Persian Gulf Security Doctrines
In the 1920s, when the economic and political structures of Middle East were about to be shaped, London and Paris took advantage of the Russian civil war and United States’ isolation to create new states in former territories of the Ottoman Empire. In fact, the new post-Ottoman order was in hands of Europe.
In the first seven decades of the 20th century, Britain brought the region under its security umbrella. By mandate rule, deploying and supporting military units in key regions and its navy force, Britain managed to create and support friendly states and even provoke competition between them in some certain spheres. However, the rising tide of Pan-Arabism and Britain’s economic go-down forced the Empire to pull out, first from the Gulf of Aden, then from the entire region and to relinquish the stage to other powers.
This provided an opportunity for the United States to gradually increase its influence in the Persian Gulf. The starting point was founding the Dhahran air base in Saudi Arabia in 1944 which was use by the Allied Forces in WWII.
In the post-Second World War days, to quell Joseph Stalin’s policies in the Persian Gulf, United States adopted various approaches including military aids to Turkey and Iran based on Truman doctrine, establishing strategic air bases in the region, dispatching a powerful navy force to the Mediterranean Sea and procuring regional defensive pacts.
In accord with these policies U.S. formed the Baghdad Treaty and later, based on Eisenhower’s doctrine, announced its preparedness to help countries against international communism. Both Baghdad Treaty and Eisenhower’s doctrine were a failure, since they deemed Arabs’ chief enemy to be the Soviet Union, not Israel. CENTO Treaty replaced Baghdad Treaty after Iraq’s withdrawal; however, it didn’t have any considerable military power.
Reliance on regional allies
Persian Gulf’s first security system after Britain left the region was based on Nixon’s doctrine, and it failed with the Iranian Islamic Revolution. In 1980s, Iraq caught United States’ attention. Iran’s containment was the top agenda during these years and the [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was founded to confront Iran’s threat. It was in fact an agent to safeguard West and America’s interests.
From 1979 to the end of the Cold War, Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan and their successors followed a policy of power balance to contain both Iran and Iraq through a war of attrition, immediate presence in the region and dual containment doctrine.
Based on Nixon’s doctrine announced in the Guam Island for the first time, major countries of the Third World had to take the initial step towards protecting West’s interests. Smaller allies entered imperialistic operations and within this context the concept “regional superpower” emerged.
From 1971, influenced by events such as the Vietnam War, Nixon’s policy used regional allies as its representatives to play an active role. Based on this strategy, providing security of the Persian Gulf region was conferred to Iran and Saudi Arabia, though Iran had a more significant role due to its powerful military force, high-level ties with U.S., moderate stance as to Israel and neighboring the Soviet Union. Iran had a very influential role in oppressing the Dhofar revolt in Oman and marginalizing Iraq’s Soviet-backed Baath regime. However, reliance on Iran and Saudi Arabia tied in United States’ opportunities with regimes whose legitimacy was doubted.
Lacking a strategic plan and having no fear from rise of radical regimes, Washington supported Iran and Saudi Arabia’s monarchies.
Hence, political reforms in these countries were ignored, while no strategy would have sufficient stability if it relies merely on power structures and disregards domestic situation of a country. We could say legitimacy is the basic condition to bring about stability and a new security system in Persian Gulf.
The Iranian Islamic Revolution, U.S. moves towards Iraq
United States’ initial security system in the Persian Gulf collapsed with the Islamic Revolution of Iran. In response, America moved towards Iraq to set equilibrium against the Islamic Republic. The superpower also asked GCC members to support the Iraqi army; however, due to their military weakness America had to increase its immediate presence in the region despite its primary projections.
After the Iranian revolution, the American presidents whose country was the chief power holding stake in the Persian Gulf adopted a harsh rhetoric against Iran: Iran was introduced as a threat against the region. Jimmy Carter, the then-president of United States remarked that no rival should take control of the region and any attack on the Persian Gulf was in fact attacking U.S. vital interests. Carter warned that this would be responded with military power. It was in accord with this policy that “Rapid Deployment Forces” were created to be dispatched to certain locations.
A new definition of security was promoted by Gorbachev and Reagan in the 1980s. In West, this new definition comprised economic and political legitimacy. In fact, decline of the traditional, realistic understanding of international relations and termination of the zero-sum concept in national security paved the way to enforcement of a collective security system.
