT regulations according to which advanced countries should provide other members with nuclear technology and material. I seriously recommend the government to start the high-enrichment process if the negotiations and bids fail to bear a fruit. We have applied domestic technology to produce fuel rods for Esfahan reactor. We could use the same technology to manufacture fuel rods for Tehran reactor which as everyone knows, pursues peaceful nuclear activities and produces radioisotopes with medical application. Tehran research reactor’s nuclear fuel should have been provided by other countries according to NPT regulations. The fuel rods have to be replaced in less than two years, so we have no more time to waste and we should set an ultimatum for the end of 2009.