Talk to Iran, It Works

AFTER President Obama and the president of Iran, Hassan Rouhani, talked on the phone in late September, those hoping for a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear standoff were excited that a breakthrough was imminent; meanwhile, some American allies expressed deep skepticism over a potential rapprochement with Iran.

Later this week, another round of talks will begin in Geneva. The window for achieving a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis is not open-ended. Both Mr. Obama and Mr. Rouhani face domestic pressures — from skeptical members of Congress and hard-liners in Tehran.

Although most Americans may be unaware of it, talks with Iran have succeeded before and they can succeed again.

Immediately after 9/11, while serving in the State Department, I sat down with Iranian diplomats to discuss the next steps in Afghanistan. Back then, we had a common enemy, the Taliban and its Al Qaeda associates, and both governments thought it was worth exploring whether we could cooperate.

The Iranians were constructive, pragmatic and focused — at one point they even produced an extremely valuable map showing the Taliban’s troop strength and positions just before American military action began.

They were also strong proponents of taking action in Afghanistan. Iranian-American agreement at the 2001 Bonn conference on Afghanistan was central to establishing the Afghan Interim Authority. After I was sent to reopen the United States Embassy in Kabul, we forged agreements with Iran on various security issues and coordinated approaches to reconstruction. And then, suddenly, it all came to an end when President George W. Bush gave his famous “axis of evil” speech in early 2002. Iran’s leaders concluded that despite their cooperation with the war effort, the United States remained implacably hostile.

Real cooperation effectively ceased after the speech, and the costs were immediate. At the time, we were in the process of negotiating the transfer of the notorious Afghan warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, from Iranian house arrest to Afghan custody and ultimately to American control. Instead, the Iranians facilitated his covert entry into Afghanistan, where he remains at large, launching attacks on coalition and Afghan targets.

We met again when I was ambassador to Iraq in 2007. The goal was to persuade Iran to cease supporting groups like Moktada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army, a Shiite militia that was targeting the Iraqi government and coalition forces. While the negotiations accomplished nothing, they may have convinced Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki that force was the only way to deal with the militias. He began a successful operation against them, with coalition support, in 2008.

The Afghan experience demonstrates that diplomatic progress between America and Iran is possible. It’s not guaranteed, but a solid diplomatic solution is always better than the alternatives.

Iran’s government is an adversary, but it is also a rational actor. And, like all governments, it is capable of being pragmatic and flexible when it is in its interest to be. There is a chance that America can replicate past successes if it applies four lessons from the 2001 talks.

First, negotiators must understand that serious progress is likely to come only in direct talks. The involvement of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany should continue, but the heavy lifting will have to be done by the two central actors.

Second, the substance of the talks must be closely held. Revealing the details too soon will give ammunition to those who oppose the talks and limit the flexibility of the negotiators.

Third, America should be ready to introduce other issues beyond the nuclear file. Progress in one area can build confidence and facilitate progress in others. I mentioned this in a discussion with Iranian leaders in New York last month, and they seemed receptive, mentioning Afghanistan and Syria as possibilities.

Finally, the United States must make clear that it does not seek to overthrow the Iranian government. Iranian paranoia on this issue is limitless, and understandably so. In 1953, the American and British intelligence services ousted a democratically elected Iranian prime minister, an episode that few Americans remember and no Iranian can forget.

The outlines of a deal are clear. Iran wants sanctions lifted and an end to its isolation, while the international community wants clear verification that Iran’s nuclear program will never be weaponized. The Iranian officials I met in New York argued that a nuclear weapon would actually degrade Iran’s security because it would spark a destabilizing cascade of proliferation in the region.

That is encouraging talk, but the Iranians will have to move first. There can be no question of easing American sanctions until Iran has demonstrated its seriousness in confining any nuclear program to peaceful purposes.