Meanwhile, the power equilibrium in Persian Gulf was as shaky as before. None of the three central powers, i.e. Iran, Iraq and the [Persian] Gulf Cooperation Council tended to cooperate with each other. Even the GCC members acted against the other regional powers instead of creating a real collective security system. The United States had succeeded in establishing security in Europe, East Asia and Latin America through launching fundamental reforms instead of resorting to military forces; however, it fall short of a similar project in the Persian Gulf.
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait; the dual containment doctrine
With Iraq’s military attack on Kuwait, a new chapter of security relations opened in the Persian Gulf. Up to 1990, the United States had followed a British-model policy; that is a low-cost security system relied on its navy and regional allies. The country shifted its policy after liberating Kuwait and added to its military bases and presence. The cause, Iraq’s attack on Kuwait, was a starting point for the dual containment doctrine which was supposed to be applied on Iran and Iraq.
Dual containment was introduced for the first time in May 1993 by Martin Indyk, then the Executive Director of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, in an annual speech. With Indyk’s inclination towards Israel, it was pretty clear from the beginning that two key objectives of the doctrine would be Israel’s security and peace between Arabs and Israelis. Based on dual containment, Iran and Iraq were supposed to be put under attritional pressures through economic and arms sanctions. Indyk believed there was interdependence between western and eastern parts of the Middle East. So containing Iran and Iraq in east could increase U.S. power to advance the Arab-Israeli peace process and vice versa. This would help America’s friends to bring a better life for their nation according to Indyk.
The doctrine aimed to contain and ultimately isolate both countries. Iran’s opposition against the Arab-Israeli peace talks in the Madrid Conference, United States Israel-induced increasing hostility towards Iran and Iraqi missiles which hit Israel during war against Kuwait, all moved America to the dual containment policy in 1993.
However, Americans believed the policy is being applied merely to Iraq. In March 1995, what President Clinton claimed to be Iran’s terrorist activities which threatened peace and security, its support for international terrorism that threatened the Middle East peace process and alleged attempts to access WMDs became a basis to impose sanctions on Iran.
Dual containment didn’t bring success to U.S. plans. Experts believe U.S. allies’ wanting cooperation was the reason for this failure. The immediate impact of the doctrine was increasing presence of U.S. military forces in Arab countries of the region and excessive sale of American arms to these countries.
As a result of United States Persian Gulf-related strategies in 1990s, especially the immediate military presence such as in Saudi Arabia, and one-sided policy in Middle East peace process, a gap emerged between states of the region and America, in addition to spread of Islamic, anti-American hatred and radicalism, culminating in 9/11.
The current security system of Persian Gulf
Persian Gulf’s current security system devised by the United States is based on its preparedness to continue military presence in the region and prevent wars in which WMDs would be used. It can be said that U.S. tends to create and develop a pro-West stable security system in the Persian Gulf because of the impact oil and nuke proliferation have on its interests. Western countries, especially America, believe that Persian Gulf developments have become increasingly tied to trans-Atlantic security. Terrorists and WMDs move from Persian Gulf towards southeast Europe, and then inside the Continent and United States. So NATO’s mission is to fight against terrorism in the region. For NATO, the priority is trans-Atlantic security which is threatened by international terrorists whose center is in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.
Of course there are differences over means of fighting against terrorism, that’s why some NATO forces didn’t send troops to Iraq in 2003. However, all 26 members took part in training activities inside and outside Iraq. For example, Germans trained the Iraqi police and UAE Army in 2005. Apparently all Western countries believe that NATO: “In the longer run, NATO should assist the countries of the region in establishing new collective security mechanisms. Eventually, confidence-building efforts could lead to the development of new security structures in the Persian Gulf. These could not only include the countries of the GCC but could also embrace Iraq, Iran and Yemen” (NATO 2005 annual session).
However, there’s no agreement between Persian Gulf countries and West over establishing a “collective security” system. This was evident for example in Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait where there were differences between Saudi Arabia and the United States. The Saudis believed that Americans didn’t wish to continue war against Iraq after the country surrendered officially, since U.S. interests weren’t threatened at that time and the superpower hadn’t prioritized the interests and security of Persian Gulf Arab states.